An Inquiry into the Making of Market Devices by Pallesen, Trine
Trine Pallesen
PhD Series 25.2013
PhD
 Series 25.2013
Assem
bling M
arkets for W
ind Pow
er  
copenhagen business school
handelshøjskolen
solbjerg plads 3
dk-2000 frederiksberg
danmark
www.cbs.dk
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:  978-87-92977-62-5
Online ISBN: 978-87-92977-63-2
Doctoral School of Organisation  
and Management Studies
Assembling Markets 
for Wind Power  
An Inquiry into the Making of Market Devices


AssemblingMarketsforWindPower
AnInquiryintotheMakingofMarketDevices



TrinePallesen


Supervisors:
Peter Karnøe (Aalborg University) 
Paul du Gay (Copenhagen Business School) 
Michel Callon (Mines ParisTech) 
Doctoral School of Organisation and Management Studies 
Copenhagen Business School 
Trine Pallesen
Assembling Markets for Wind Power  
An Inquiry into the Making of Market Devices
1st edition 2013
PhD Series 25.2013
© The Author 
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:  978-87-92977-62-5
Online ISBN: 978-87-92977-63-2
The Doctoral School of Organisation and Management Studies (OMS) is an  
interdisciplinary research environment at Copenhagen Business School for  
PhD students working on theoretical and empirical themes related to the  
organisation and management of private, public and voluntary organizations.
All rights reserved.
No parts of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
3Thesis submitted at Department of Organization, Copenhagen Business School, 
and Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation, Mines ParisTech, 15th of April 2013 
4
5ON VALUATION & LOCATION
BILL: I know this is a ridiculous question before I ask it, but you haven't by any chance kept 
up with your swordplay?
BUDD: Hell, I pawned that years ago.
BILL: You hawked a Hattori Hanzo sword!?!?
BUDD: Yep.
BILL: It was priceless.
BUDD: Well, not in El Paso it ain't. In El Paso I got me 250 dollars for it.
(QUENTIN TARANTINO: KILL BILL VOL. 2, 2004)
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1.INTRODUCTION
1.1InsightsFromtheConceptionofanEconomicGood
On a windy day in October 1975, the Danish carpenter Christian Riisager decided to 
reconfigure the range of his 15 kW wind turbine, which he had constructed in the backyard of 
his home in central Jutland a few years earlier. With the oil crisis of 1973 in mind, he decided 
to further develop his life-long interest in natural energies and test his turbine on the public 
electrical grid. He was thinking that if the electricity produced from his wind turbine could be 
integrated into the energy system through the grid, wind could potentially help ensure national 
electricity supply and decrease his own, and eventually the national, dependence on fossil 
fuels (Jersild 2000; Jensen 2003). 
Rather than asking for permission at the local utility, Riisager went on to test his turbine, an in 
vivo and illegal experiment; he plugged in the wind turbine to the electrical grid through the 
outlet of the family’s washing machine. He then went on to observe the effects of this 
somewhat uncontrolled experiment. For four days, Riisager left his turbine connected to the 
grid, all the while checking his household’s installations for malfunctions as well as visiting 
the neighbours to ask whether their installations worked as usual. The Riisager family varied 
their electricity consumption in order to test whether fluctuations affected the integration of 
the wind turbine into the electrical system. However, the connection seemed to remain 
undetected by everyone, including the local utility; and not least important, the family’s 
electrical meter ran backwards (Karnøe 2012; Jersild 2000).
After four days of producing electricity and sending it into the grid, Riisager disconnected the 
turbine and went to visit the local utility, called Herning Elværk, to ask whether any 
disturbances had occurred during the past few days. As Riisager expected, no disturbance had 
been noticed at the utility, and the director, Mr. Lund, was quite interested in not only hearing 
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about Riisager’s story, but also in continuing the connection. However, to legalize the 
connection between the wind turbine and the grid, permission by the national council of 
electricity (Elektricitetsrådet) was required – something that would become far more difficult 
to obtain than the two men expected, not to mention the arrangement of the physical 
connection to the grid itself. The national council of electricity was reluctant to expose the 
grid to experiments with an untested technology. The story has it that without an article 
wrongly reporting the legalization of the connection, the permit would not have been given 
(Jersild 2000; Jensen 2003). But eventually, in 1976, the permit was granted, and the 
Riisagers could, as the first since the construction of the famous Gedsermølle1 in 1957, legally 
produce wind power and lead it into the electrical grid.  
This story of an early meeting between the wind turbine technology and electrical grid 
infrastructure has passed quite unnoticed in general, and Riisager has become better known 
for his wind turbine design than his experiments with combining turbine and grid 
infrastructure. However, considering this story about Riisager’s turbine-to-grid experiment, 
two opposing insights may be taken from the experiments. On one hand, the experiment did 
not make wind power an economic good. With the experiment, Riisager performed a 
connection to a central part of a technical ‘infrastructure’ that allowed electricity to circulate 
between producers and consumers, but no economic compensation to the producer was 
determined, and in public the exchange value of wind power remained a highly debated and 
unsettled subject in the years that followed. On the other hand, the experiment was an 
important first step in the process of wind power becoming an economic good. While Riisager 
probably thought of his experiment as purely technical, a matter of tension in the lines, he 
proved the feasibility of the connection between turbine and grid. This physical connection 
allowed wind power to travel to consumers (not involved in its production), and it was 
eventually a first step towards the economization of wind power.   
1 Gedsermøllen, designed by Johannes Juul, was at the time of its erection the world’s biggest windmill. It is 
often referred to as the ‘mother’ of modern wind turbine design: a three-bladed, horizontal-axis, upwind, stall-
regulated turbine.  
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1.2ConnectingtoaField
The idea of connecting the turbines to the grid became a central point for starting the 
fieldwork of this thesis. During my fieldwork, the connection between turbines and grid kept 
surfacing as a crucial moment in wind power projects. On my first fieldtrip in France, on the 
highway from Paris to Orleans, the landscape was highly ‘decorated’ with turbines, and 
during an interview with a developer, I asked about these turbines, and he stressed the 
possibilities of getting connected to the grid as one of two major factors for choosing a 
location for a project: 
“As a wind site, it [North of Orleans] is actually horrible! There is not much wind. But the 
area is so far from beautiful, even ugly, and therefore no one objects to the construction of the 
turbines. And finally, the existing electricity lines between Orleans and Paris facilitate the 
connection, and that is why you see so many turbines in the area” (Int. Lefebvre, my 
translation). 
Today, many developers of wind power projects experience that getting a wind turbine 
connected to the grid, and doing so legally, is a process much unlike the experiment made by 
Riisager. The negotiations between developer and grid operator may take years and often 
constitute between 10% and 15% of a project’s overall costs of constructing a wind park2. The 
different modalities of this connection have been organizing the work leading to this thesis. I 
build on fieldwork in France, and common for all the sites that I have visited and investigated 
is that they appear as being ‘behind the grid’, i.e., places, negotiations, and arrangements that 
enable and organise the eventual connection between the turbines and the electrical system. 
Among these sites are municipalities in the French countryside, the French Parliament, 
Transmission System Operators, Energy Agencies in both France and Denmark, and 
industrial associations, etc. All of these sites have been part of the making or exploration of 
devices that arrange the connection in some way, and thus they become examples of some of 
the work that goes into the making of an economic good. They have dealt with, and some are 
still dealing with, what turns wind power into an economic good, and, how different modes of 
connections advance the process. This thesis explores a part of the void in the making of a 
2 Developers and grid operators formulated these project estimates during interviews. Furthermore, the finished 
contracts between developers and grid operators have become an object of exchange in itself, and in some 
French regions, half of the projects with signed contracts with EDF are sold. Thus, the possibility of getting 
access to the grid to undertake the connection has become a valuable right in itself. 
18
market for wind power: It analyses essential parts of the process in moving from the technical 
connection to a connected economic good. 
1.3‘Free’and‘Regulated’Markets
The agenda mobilized by Riisager as a backdrop for his backyard experiments was the oil 
crisis of the 1970s, and his grid-connected windmill was a proposed translation of the 
‘security of energy supply’ theme. Today, proponents of wind power are generally enrolling 
climate change and global warming, in particular, as the backdrop of their arguments for the 
increase of wind power in the energy system. But if wind power is accepted as one potential 
part of the solution to global warming, the question remains: How do we organise this 
solution, and more precisely, are markets to play a role in this solution?  
This question is not left unaddressed by economists; e.g., Nicholas Stern’s report (2006) 
stressed global warming as the biggest market failure of the 20th century, i.e., CO2-emissions 
being left out of the market calculus. Nonetheless, the debate continues with regard to the 
relation between the market, in a general sense, and the natural environment (e.g., Reijonen 
and Tryggestad 2012). As a rough caricature, proponents of free-market environmentalism 
insist that efficient markets will emerge if market mechanisms are allowed to work freely. In 
their view, climate problems arise because markets are ‘infected’ by politics/laws. Eco-
socialists, on the other hand, argue just the opposite; markets (and capitalism at large) are the 
root of environmental problems and should not be trusted as a means of solving these 
problems. Disagreement about the role to be played by the market in solving climate change 
is also found at the political stage; Vaclav Klavs, president of the Czech Republic, proposed 
that we put our trust in the market to solve global warming (see Callon 2009). This 
disagreement may be summed up as a choice of more market – or less market – to encounter 
the challenges of global warming. 
Not surprisingly, the organisation of wind power in Western capitalist societies is moulded on 
the market model, but a rather specific ‘market model’, and not the generic ‘all-fits-one’ 
market figure found in neo-classical economic theory. This model is sometimes referred to as 
a ‘political market’: 
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“An important recurrent theme in [the] literature has been the notion of ‘political markets’, 
namely the understanding that the insertion of renewable generation technologies within 
conventional markets is premised on political will, articulated through public policies”
(Szarka 2007: 322).
The introduction of these public policies is grounded in economic theory itself, and closely 
related to the concept of ‘externality’ and ‘public good’. Because of the non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous characteristics of public goods, such as the environment/climate, economic 
theory argues that private actors are unlikely to be prepared to invest in their maintenance, 
because it is something which everyone can acquire free of charge. This dilemma is elsewhere 
referred to as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). This malfunctioning of the 
economic system, it is stressed, is central to the creation of environmental problems: “…there
are features in our economic system that act as systematic inducement to environmental 
abuse” (Baumol and Oates 1979: 71). 
In other words, market failures are said to emerge because the costs of production are 
transferred to the collective, and the related markets are often deemed justified cases for state 
intervention and the ‘text-book’ approach to the distribution of responsibilities. The provision 
of private goods is assigned to the market, whereas the state is assigned the provision of 
public goods, such as climate stability or security of supply.    
Proponents of different versions of ‘political markets’ therefore place themselves in between 
the position of the free-market environmentalists and the eco-socialists; in this middle range, 
the discussions stress the efficiency of different markets and thus builds on a recognition of 
the diversity of different markets as well as their ability to account for the specific 
environmental concerns they spur (Reijonen and Tryggestad 2012). From the viewpoint of 
economic theory, what is deemed ‘political’ in the so-called political markets is therefore less 
the introduction of public policies – they may be accounted for by economic theory itself as a 
way of correcting market failures – but rather the move from isolating the problem towards its 
resolution. For example, in the case of wind power, it may be asked: Is wind power a (partial) 
solution to global warming?  
The link between global warming and wind power is not naturally given, rather it may be seen 
as a translation – and questioning the link also means questioning the reasons for articulating 
public policies in favour of wind power. Thus, it seems that when economics prescribe the 
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introduction of public policies, it is assuming that they are responses to well-defined 
problems, which may, in turn, be causally linked to the solutions, i.e., the policies.  
Once established as a solution to the problem (e.g., wind power to global warming), the 
question then becomes what policies to introduce, or more precisely, how to design the 
market. In the case of wind power markets, one such example is the discussion of whether to 
design feed-in tariffs or certificate models to support the inclusion of wind power in the 
electricity systems, a discussion that has come up in a number of European countries (see 
Gipe 2006; Finon and Menanteau 2003; Finon 2006). This discussion has roughly been 
summed up in the table below as a description of the most common renewable energy 
governance models employed to sustain wind power projects. Frede Hvelplund (2001a and 
2001b), a Danish energy economist, studied the discussion according to the guiding question: 
Does the governance system qualify as a market model? 
Figure1.1:GovernanceModels
                 (Hvelplund 2001a: 22) 
Hvelplund’s summary was a contribution to the debate between ‘the most market-like’ 
subvention system (the certificate system) on the one hand, and the system which has proven 
efficient in furthering wind power development (the feed-in tariff) on the other hand3.
Hvelplund's contribution pointed out two interesting aspects of the discussion: First, he 
maintains the divide between the political and the economic model; second, his conclusion 
that both systems are mixtures of the political and the market also seems to carry an indirect 
defence of the existence of the pure form of the market, at least as an abstract figure. As he 
acknowledges that both the feed-in tariff system as well as the certificate system configure 
3 Hvelplund’s conclusion, however, is that both models are partly political and partly market; thus neither system 
should be qualified as more ‘market-like’ than the other, according to Hvelplund (Hvelplund 2001a and 2006).  
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elements of the ‘market’ and elements of the ‘political’, he keeps the idea of the free-market4
alive. 
Whether it is free-market environmentalism, eco-socialists, notions such as public goods, or 
political markets, they all emphasize a clear a priori distinction between the political and the 
economic, or more precisely that which is related to the market sphere. Often, the 
combination of these spheres is treated as a pollution of the ‘pure’ economic market, which is 
assumed to be an existing reality by, the political, i.e., the value-laden. Here, the political 
sphere and the market sphere (pertaining to the economic system) are two distinct systems 
that may be combined in different configurations, but they remain nonetheless distinct 
domains. To be able to make such a clear-cut distinction between the market (and economics 
at large) on the one hand, and the political on the other hand, reflects an underlying view of 
the market as a rather abstract structure with inherent properties. Whether one is a believer of 
eco-socialism or free-market environmentalism, or somewhere in between, the so-called free 
market exists as an abstract structure, living in and by itself; either as a panacea or as an evil. 
The approach to be taken here, however, suspects this distinction between different domains 
to be unproductive. Rather than taking established differences as a starting point, the ambition 
is to follow a process through which such distinctions may become part of the negotiations of 
market design. 
1.4ReconfiguringtheMarketFigure–andMarketsintheMaking
The potent figure of the ‘free’ market discussed above is the figure of economic theory, but it 
is also a figure that is dominant in everyday life, a reality we all engage with on a daily basis. 
This market figure is best described as an abstract structure that organizes scarce resources 
through the mechanisms of supply and demand. However, economics, as a science, has over 
the last few decades been increasingly criticized for not investigating this ‘vessel of growth’ 
of capitalist societies, i.e., the market (e.g., North 1977; Callon 1998; Aspers 2011). Rather 
than attempting to explain the market, this structure is treated as ‘natural’; in other words, the 
market may serve as explanan but rarely explanandum.  
4 This is not to say that Hvelplund speaks in favour of a free market structure, quite the opposite is the case.  
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Over the last few decades, the new economic sociology as a growing field has challenged this 
‘negligence’, and new approaches to the study of economic action and markets as one form of 
organization have emerged, stressing the relation to (or embeddedness in) society. The present 
thesis draws on what we may call ‘constructivist market studies’, a perspective which 
emphasizes markets as heterogeneous assemblages that are temporarily stabilized. With this 
perspective, the production of the market is brought to the centre of the analysis as the 
outcome of a long range of negotiations and struggles, aligning a range of diverse interest and 
concerns5. Instead of seeing the market as a natural structure already out there, this approach 
stresses markets as a configuration emerging from (or being the effect of) a range of 
heterogeneous actors and their networks (Callon 1998). In this view, markets, agents, 
calculative abilities, and commodities do not exist in a natural state. Rather, all these elements 
must be assembled into a distinct form of calculative agency.  
This points us to an important difference between economics and constructivist market 
studies; there is not one single market structure, but rather an infinite number of different 
markets constituted through their unique socio-technical arrangements, and to get a grasp of 
these markets, they must be studied in the making. Whereas most economic sociologists may 
acknowledge this, proponents of constructivist market studies retain an openness towards the 
potential constituents of the market; by defining markets as socio-technical assemblages (e.g., 
Caliskan and Callon 2010), the specificity (and heterogeneity) of a given market may be 
captured.
From the perspective of constructivist market studies, the efficiency of markets with regard to 
the concerns they encapsulate in the market calculus depend on the socio-technical 
arrangements from which they are made (Callon 2009). This approach transcends the debates 
between eco-socialism and free-market environmentalists as well as the market/politics 
divide; there is not only one market configuration out there capable of it all – or nothing (!) 
Rather, Callon proposes the notion of ‘civilizing markets’, as markets that continuously 
partake in the articulation of the problems they touch as well as their solutions. These markets 
are markets that respond to a multitude of questions, accepting and inviting a variety of actors 
5 Among these interests and concerns are that of the economists; the economist does not describe a reality, i.e., 
the economy, he contributes to its (re)production. Hvelplund's contribution discussed above is not a simple 
description, but may eventually become a performative act that itself participates in the construction and design 
of wind power markets. 
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who articulate these questions to join and eventually help transform these questions into 
‘possibly solvable problems’ (Blok 2011).      
These ‘civilizing markets’ seem to extend their range of possible constituents into new 
domains. Meanwhile, rather than labelling these markets as ‘political markets’, referring to an 
arrangement between distinct domains, these distinctions are made the effects of markets:  
“The distribution of the political and the economic is not anterior to the market; it is the 
outcome of the functioning of markets, of which it is a by-product, in a sense” (Callon 2009:  
542).
To describe something as a ‘political market’, that is, as made up of building blocks 
pertaining to different and distinct domains and reigned by different ‘regimes’ or ‘logics’, 
disables us from capturing the negotiations unfolding in the making of markets as well as the 
heterogeneity of the constituents. In other words, we miss the specificity of a given market. 
Instead, in the present study, I adopt the notions of politicization and economization as ways 
of describing processes of opening up to debate and contestation (politicization) or ways of 
making things calculable and subject to measurement (economization)6. This allows us to 
grasp how markets in the making create and resolve issues; issues that may in turn be labelled 
political or economical. 
The premise of the heterogeneous architecture of markets allows for an in-depth analysis of 
the devices, material and textual, contributing to the marketization of wind power. From this 
point of view, the devices followed below contribute to the making of the market, or the 
marketization, of wind power: “Being economic is not a qualification that comes from outside 
the agencement, this qualification is included in the agencement” (Muniesa et al. 2007: 4). 
And as such, the analysis will stress the ways in which wind power is qualified, and/or 
disqualified, as an economic good.  
The research question must be seen in this light: I do not set out to conclude for or against 
markets as a means of organising renewable energy, but rather, the project follows the making 
of the market for wind power through a set of devices that eventually frames the modality of 
being economic – and in doing so, excluding other actions and considerations from that which 
is ‘economic’.  
6 For a more elaborate discussion of politicization and economization, see Chapter 2.  
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1.5 Wind Power Markets: Making Assemblages and a Research
Question
As explained above, the connection between turbines and the grid is no longer a simple and 
straightforward affair. Rather, it is a tedious and costly business, sometimes taking years to 
settle between developer, grid operator as well as local communities. In the present thesis, this 
connection serves as an entry point to the assemblage work of market-making; the minimal 
ontology underlying the approach allows for devices to emerge as crucial to the marketization 
of wind power, and consequently as objects for research. Approaching the process of 
marketization openly, without a pre-fabricated list of possible constituents, allows an image of 
market configurations that “combine devices that we previously attributed either to the 
economy or to expression and political action” (Callon 2009: 543). 
In order to study marketization, I have chosen to follow two specific devices: One is the 
formulation of the feed-in tariff. When the wind power developer wishes to connect their 
turbines, it is to obtain a specific price – and this price is determined in the tariff. Following 
the formulation of the tariff is the study of a process of valuation; how the value of wind 
power is determined as well as who calculates – and who does not calculate. The other is the 
connection of wind turbines. Wind turbines must be connected in a specific place, a location; 
something that is being orchestrated, in France, through a device called the ZDE (‘Zone de 
developpement d’eolien’). The ZDE is a device that divides the region into one or more zones 
suitable for wind power development. Furthermore, being located inside a ZDE has become a 
prerequisite for accessing the tariff. 
These devices frame connections to a price as well as a specific location, including landscape 
and grid, but the devices are also part of the assemblage that eventually takes a part in the 
marketization of wind power.  
Research Question: 
How do the two devices, i.e., the feed-in tariff and the ZDE, affect the marketization of wind 
power? And how are processes of politicization and economization framing the two devices? 
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1.6TheDevicesatStake
The overall argument of this thesis is that the assemblage of these devices is at the heart of the 
marketization of wind power. And to attempt to grasp the marketization, the two devices are 
unpacked; it is in their making, and in their framing, that the boundaries between the political 
and the economic are drawn. Rather than seeing the devices as having inherent properties, 
e.g., the feed-in tariff being an economic tool, and the ZDE a planning tool, what is traced is 
the effects of the devices as they unfold.
1.6.1FeedinTariffs
The feed-in tariff as a device is designed to accelerate investments in renewable energy 
technologies. This is achieved through long-term contracts (for on-shore wind power, it is 
often 15 years) at a set price or as a fixed premium added to the market price (Couture et al. 
2010). The design of the feed-in tariff may take different forms, but they generally entail a 
guaranteed access to the grid (ibid.). The price is often fixed at a degression rate, i.e., the price 
decreases over the time of the contract to create incentives for technological cost reductions 
(Edenhofer et al. 2012). Furthermore, differentiations in tariff-levels are often made according 
to the type of technology (wind power, solar power, hydro power), capacity/size of 
installations, resource quality, location, etc. (Couture et al. 2010).
First designed in the US in 1978, the feed-in tariff has spread to a range of countries; the first 
country in Europe to adopt the feed-in tariff was Germany in 1990 (The Electricity Feed-in 
Law, or Stromeinspeisungsgesetz), followed by Switzerland (1991), Italy (1992) and 
Denmark (1993) (Mendonça 2007).   The most common alternatives to the feed-in tariff are, 
as mentioned briefly above, call to tender systems and quota-obligations, generally 
categorized as quantity-based instruments (e.g., Edenhofer et al. 2012).  
The French feed-in tariff is designed as a purchase obligation, meaning that EDF is obliged to 
buy the electricity produced from the wind turbines. The feed-in tariff was first adopted in 
France in 2001, replacing the Eole 2005 tendering scheme, and has so far remained the 
dominant governance model for wind power in France. 
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1.6.2WindPowerDevelopmentZones(ZDE)
The wind power development zones were an integrated part of the French law on energy 
policies, POPE (Programme fixant les Orientations de la Politique Énergétique), adopted in 
2005. The period between July 2005 and 14 July 2007 was made a transition phase during 
which developers could choose under which legislative framework to operate; however, from 
14 July 2007, the development zones became an obligatory framing for wind power 
developers in France if they were to access the price fixed in the tariff. The development 
zones are argued to be an important, or even necessary, step towards the further development 
of the wind power industry in France. Firstly, with the development zones, the local resistance 
is officially defined as a serious obstacle to the further development of wind power; and 
secondly, the local communities are engaged in the planning process, which is expected to 
increase local acceptance and sustain an untroubled development process in the future 
(Ministère de l’Economie et al. 2006). The design of the zones is made based on the following 
criteria:
 The wind potential of the zone. 
 The possibilities of connecting the turbines to the electrical grid. 
 Respect of the landscape, historical monuments, and protected sites.
In contrast to the feed-in tariff, the ZDE was designed and developed by French bureaucrats 
in the months predating its adoption by parliament. As such, the ZDE was experimental and 
the outcome of its introduction not entirely foreseeable.   
1.6.3TheStatusoftheDevices
The devices, i.e., the feed-in tariff and the ZDE, serve as entry points to the analysis of 
marketization of wind power. As such, these devices are central to the organization of wind 
power as a good, all the while organizing the connection of wind turbines to the existing 
electrical system. As already indicated, this connection entails a technical dimension in which 
lines, loads, and frequencies are at stake in the meeting between the grid, itself a large and 
complex assemblage (Karnøe 2012; Hughes 1983; Bouneau et al. 2007; Bennet 2005), and 
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the turbines. Furthermore, the connection to the grid is also a connection to an economic 
assemblage with a well-defined distribution of roles and a distinct way of organizing the 
meeting between supply and demand. However, the notion of ‘connection to’ may allure to an 
idea of plugging into something, e.g., an already existing and stable system, in this case the 
grid, a price, or a landscape/territory. With assemblage, no assumptions are made about these 
existing and stable systems; they are not assumed to remain untouched structures to which 
one simply connects. Rather, with the notion of assemblage, the idea of a socio-material 
network with a changing ‘morphology’ is adopted, and the connection of devices may, and is 
likely to, produce politicizations and economizations of the overall assemblage. In other 
words, whereas the two devices are only elements of the socio-technical assemblage, their 
design addresses dimensions of the larger assemblage that they are made a part of.    
1.7BriefDescriptionoftheFrenchElectricitySector
Electricity in France seems to have become almost identical to nuclear power. This was true 
for the interviews I conducted in Denmark before leaving for France, where I was constantly 
met by quotes such as “well, France is all about nuclear power” (e.g., Int. Moesgaard, my 
translation). Gabrielle Hecht, in the afterword to her now classic work, “The Radiance of 
France”, portrays sequences of the only televised debate between Nicolas Sarkozy and 
Ségolène Royal, the two presidential candidates. Sarkozy asked Royal whether: 
“…she would continue to support nuclear power if elected. She replied with her own 
question: did he know what proportion of French electricity came from nuclear power? Yes, 
he answered: around 50 percent. No, she retorted, it was 17 percent. Wrong he shot back. 
Right, she insisted. He changed tack: would she confirm the recent decision to build an EPR 
(European Pressurized Reactor)? No, she said, she would suspend the EPR as soon as she 
took office. You would suspend new nuclear plants and prolong the life of old ones? He asked 
derisively. The EPR isn’t a plant, she answered; it’s a prototype. Did he even know what 
generation of nuclear technology it represented? It’s a fourth generation reactor, he replied, 
and it’s not a prototype. Wrong again, she snapped, it’s a third generation reactor, and it is a 
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prototype. Fourth. No, third. You don’t know your facts. No you don’t know yours” (debate 
referred in Hecht 2009: 341). 
So, what can we make of this? Well, the fact that nuclear power became an important issue in 
the only televised debate between the presidential candidates may underscore the importance 
this technology has been, and still is, granted in France. This is stressed by the battle on 
knowledge of technology that the two candidates engaged in, and to some extent, were 
expected to excel in (and their gaffes were somewhat puzzling, says Hecht 2009).  
Eventually, none of them were entirely right, nor entirely wrong; France gets approximately 
75% of its electricity from a nuclear reactor fleet of 58 pressurised water reactors (OEDC 
2010). The approximation of 75% has not changed much over the last years, so even though 
the fieldwork of this dissertation dates back to 2007 and 2008, and many of the numbers and 
targets used to describe the energy system referred to throughout this study will appear out-
dated, the role and importance ascribed to nuclear power has remained stable.  
Apart from the 75% nuclear power, France generates the second highest share of renewable 
electricity in Europe from large hydropower projects established in the post-war years (Szarka 
2007a). The profile of French electricity generation is illustrated in Table 1.2 below: 
Table1.1:FrenchElectricityGeneration
TWh  Variation 2010/2009 (%) 
Net generation 
550.33 +6.0 
Nuclear
407,9 +4.6% 
Fossil Fuels 
Coal 
Fuel-oil 
Gas
59.4
19.1 
7.9 
30.0
+8.3%
-7.6% 
+2.7% 
+24.7%
Hydro-electric
68.0 +9.9% 
Wind
9.6 +22.2% 
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Photovoltaic
0.6 +281.6% 
Other renewable  
(mainly biomass) 
4.8
+11.1%
                         (RTE 2011: 14) 
Often described as a latecomer to wind power development (e.g., Szarka 2007a; Jobert et al. 
2007), France adopted a tender scheme named Eole 2005, as mentioned above, in 1996. The 
targeted outcome of Eole 2005 was set at 250-500 MW but had only disappointing results. In 
2000, the Electricity Act established a new policy framework for wind power with the 
adoption of the feed-in tariff, to be discussed in depth in Chapter 4. The development of wind 
power installations following from this new Electricity Act is illustrated in Table 1.2: 
Table1.2:WindPowerProductionDevelopment
Year Annual installation
(MW)
Accumulated production 
(MW)
Energy produced 
(GWh)
2000
40 61 70 
2001
31 92 131 
2002
52 144 245 
2003
100 244 363 
2004
146 390 577 
2005
367
757
963
2006
810 1567 2169 
2007
928 2496 4140 
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2008
1081 3577  5653 
2009
1136 4713 7800 
2010
1253 5966 9600 
2011 825
6792 11900 
                   (Syndicat des Energies Renouvelables 2012: 2, my translation) 
In 2009, under now former president Sarkozy, France adopted a 23% renewable energy target 
for 2020 (of total electricity consumption) following the EU Energy-Climate Package of 2008 
(OECD 2010). Of this target, wind power is supposed to deliver 25 GW or 10% of the 
electricity consumption.  
In the fall of 2012, France got a new President, Francois Hollande. Already under his 
presidential campaign, Hollande announced his ambition of cutting nuclear power generation 
from 75% to 50% of electricity consumption by 2025 (Figaro 2012) and increase investments 
in renewable energy technologies. However, wind power appears to find itself in limbo at 
present; recently, the French anti-wind power association, Wind of Anger (Vent de Colère),
has legally contested the French feed-in tariff for being undeclared state aid. The case has 
been brought to the European Union’s Court of Justice, where it is awaiting decision (Journal 
de l’environnement 2012; Spiegel 2013).    
1.8OutlineoftheThesis
Apart from this introductory chapter, this dissertation consists of the following elements: 
The following chapter (Chapter 2) outlines the theoretical framework, which I draw upon 
throughout this thesis. In many ways, the outline is not intended as a genealogy of this thesis 
but introduces certain discussions from new economic sociology, broadly defined, to 
eventually elaborate on the strand of research often referred to as constructivist market 
studies, or the marketization program, that underpin the study. The chapter introduces the 
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underlying approach to studying markets as socio-technical assemblages, and some of the 
main concepts of the marketization program are elaborated on.   
Chapter 3 presents the methodological reflections concerning the framing of the objects to be 
followed throughout this thesis, and not least their distribution over time and place. It 
discusses why this distinct approach to studying markets is seen as the most fertile as well as 
the consequences of choosing this particular framework. Finally, the chapter presents the 
process of doing fieldwork and acquiring empirical data underlying the two analyses of this 
thesis.
Chapter 4 presents a study of the feed-in tariff, and as such, the making of a price for wind 
power. It does so by introducing new theoretical contributions to valuation in order to frame 
the discussion of the plurality values and the controversies unfolding around them. Singling 
out five different contributions to the making of a price for wind power, the study follows the 
qualification of wind power as well as the folding and unfolding of value and values. During 
the negotiations of the price, the device itself becomes central to producing issues of concern, 
among which the landscape becomes one concern and leads to the development of the ZDE, 
which is discussed in the following chapter.  
Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the ZDE-device, i.e., the device for defining wind power 
development zones in the CdC du Pays de la Serre7. In doing so, the dynamics of the device 
are considered the outcome of two phases: its conception and its practice. Organized around 
these two phases, the chapter presents the device as politicization, a deliberate attempt at 
problematizing the association between the landscape and the turbines, as well as creating 
forums in which the local population may be involved in accepting wind power projects on 
their territory. Eventually, the practice of the engineers undertaking the process works in quite 
another direction, and the outcome is better described as an economized landscape, black-
boxing the criteria from which the zones are created.  
Chapter 6 returns in more detail to the conceptual architecture outlined in the research 
question, namely marketization, market devices, and politicization and economization. The 
chapter addresses the ways in which the studies of the two devices contribute to the 
marketization program as well as the explanatory power derived from these concepts. This is 
7 CdC is an abbreviation of Communauté de Communes, an  inter-communal cooperation. 
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done partly by reflecting on the role of the device as analytical entry points – the cornerstone 
of the approach adopted here – and finally by discussing these devices as being both 
prosthetic and habilitation, and how this may be related to underlying processes of 
politicization and economization.  
Finally, Chapter 7 draws out the findings of the studies and points to the more specific 
contributions of this thesis.
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2.THEORETICALFRAMEWORK
This chapter introduces the underlying theoretical framework of this thesis. Taking an interest 
in the marketization of wind power, the chapter starts with a brief introduction to the new 
economic sociology, and the different ways in which markets have been approached, 
analytically, within this field. This chapter does not provide a genealogy of economic 
sociology per se, but stresses specific elements central to the development of the perspective 
on which this thesis builds. Next, the framework mobilized in this thesis is introduced, what 
we may call constructivist market studies. In doing so, this chapter follows the movement 
from the opposition towards the singular, universal market structure of economic theory to the 
different versions of markets found in economic sociology, and in particular, the depiction of 
‘market as politics’ proposed by Neil Fligstein, to eventually present the notion of 
marketization, found in constructivist market studies.   
With this presentation of a general framework for studying marketization, the chapter stresses 
the research agendas this thesis wishes to connect to, as well as its heritage (i.e., science and 
technology studies and actor-network theory). In particular, it emphasises the notion of 
devices, and more narrowly market devices as well as the processes of 
politicization/economization, as these are central to the research question. Finally, it briefly 
discusses the notion of ‘civilizing markets’, a description used in relation to carbon markets 
(Callon 2009; McKenzie 2009), but also a concept that may eventually become useful for the 
discussion on the marketization of wind power.   
This chapter operates at a general and introductory level. More concrete and thorough 
elaborations of the theories will be unfolded and discussed during the analytical chapters.
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2.1NewEconomicSociologyanditsMarket(s)
As already mentioned in the opening chapter, proponents of the new economic sociology have 
framed their work as a critique of economic theory, stressing the shortcomings and the lack of 
ability or will of economists to understand or engage with certain phenomena of economic 
life. This critique may be formulated as: The economists get it all wrong because their theory 
of society is simplistic and reduced to a theory of rational action. In general, one could say 
that what these contributions share is the mobilization of a certain ‘theory of society’ to frame 
their approach to markets, or economic behaviour more generally (Fourcade 2007: 1025). As 
such, the underlying claim of new economic sociology is that because of the reductionism of 
economic theory, economists are unable to provide an adequate description of a phenomenon 
such as the market. Moreover, it is not only new economic sociologists who have remarked 
on this shortcoming; economists such as Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson have brought 
attention to this flaw within economics. Coase stressed that “in modern economic theory the 
market itself has an even more shadowy role than the firm” (Coase 1988: 7), and Williamson 
pointed to a similar observation when he, in his seminal work on ‘Markets and Hierarchies’, 
stated “[i]n the beginning there were markets” (Williamson 1975: 20). This section describes 
some of the attempts at filling this void, articulated by representatives of the new economic 
sociology.
2.1.1TheEmbeddednessofEconomicAction
The new economic sociology, it is claimed, was born with Mark Granovetter’s seminal article 
from 1985, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness (Swedberg 
1994 and 1997). In many ways, Granovetter’s contribution elaborated Karl Polanyi’s ideas of 
‘embeddedness’ (Polanyi 1944). Polanyi, who introduced the notion of embeddedness, used it 
to describe the economy as immersed in social relations. Consequently, it (the economy) 
should not, and cannot, be separated from, or be made an autonomous sphere vis-à-vis society 
as a whole (Polanyi 1944; Block 2001; Machado 2011): 
“One can state the issue succinctly. The kinship, status, hierarchy and political or religious 
affiliations which underlie these economic structures are not explicable in terms of 
economizing behaviour – one can only understand then and therefore the functioning of the 
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economy – by in ‘depth’ studies which are social, cultural, and psychological in origin”
(North 1977: 708).
Granovetter, who would later become equally associated with the notion of embeddedness, 
stressed a somewhat different level of analysis, as his version of this idea has to do with the 
effects of interpersonal relations on economic outcomes (Granovetter 1985). Granovetter’s 
contribution has been fundamental to the new economic sociology, as it (re)connects, or 
anchors, economic action in the social – and thus makes the case for a sociological approach 
to economic phenomena (Swedberg 1994).  
Contributions from the last few decades8, following Granovetter’s article from 19859, have 
generally dealt with the interfaces between sociology and economics and have attempted to 
bring sociology back into economics, or rather to reposition sociology as a key to the analysis 
and understanding of economic life. However, it is primarily the direct critique addressed at 
the economists for not acknowledging economic action as embedded in the social that, 
according to Granovetter himself, is a demarcation between the new economic sociology and 
the ‘old’ economic sociology, and thus one key characteristic of the new economic 
sociology10:
“In general, one of the main differences between the new and the old economic sociology has 
been precisely that it does not hesitate to attack neoclassical arguments in fundamental ways, 
whereas the older work kept its criticism rather muted … My position is that there is 
something very basically wrong with microeconomics, and the new economic sociology 
should make this argument loud and clear in the absolute core economic areas of market 
structure, production, pricing, distribution and consumption” (Granovetter in Swedberg 1997: 
163).
 As such, it is less a difference in substance between old and new economic sociology, and 
more the deliberate critique addressed at the economists that constitutes the difference. 
Therefore, Swedberg and Granovetter in their suggestion of some key propositions 
characterising economic sociology embrace contributions from both the old and new: (1) 
8 Contributions to the field of the sociology of markets have intensified since the early 1980’s (Swedberg 1994; 
Fourcade 2007).  
9  Major proponents include Granovetter 1985, Zelizer 1994, Abolafia 1996. 
10 For a description of the history of economic sociology, see for example Granovetter (1990), Swedberg (1994), 
Granovetter and Swedberg (1992). 
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Economic action is a form of social action, (2) economic action is socially situated, and (3) 
economic institutions are social constructions (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992). This move 
from ‘economic’ to ‘social’ is well illustrated in the following description by Fligstein and 
Dauter (2007): 
“For neoclassical theory, markets simply imply exchange between actors for goods and 
services. These exchanges are usually thought to be fleeting, with price (i.e. the amount of a 
commodity that is exchanged for another through the use of a generalized medium of 
exchange, i.e. money) determined by the supply and demand for the commodity. The problem 
from the point of view of the sociology of markets is that this type of exchange already shows 
a great deal of social structure. First, market actors have to find one another. Second, money 
has to exist to allow market actors to get beyond bartering non-equivalent goods. Third, 
actors have to know what the price is. Finally, underlying all exchange is the faith that both 
buyers and sellers have that they will not be cheated. Such faith often implies informal (i.e. 
personal knowledge of the buyer and the seller) and formal mechanisms (i.e. the law) that 
govern exchange. Furthermore, market actors are often organizations implying that 
organizational dynamics influence the market structures” (Fligstein and Dauter 2007: 112ff.).  
So, even though different proponents of economic sociology have difficulties providing a 
sociological definition of markets, from their point of view, market exchange is premised on a 
range of social arrangements that are entirely outside the sphere of traditional economic 
explanation (Fligstein and Dauter 2007).
Central to these contributions are the (re)embedding of so-called economic action in the 
social: In this tradition markets may be defined as arenas of social interaction in which goods 
and services are exchanged for money – under conditions of competition (Beckert and Aspers 
2011; Fligstein 2001). Definitions of this sort are illustrative of what Zelizer refers to as “the 
attack on a common presumption among economists and sociologists alike: what I call the 
twinned stories of separate spheres and hostile worlds” (Zelizer 2007: 1059). These separate 
spheres have traditionally been viewed (by economics and sociology alike) as distinct arenas: 
On one side an arena of rationality, calculation, and efficiency, and on the other side, an arena 
of personal relations, sentiment, and solidarity. Furthermore, it is claimed, close contact 
between these spheres can result in contamination and disorder. Zelizer caricatures this idea 
of contamination of spheres as: “Economic rationality corrupts intimacy, and intimate 
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relations hinder efficiency” (Zelizer 2007: 1059). One of the merits of the new economic 
sociology is its effort at challenging this dualism by moving towards a ‘social conception of 
economic activity’ (Zelizer 2007). As such, the new economic sociology has challenged the 
so-called pact which Talcott Parsons allegedly signed up to with economists: economists get 
to study the economy, and sociologists get to study society (e.g., Stark 2009; Fourcade 2011). 
Whereas the economic sociology described above may be a reaction to the reductionist and 
under-socialized picture of economic agents and activity, the claim that economic activity is 
embedded in the ‘social’ has raised other concerns, also from within the expanding field of 
new economic sociology. One such early critique of the embeddedness-perspective has been 
delivered by Neil Fligstein, and his emphasis on specific institutions as the main architecture 
of markets, points to the distinctive characteristics of markets, all the while fleshing out their 
plurality.
2.1.2MarketsasFieldsandStructures:MarketsasPolitics
This section briefly discusses the work of Neil Fligstein, who, a part from being one 
prominent contributor to the field of new economic sociology, proposes a very specific 
programme of markets as politics. Fligstein’s approach to markets carries some family 
resemblances with constructivist market studies, and thus forms a link to the later discussion 
of constructivist market studies.   
Fligstein’s critical agenda is less oriented towards critiquing the apparent social naivety of 
neoclassical economics, and rather stresses the lack of theoretical coherency, and clarity, of 
approaches to economic life within new economic sociology itself: “The element that holds 
the field together is its opposition to the neoclassical model of perfect competition” (Fligstein 
2001: 8). The project Fligstein elaborates is partly that of creating some unity in the field as 
well as creating the foundation on which neoclassical theory and new economic sociology 
may start to collaborate (Fligstein 2001). In other words, new economic sociology must move 
beyond concentrating its critical capacities on documenting the shortcomings of neoclassical 
economic theory. To this end, Fligstein emphasises the importance of a theory of institutions, 
something that he claims to be missing in (economic) sociology (Fligstein 2001).  
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Fligstein stresses that a sociological approach to markets should make “us understand that 
there is not a single set of social and political institutions that produces the most efficient 
allocation of societal resources” (Fligstein 2001: 23). However, the issue at stake is creating 
the conditions that give rise to the stability that encourages investment. Once the institutional 
conditions are in place, he says, a variety of ways exist in which firms and markets may be 
organized to generate profits (ibid.). 
Fligstein stresses the need for alternative theoretical frames to make sense of economic 
processes, including market processes (Fligstein 1996 and 2001). The current presentation of 
Fligstein’s framework serves the purpose of presenting an attempt at an elaborate and 
coherent model for understanding, and to some extent, predicting market processes and 
dynamics. In doing so, Fligstein brings together theoretical perspectives on institution 
building from politics and sociology (e.g., DiMaggio) in order to produce insights on the 
kinds of rules necessary to allow markets to exist (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996). 
Using the metaphor ‘markets as politics’, Fligstein focuses on how market structures are 
produced along two dimensions: Firstly, he sees markets as part of state-building, stressing 
the role of the state in creating the institutional conditions for markets as well as their stable 
functioning; secondly, he argues, market processes are the result of two struggles, struggles 
internal to the firm as well as struggles between firms:  
“Markets are social constructions that reflect the unique political-cultural construction of 
their firms and nations. The creation of markets implies societal solutions to the problems of 
property rights, governance structures, conceptions of control, and rules of exchange”
(Fligstein 1996: 670).
Thus, Fligstein stresses the political and cultural aspects of market-making, and as such, he 
recognizes the diverse forms markets may take. The diversity of markets springs from the 
concrete (societal) solutions to a specific set of challenges, and the markets resulting from 
these solutions are social constructions reflecting the unique political-cultural construction of 
their firms and their nations. We must therefore expect market resemblances within a nation, 
though firm-specific diversity will affect individual markets in different ways.
Fligstein’s starting point is to propose institutions, which are preconditions to the existence of 
markets (Fligstein 1996). These institutions, defined as shared rules that are both formal and 
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informal, are the basis for the social structure of markets: property rights, governance 
structures, conceptions of control, and rules of exchange. These categories are meant as 
general (abstract) types that may appear as laws, understandings, or practices, and they enable 
actors to organize, compete, and cooperate (Fligstein 1996 and 2001). Each type of institution 
addresses different problems in the instability of market organization, both related to the 
creation of markets as well as ensuring stability. Property rights define who has claims on the 
profits of firms and they draw a set of delineations between different actors and their rights to 
the earnings of the firm. The making of these property rights is stressed as a continuous and 
contested political process, rather than the outcome of an efficient process (Fligstein 2001). 
As such, property rights define social relations and stabilize markets by making clear who 
carries risks and who is entitled to possible rewards (ibid.). Governance structures are general 
rules in the form of laws and informal institutional practices. As rules they specify the 
boundary between legal and illegal forms of competition by defining relations of competition, 
cooperation, and organization of firms. Drawing on the institutionalism of DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1977), institutional practices are seen as spreading 
amongst organizations (e.g., as a result of isomorphism). Governance structures are central to 
the legal and normative rules according to which firms structure themselves as well as their 
relations to competitors (Fligstein 2001). Thirdly, rules of exchange as social structures define 
who may be part of transactions and the conditions for these transactions. Rules of exchange 
include rules for common standards, billing, insurance, as well as the regulation of health and 
safety standards, and they are central to the stabilization of market transactions that would 
otherwise be haphazard without these rules (Fligstein 2001). Finally, conceptions of control
refer to forms of local knowledge11 as historical and cultural products, which frame the 
understandings as well as the practices about ‘how things work’ in a specific market. This 
includes the principles for structuring organizations as well as the strategies for competition at 
play. The interrelations between state building and market building become evident from the 
descriptions of the four institutions; states, at least those organized as capitalist states, develop 
rules about property rights, governance structures, and rules of exchange as a means of 
stabilizing markets; they are arenas on which states establish rules for economic actors. And it 
is the enforcement of these laws that affects “what conceptions of control can produce stable 
markets” (Fligstein 1996: 660).  
11 Here Fligstein draws on Geertz’s notion of ‘local knowledge’ (Geertz 1980 and 1983). 
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For Fligstein, the ‘stability’ of markets is the aim of the development and enforcement of 
rules by states. He stresses three phases of market formation: emergence, stability, and crisis. 
Though the phases may seem slightly simplifying, they feed into Fligstein’s metaphor of the 
market as politics: “Differing conditions of market stability produce different kinds of 
politics” (Fligstein 1996: 663). Stable markets have well-defined identities and status 
hierarchies, and firms resemble one another. In emergent markets, Fligstein argues, politics 
often resembles social movements, and the conditions are open and fluid. With the emergence 
of these new markets, all interorganizational relations have to be constructed, and markets are 
always the outcome of these projects of institutionalization: “In this way, markets are social 
constructions. Making these institutional projects successful is inherently a political project”
(Fligstein 1996: 664).
To sum up Fligstein’s contribution to new economic sociology, he directs his critique at his 
own field rather than that of economics: “Sociologists must go beyond documenting the 
shortcomings of the neoclassical model” (Fligstein 1996: 657). Or, as he states elsewhere, one 
of the major reasons why economists ignore work from the field of economic sociology is that 
they have failed to develop ‘alternative theoretical tools’ to explain (or make sense of) 
economic processes (Fligstein 2001). Furthermore, even though Fligstein does not subscribe 
wholeheartedly to the idea of ‘embeddedness’ (Fligstein 1996, 2001), he replaces this notion 
with another set of explanations that remain inside the sphere of ’the social’, and thus 
eventually holds on to the idea that economics should be, in some sense, embedded in 
sociology, which is seen as a meta-discipline ‘owning’ the core material of the field of 
economic life: that is ’the social’.  
From Fligstein’s project, at least two central contributions should be stressed: Firstly, his 
work illustrates the detailed and elaborate work and the numerous negotiations that go into the 
making and stabilization of markets, and thus allows for the identification of a number of 
different starting points for studying markets and their making. Secondly, Fligstein’s project 
clearly demonstrates the ‘pluralism’ of markets as the contingent effects of the institutions 
constituting the architectural building blocks of his markets as politics. The marketization 
programme presented in the following shares the general conclusions of markets as both 
plural and negotiated, but in doing so, it expands the architecture and thereby also the possible 
sources for their plurality.
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2.2MarketsasConstructed–TowardsSociotechnicalAssemblages
The marketization programme presented in the following section may be seen as the synthesis 
of the last twelve to fifteen years of growing contributions to the emerging field of 
constructivist market studies. Often referred to as the crucial motivator of this strand of 
research, Michel Callon’s collection ‘The Laws of the Markets’ was published in 1998 as a 
collection of essays, including articles by key contributors from the new economic sociology 
(e.g., Mark Granovetter, Viviana Zelizer, and Mitchel Abolafia), as well as authors 
representing a constructivist perspective (e.g., Michel Callon, Franck Cochoy, and Peter 
Miller) (Callon 1998). As such, the volume brings together authors taking an interest in the 
ways markets are shaped, put together, and assembled in a broad sense. In the opening chapter 
of the volume, Callon raises an elaborate critique of the new economic sociology: They have 
replaced the under-socialized image of economic activity of economics with the over-
socialized image of economic sociology. By stressing the embeddedness of market behaviour, 
one risks loosing sight of what constitutes economic and calculative behaviour altogether 
(Callon 1998a and 2008; McFall 2009). Instead, what Callon proposes is an alternative 
programme: To study markets at the intersection of economic sociology, science and 
technology studies (STS), and more especially actor-network theory (ANT).
This branch of literature, sometimes referred to as the ‘new’ new economic sociology (McFall 
2009), is often presented as expressing a rather different perspective to that informing the 
overarching agenda of economic sociology, namely, placing ‘the social’ at the heart of the 
study of the economy (Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Zelizer 2007)12. The ambition of 
constructivist market studies extends beyond the instatement of sociology as the prime motor 
of explanation for economic processes; rather, it seems to address the economic sociologists 
(even more than the economists) and criticizes the replacement of homo economicus with 
homo sociologicus (Callon 1998a; Callon 2008). According to Caliskan and Callon, because 
of the ambition of the new economic sociology “to embed the economy in society and 
economics in sociology” (Caliskan and Callon 2009: 383), a number of important questions 
about the constitution and operation of markets have been pushed into the background. In 
12 There seems to be a tendency to limit the contribution of the anthropology of markets to the idea of 
‘performativity’, or performation (Zelizer 2007; Fourcade 2007; Fligstein and Dauter 2007).   
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deconstructing markets and analysing them as elements of ‘the social’, it fails to account for  
the particularities of market relations:  
“Do we explain something by dissolving the object to be explained in another general and 
controversial frame – society? The explanans being fuzzier than the explanandum, this 
approach leaves us with a more complicated question: what is society made of? Is it really 
satisfactory to limit the answer to the usual ‘sociological list’ without mentioning and 
analysing socio-technical assemblages and things that circulate from hand to hand? What 
would an economy be without commodities and their physical properties and materialities?”
(Caliskan and Callon 2009: 383ff, emphasis in original).  
Thus, the critique promoted by the advocates of constructivist market studies is not primarily 
targeted at economics as a discipline, and in particular its inability to account for the ‘social’ 
element of markets. Rather, the critique is addressed at economic sociology and the ways in 
which ‘the social’ is overemphasized, and the practical nuts and bolts of market-making – 
their distinctive assemblages and modes of operation – are hence under-developed. The 
ambitious programme announced by Callon in ‘The Laws of the Markets’ is one which 
simultaneously brings back the economic actor, all the while extending its ontology; an actor 
is “made up of human bodies but also prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices, 
algorithms, etc.” (Callon 2005: 4). Economic agencies, from this perspective, are materially 
and technically distributed, and spatially and temporally diverse (McFall 2009); in other 
words, they are socio-technical assemblages endowed with specific and non-reducible 
capacities (Callon et al. 2005; Callon et al. 2007; MacKenzie 2007 and 2009a; McFall 2009). 
As such, proponents of constructivist market studies may seek to disembed the actor of 
economic sociology from her social ties, at least as a predefined explanation for action. 
However, agency as a socio-technical assemblage implies other kinds of networks rather than 
the purely social. As an illustration of these networks, I will now turn to the issue of 
calculative agency, market devices, and performativity. These elements are central to the 
following analyses, and they are the premises on which the marketization programme is 
largely founded.
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2.2.1CalculativeAgency
According to Callon, at the heart of the market lies calculation (Callon 1998a). But seen from 
the perspective of constructivism, the ability to calculate is not an inherent feature of man13 – 
or of homo economicus. The root of what Callon chooses to call ‘calculativeness’, following 
Oliver Williamson, cannot be explained simply by cognitive or institutional competences. 
Rather, calculativeness is an effect of networks made up of social ties as well as distinct 
instruments and tools. Again, the contribution made by proponents of the marketization 
programme in regard to their description of calculativeness is found at the nexus between the 
under-socialized agent often portrayed by economics, by whom calculativeness is made part 
of human nature, and the over-socialized agent of sociology, describing calculation as 
rationalizations made ex post. In other words, calculativeness is neither an inherent capacity 
of humans per se, nor something we can simply ignore or disregard; rather, the sources of 
calculativeness lie in the nature of the equipment of agencies (Callon 1998a). As Muniesa and 
Callon suggest, “[e]conomic calculation is not an anthropological fiction, precisely because 
it is not a purely human mechanical and mental competence; it is distributed among human 
actors and material devices” (Callon and Muniesa 2005: 1245).
To Callon and Muniesa, enabling calculation in markets consists of three analytically 
different elements, namely, making goods calculable, making agents calculative, and lastly, 
organizing the calculative encounter (Callon and Muniesa 2005). Together these three 
elements “define concrete markets as organized collective devices that calculate compromises 
on the value of goods” (Callon and Muniesa 2005: 1230). The three elements that correspond 
to the stages of a process include sorting out or detaching the relevant entities and arranging 
them within a single space. Examples of single spaces are a shopping cart, an invoice, or a 
grid (ibid.). Moreover, the entities are associated with one another; relations are created 
between them through manipulations and transformations. Lastly, the result is extracted. This 
result – or this new entity – whether in the form of a sum, a ranking, a calculation, etc., 
corresponds precisely to the relations and manipulations performed in the previous stages 
(Callon and Law 2005). In other words, it is nothing other than the effect of the manipulations 
and associations it has been submitted to.  
13 This is arguably the assumption made by neo-classical economics: “Agents calculate because they are 
calculative by nature” (Callon and Muniesa: 1229).  
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This description of calculation implies at least three characteristics of calculation; it illustrates 
the calculation as not a purely quantitative matter, but a process that links the quantitative 
with the qualitative – or calculation with judgement (Callon and Muniesa 2005), one version 
of which Cochoy has named ‘qualculation’14 (2008).  Furthermore, the role of devices is 
stressed; the existence of calculative agencies correlates closely with that of calculative tools 
– they are a prerequisite for calculativeness (Miller and O’Leary 2007).
Calculable goods, then, are an outcome of distributed agencies whose “encounters are 
organized and stabilized to a greater or lesser degree” (Callon and Muniesa 2005: 1245). The 
organization is provided by so-called algorithmic configurations that perform a variety of 
functions: They draw the configuration of calculative agencies participating in a particular 
encounter, they organize the links between agencies, and they outline the ground rules of 
ordering connections (Callon and Muniesa 2005; Araujo 2007).
2.2.2MarketDevices
In the following chapters of this thesis, market-making will to a large degree be followed 
through the analysis of devices, or dispositifs. In sociology, Foucault is usually credited for 
the introduction of the notion dispositif (commonly translated into device in English) 
(Beuscart and Peerbaye 2006; Raffnsøe and Gudmand-Høyer 2005; Callon et al. 2007); 
Foucault sees the dispositif as a network that can be traced between different elements in: 
“a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical and moral propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault, 
from Dumez and Jeunemaître 2010: 30).  
Extending the Foucauldian understanding of the notion to science and technology studies, and 
stressing the heterogeneity of the assemblage as also pointed out by Foucault, the device is 
used to designate all of these socio-technical assemblages of humans and non-humans, 
pointing to them as action programmes (Latour 1996), or as scripts, inscribed into objects 
(Akrich 1992).  With the notion of the socio-technical device, the distribution of agency as 
14 With the notion of qualification, Cochoy points to qualification as a prerequisite of calculation (Cochoy 2008; 
Callon and Law 2005).  
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well as its materiality is brought to the forefront, and it is a notion close to that of 
agencement: “An agencement is constituted by fixtures and furnishings, by elements that 
allow tracing lines and constituting a territory” (Muniesa et al. 2007: 3). These fixtures and 
furnishings and the territory that emerges are central to the distribution of roles and identities, 
as well as defining the relations between them. Accordingly, for a device to be a market 
device, or an agencement to be a market agencement, the framing of, for example, goods, 
agencies, and encounters are central. The stock ticker analysed by Alex Preda illustrates this 
point rather well; it redraws the boundaries between different groups, such as brokers (official 
and unofficial) and ticker-operators, as well as stimulates the competition between the New 
York and the London stock exchange (Preda 2006). Whereas the stock ticker may be analysed 
as a telecommunication device, it could also be analysed as a market device; it reconfigures 
the role and identity of traders as well as the premises of competition. As such, the status of 
the devices as a market device is an empirical question. In other words, “[w]e can imagine 
that there are several kinds of agencements that do not need to be economic in nature, but 
they can turn economic through some aspect” (Muniesa et al. 2007: 3), and as such, devices 
may be central to the construction of ‘economization’, i.e., something which renders objects 
or behaviours economic: 
“Market agencements are one kind of economic agencement. Like any other socio-technical 
agencements involved in a process of economization, markets contain devices that aim at 
rendering things more ‘economic’ or, more precisely, at enacting particular versions of what 
it is to be ‘economic’. Emphasis is put on the conception, production and circulation of 
goods, their valuation, the construction and subsequent transfer of property rights through 
monetary mediation, exchange mechanisms and systems of prices. Market agencements 
detach things from other things and attach them to other things” (Muniesa et al. 2007: 4).
These detachments/reattachments are characteristic to the market agencement as one distinct 
form of economic agencement, stressing the circulation, pricing, and exchange of goods.
Finally, the analysis of often heterogeneous market devices calls for attention to be paid to the 
knowledge or expertise mobilized for their production; acknowledging that markets are 
simultaneously objects and products of economic research (Muniesa et al. 2007), the notion of 
performativity is intimately linked to the role and construction of market devices. 
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2.2.3ThePerformativityProgramme
One of the major elements in the constructivist market studies programme is the notion of 
performativity. Resonating with a general upsurge of interest within the larger STS 
‘community’ in studies of performativity, studies of the effects of ‘economics’ on the 
‘economy’ has sparked great interest in the last fifteen years and has proved particularly 
fruitful within the studies of financial markets (e.g., McKenzie and Millo 2003; McKenzie 
2004; Beunza and Stark 2004). The upsurge in interest in this phenomenon is often linked to 
Callon’s (1998) “The Laws of the Markets”, in which he argues “that economics, in the broad 
sense of the term, performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it 
functions” (Callon 1998a: 2). In other words, economics is seen as a technology that is 
involved in the production and reproduction of markets. When Callon argues that homo 
economicus exists, it is because he/she has been framed, formatted and equipped; and 
economists are often a central part of constituting this ‘creature’ of their theories.  
The objects of economic theory, such as detached goods, rational agency, and calculative 
behaviour are all part of the reality of the economy, but they are made to happen (Callon 
2007b; Cochoy 2007). For markets to work, they must become ‘practical enactments’ of the 
models of economists (Holm 2007). This approach has been criticized for eventually 
returning to simply a defence of the economist’s position (e.g., Miller 2002), and seeing “the 
market as an ideological model rather than an empirical core to economic activity” (Miller 
2002: 219), something that Miller claims has been demonstrated through anthropological and 
sociological studies. In particular, the disentanglement that Callon claims to be a first 
requirement for market transactions to be undertaken is basically impossible to Miller (2002).
In a response to Judith Butler, who raises the question of whether the performativity of 
economics does not imply a depoliticization of questions of the economy (Butler 2010; Callon 
2010), Callon discusses two relations between the performativity of economics and politics 
(Callon 2010). Firstly, he stresses the plurality of models and theories to account for and 
describe different aspects of market functioning. Theoretical frameworks, e.g., evolutionary 
models, are not the same as those proposed by neo-classical models (ibid.), and accordingly, 
there is room for negotiations regarding the type of models according to which a given market 
is conceived and enacted. These negotiations imply a political debate in which economics is 
one stakeholder (ibid.). This relation between politics and economics corresponds to a 
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‘political engineering’ of markets, involving the creation of institutions, procedures, and 
devices (Callon 2010, see also Callon et al. 2001). Secondly, this relation reaches beyond 
markets as instruments for political action, i.e., the engineering project: “Saying and doing the 
economy means entering into the agonistic field where the delimitation-bifurcation between 
the economy and politics is constantly being debated and played out” (Callon 2010: 165). It is 
because the economy is being performed, i.e., implying one definition of the economy and 
thereby leaving some things out of this definition, that counter programmes may emerge 
which attempt to redefine and redraw these boundaries (ibid.).
These ideas of what may be summed up as market design and the drawing of boundaries 
between the economy and politics is further elaborated in what remains of this chapter. 
2.3Marketization
In their article from 2010, Caliskan and Callon build on the numerous studies undertaken 
under the broad heading of constructivist market studies to flesh out what they call the 
marketization programme. This approach implies a replacement of the object to be studied 
from ‘the economy’ to ‘economization’ or from ‘the market’ to ‘marketization’ (Caliskan and 
Callon 2009 and 2010). This shift implies looking at new places as well as a different 
ontology. Instead of taking the economy or markets as starting points, the perspective to be 
unfolded here is based on the premise that these entities, i.e., the economy/markets, are 
achievements or resulting arrangements, rather than pre-existing realities that may serve as 
starting points for an analysis of the market (Callon 1998; Caliskan and Callon 2009). More 
precisely, speaking of economization or marketization, the conjugation of the words stresses 
the distinct activities and investments undertaken to render something economic (Caliskan 
and Callon 2009).
To define markets, Caliskan and Callon take their point of departure in a generalized 
perception of markets as institutions, enabling the production of values through the 
organisation of competition. Markets are socio-technical assemblages and have the following 
characteristics (Caliskan and Callon 2010):
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 They organise the conception, production, and circulation of goods (and services), as 
well as the transfer of the goods during which property rights are exchanged for 
monetary compensation.
 They are heterogeneous; i.e., made up of rules and conventions, technical devices, 
logistical infrastructures, discourses, etc. 
 They delimit the space in which confrontation and power struggles flourish until they 
are peacefully determined by pricing mechanisms.  
The definition maintains an openness towards the diversity of markets, which acknowledges 
that markets are organised and configured in many possible ways. As an approach to the study 
of markets that allows for an appreciation of their plurality, Caliskan and Callon point to five 
focal points of the process of marketization to be presented next.
2.3.1MarketizationasFiveTypesofFraming
How does one then approach marketization? Given that they view a market as a distinct 
arrangement configured by a specific marketization process, Callon and Caliskan (2010) point 
to five types of framings crucial to the diversity of markets:  
1. Pacifying goods 
2. Marketizing agencies 
3. Market encounters 
4. Price-setting 
5. Market design and maintenance 
These five framings may provide the focal points that Callon and Caliskan argue (2010) to be 
necessary for understanding the process of marketization. In the following, these five 
framings will be unpacked. 
Framings 1-3: Goods, Agencies, and Encounters  
The existence of markets are premised on the distinction between the ‘things’ to be valued 
and the ‘agencies’ capable of valuing them (Caliskan and Callon 2010). This ontological 
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divide is by no means given or natural but an effect of the arrangement it is part of. Thus, 
pacifying things, and enabling the transfer of property rights, requires the disentanglement of 
objects from their previous connections (Thomas 1991) to be attached or re-entangled with 
their new owners (Caliskan and Callon 2010). Thus, the emphasis put on the role of property 
rights (as seen in Fligstein’s contribution above) is accentuated within the marketization 
programme, but more importantly, the (often) material process of disentangling and re-
entangling goods is stressed. In the case of wind power, for instance, disentanglement through 
the grid is crucial as a first step in the transfer of electricity, but not more specifically than the 
meters counting the consumption of the individual consumer. Technical devices, such as 
transformer stations, grids, and meters, etc., partake in the framing of goods, agencies, and 
their encounters, enabling detachment from the site of production as well as keeping identities 
in place (e.g., the consumer as a certain sort of person through their meter), and finally, 
making the electrons behave in controlled and predictable ways15.
Pointing to the agencies stresses the ‘key characteristic’ of marketization, namely, the 
diversity as well as multiplicity of actors competing and participating in the definition and 
valuation of goods (Caliskan and Callon 2010). Empirically, we associate a range of concrete 
actors with markets, e.g., firms, trade organisations, consumers, etc., but the diversity of 
possible configurations is potentially much wider and should be part of an empirical analysis 
of any individual case; “the classification of the different forms of agency is a finishing point, 
not a starting point of investigation” (Caliskan and Callon 2010: 10). To capture the diversity 
(and heterogeneity), as well as the compound character of these agencies, the notion of 
agencement is mobilized. One reason for the introduction of the notion of agencement16 is to 
overcome the so-called agency/structure divide, often found in the sociological tradition 
(Caliskan and Callon 2010; Hardie and MacKenzie 2007; Muniesa et al. 2007). The divide 
between agents and things, or those arranging and that which is being arranged, is overcome 
with the notion of agencement: “agencement is arrangements endowed with the capacity to 
act in different ways, depending on their configuration” (Caliskan and Callon 2010: 9). 
Furthermore, the notion addresses a second divide that is quite central here at the inter-section 
between the rational individual, homo economicus, of economic theory, and the 
embeddedness of the agent presented by the (economic) sociologist, discussed in the opening 
15 For an account of a breakdown in control and predictability of the electrons, see Bennet 2005. 
16 To develop the notion of agencement, Callon and others draw on the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1980).  
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sections of this chapter. In the present work, I remain, however, with the notion of assemblage 
to stress the work of making the connections, which go into the making of wind power 
markets. I believe that the notion of assemblage better captures the work, over time and space, 
of making connections between different devices and the material infrastructure of the 
market: the grid. This does not mean, however, that I wish to do away with the ideas 
underlying the agencement stressed by Callon, but simply that the present thesis wishes to 
stress one particular aspect of the emergence of agencement. 
Framing goods, agencies, and encounters creates the lines between what is inside the 
assemblage and what is outside, as well as setting the scene for and enabling the transactions 
of goods. Also, these three framings shape the marketization in its generality, but to allow for 
transactions to happen, goods must be priced. 
Framing 4: Price-setting 
The existence of markets implies that valuations are taken into the form of prices (Caliskan 
and Callon 2010). Fixing prices17 has, since Weber, been described as a struggle between 
men, eventually to be solved peacefully (Weber 1978; Stark 2009; Caliskan and Callon 2010). 
A price is an estimated quantification (see also Espeland and Stevens 1998 and 2008 for a 
somewhat similar notion of commensuration) that calls for the mobilization of calculation 
devices, which then become central to struggles of defining value. A number of studies have 
emerged over the last decade, particularly within the social studies of finance, stressing the 
role of calculative tools/methods, employed to calculate prices, e.g., the Black and Scholes 
formula (MacKenzie 2006), or the role of existing valuation formulas in the issuing of shares 
for emerging companies (Beunza and Garud 2007).  Fixing prices are thus intimately linked 
to calculativeness, and not least the equipment that allows agency to become calculative (see 
above). Acknowledging that studies on price-setting are still rare, Caliskan and Callon point 
to two facts emerging from these studies: Firstly, the existence of a multiplicity of prices in 
markets at a given point in time, which are produced in different places and by different 
agencies (see for example Caliskan 2007). Rather than ignoring this multiplicity, we should 
take this opportunity to study forms of organization and their effects on pricing (Caliskan and 
17 The fixing of price is the main object of analysis in Chapter 4 and will be elaborated on both theoretically and 
empirically there. 
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Callon 2010). Secondly, and related to the first fact, prices are calculated from other prices. 
Caliskan proposes the notion of prosthetic prices of those prices used as inputs to derive 
actual prices, i.e., prices used to seal a transaction (Caliskan 2007).
Framing 5: Market Design and Maintenance 
The dynamics of markets, including their design, implementation, and maintenance, are 
closely linked to the work of economists and economic theory, discussed above under the 
heading of ‘performativity’. Studying market design implies studying knowledge developed 
and mobilized as a way of managing markets (e.g., Kjellberg and Helgesson 2006; 
MacKenzie 2006). But to Calsikan and Callon, market design (and performativity) may be 
gradually extending beyond the realm of economics and forming a ‘collective engagement’ 
(Caliskan and Callon 2010).  For example, the involvement of actors outside economics, such 
as natural scientists, in the making of carbon markets has been investigated in a number of 
articles (MacKenzie 2009a and 2009b; Blok 2011; Callon 2009). However, this collaboration 
as a collective engagement leads to a proliferation of matters of concern, which come about as 
the effect of making market designs. This prediction of a new role for markets, referred to 
elsewhere as ‘civilized’ (Callon 2009), lends itself to studies of marketization and is discussed 
in more depth under the heading of politicization and economization.
2.4HotandCold;PoliticizingandEconomizing
“There is [..] a great deal to be gained from considering marketplaces as yet another sort of 
assembly and from detecting their many techniques of representation. No matter how much 
effort they might make to look “natural”, they are always fully inside the domain of politics. 
So much that a close inspection of their ways of gathering, deciding and enforcing their edicts 
might go some way toward enriching the usual definitions of politics” (Latour and Weibel 
2005: 613).
In this final section, the contributions of Callon and others toward an understanding of the 
political and the economic as effects are discussed. According to Latour and Weibel quoted 
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above, the studies of market configuration may enrich the way we think about politics. But 
first, I will follow up on the discussion hinted at in the previous chapter – the discussion of 
what is meant here by politics or the political – and I will draw a distinction between the two. 
Andrew Barry’s discussion of politics/political is a good starting point; from what he calls a 
conventional definition of politics as “all those kinds of institutions, agencies and practices 
broadly associated with international, national and local government” (Barry 2002: 268), he 
identifies two distinct dimensions of what is commonly referred to as politics: On the one 
hand the technicality (or what Barry calls the physics) of politics (e.g., press conferences, 
parliamentary debates, opinion polls, etc.), and on the other hand contestations and conflicts. 
To see the full scope of politics, we must see both contestations and its containment: “It
[politics] is about the possibility of governing and about questioning and disrupting the 
conditions for government” (Barry 2002: 270, emphasis in original). It is about conflicts as 
well as their resolution. Therefore, Barry proposes, it may be fruitful to distinguish between 
politics as the technical practices and institutions, and the political as an “index of space of 
contestation and dissensus” (Barry 2001: 7). For something to be political, it must then be 
open to possible disagreements or conflicting views coming to the surface. Following this 
distinction, politics will (often) be deeply anti-political in its effects, in as much as it delimits 
the space of potential conflict and debate.
Barry then asks the question of the specific relation between politics, technology, and the 
economy: In what ways may the operation and organization of markets become either a 
political matter or be prevented from becoming one? 
“In sociology, from Weber onwards, calculation is often regarded as an essentially anti-
political instrument, in the sense used here. Calculation is thought to reduce the space of the 
political and to limit the possibility for disagreement. When situations become calculable it is 
taken to indicate the fact that political contestation has ended” (Barry 2002: 272).
This description of the calculable situation resembles the framed situation described by Callon 
in his ‘Laws of the Markets’ (1998b). Calculation is not possible without framing; it is the 
framing that allows the ‘states of the world’, possible actions, as well as the expected 
outcomes of these actions to be recognized (Callon 1998b). However, no framing is universal, 
and overflows of the frame are always possible. Using pollution as an example of an 
overflow, i.e., something that would often exist outside the frame of economic calculation, 
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Barry illustrates how pollution as an overflow may be brought inside the frame (and thus be 
made calculable) through the introduction of pollution monitoring devices, tax differentiations 
between more or less polluting fuel forms, or measurements of different cars’ fuel efficiency. 
While this reframing may change the situation for a potential car buyer by informing him of a 
new set of properties of the car he considers buying, it reduces the space of potential conflict. 
When car buyer and seller meet, these translations of pollution have been made calculable, 
and the transaction can be undertaken without political conflict: “[t]he political differences 
and moral dilemmas of car buyers have been partially resolved elsewhere” (Barry 2002: 273). 
The transaction can proceed because the world has been translated into stable properties and 
been made calculable. 
However, measurement and calculation are not only restricting political controversy in the 
economic fields. They may also open up to the political, i.e., they may spark controversies 
and disagreement (Barry 2002)18. The notion of commensuration, proposed by Espeland and 
Stevens (1998 and 2008), hints at the efforts and negotiations underlying the identification of 
common metrics, something which is a prerequisite for calculations:  
“Commensurations creates a specific type of relationship among objects. It transforms all 
differences into quantity. In doing so it unites objects by encompassing them under a shared 
cognitive system … Commensuration always is a process, often one that requires 
considerable social and intellectual investment” (Espeland and Stevens 2008: 408).
Commensuration implies classification in such a way that things become comparable; this 
may appear simple when there is agreement on the similarity of the things to be 
commensurated (an example of a well-framed situation). However, at other times 
commensuration is about creating relations between things which are generally not perceived 
as comparable; conflicts and negotiations are likely to surface (as in cases where the framing 
is still fragile).  
18 Barry stresses two issues where calculation and measurement may become sources for the political to raise; 
namely, the fragility of metrological regimes and the inventiveness of measurement. The former underscores the 
fragility of the standardization of metrological systems in the wake of more complex situations. The latter 
stresses that measurements have performative and regulative consequences (Barry 2002).   
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As a description of the prevalence of overflows in specific situations, Callon introduces the 
metaphor of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ situations. In ‘cold’ situations, overflows are easily resolved and 
reframed. Possible world states are easily identified – or already known – and calculated 
decisions can be taken (Callon 1998b). In ‘hot’ situations, on the other hand, everything is 
controversial, including the identification of the overflow, its possible sources, the ways 
effects may be measured, etc. Furthermore, Callon adds that ‘hot’ situations are becoming 
increasingly more common and more pervasive – partly as a consequence of the spreading of 
the technosciences – but more importantly, they are exceedingly difficult to cool down: 
“Externalities are at the centre of public debates with no obvious conclusions” (Callon 1998b:  
263). It is thus the claim of Callon that stable and robust framing, though maybe still the 
prevalent condition, is increasingly being confronted through the detection and identification 
of overflows. 
Following Callon, Fabian Muniesa has elaborated on the discussion of the thermal metaphor, 
and he brings us full circle, back to the distinction between the political and the economic, as 
he discusses links between processes of politicization and economization: 
“To politicize something can mean a lot of things: to foster partisanship in the consideration 
of that thing, to discuss what to do about it in a way that is open to dissent and disagreement, 
to impose a differentiated will in the orientation or in the determination of that thing, to 
appraise that thing not only in itself but as part of a collective world. To economize something 
can also mean a lot of things: to subject this thing to a measure of rationing, to make this 
thing prone to calculation, to provide ground for a rather univocal assessment of this thing, to 
reduce the amount of collective energy and attention that this thing calls for. From all the 
contrasts that these profusions of meanings may suggest, I propose to pick this one: 
politicizing is to economizing what heating up is to cooling down” (Muniesa 2011: 337). 
Rather than discussing politicization and economization as operations or actions pertaining to 
distinct domains, Muniesa stresses that the processes point neither towards a distinct origin, 
nor a distinct domain for their resolution. An example in which we find both economizations 
and politicizations is climate change; scientists attempt to measure and predict the effects of 
melting poles, distribute these effects between ‘consequences of human activities’ and ‘a hot 
summer’, and distinguish emission allowances between developed and developing countries. 
These actions are close to economization. On the other hand, the recent and shocking decrease 
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of Greenland’s ice sheet contests the measurements and predictability of climate change, 
imposing immediate threats on coastal villages and polar bears. It has sparked a politicization 
of the emerging understanding of climate change and its effects.
Taking the example of the creation of carbon markets, Callon stresses how the construction of 
this market produces matters of concern that nobody knows whether to address politically, 
economically, or techno-scientifically (Callon 2009). Different gases and their effects as well 
as opposing market designs and the inequality of the distribution of effects associated with 
climate change are all issues in the midst of the carbon market design, and as such, organizing 
markets potentially include a “set of actors who were formerly on the fringes of markets and 
are now at their centre” (Callon 2009: 546). Using the example of carbon markets, Callon 
illustrates how markets may produce matters of concern as well as how they may take these 
issues into account in their organization. This prompts him to suggest a new and civilized 
form of market:   
“They will force us not only to revise our market theories and our common conceptions of 
their functioning but also, above all, to alter our ways of distinguishing political and 
economic processes. As I have shown elsewhere, these markets of a new kind, which seem 
more open and civilized than those to which we are accustomed, combine devices that we 
previously attributed either to the economy or to expression and political action” (Callon 
2009: 544). 
With this ambitious claim on behalf of markets, I leave the unpacking of this theoretical 
programme for the coming analyses. The strength of the marketization programme, not least 
to the study at hand, is its focus on processes of rendering markets, as well as its openness to 
the elements of this process. Agency is neither ascribed to the individual (rational) human 
being, nor is it simply a human being embedded in social ties, institutions, or conventions. 
Rather, agency is made up of humans, tools, equipment, and devices; it is a socio-technical 
assemblage, and as such, any study of such an entity may find its starting point in various 
locations. However, if we accept this premise of the socio-technical assemblage, we are 
impelled to inquire into its configuration; because it is only through empirical studies that we 
can get closer to their making and their plurality. Therefore, bringing the marketization 
programme on board implies a move from theorizing and modelling economic behaviour to 
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detailed studies of negotiations, tools and devices, and eventually matters of concern, as they 
emerge – and are tackled – via their marketization.  
The analytical framework developed in this thesis, made possible by the marketization 
programme, makes devices the analytical entry points to the production of insights of market 
making activities and their effects. Furthermore, it draws attention to the underlying struggles 
of defining boundaries between questions to be tackled through politics – and questions to be 
solved by economics; or in other words, to inquire into processes of politicization and 
economization. But by acknowledging this non-reductionist approach, proponents of the 
marketization programme are left with quite a bit of work to do in narrowing down and 
delimiting their object of research, something that is the subject of the next chapter.  
57
3.METHODOLOGICALCONSIDERATIONS
The following chapter outlines the methodological injunctions informing this thesis. As such, 
this chapter is intended to tie together the preceding chapters and extend the rationale of the 
inquiry they have initiated, not least by beginning to unpack the empirical field and the data 
examined in the chapters to follow. Located within a constructivist theory programme, as 
described in the preceding chapter, the aim is not to account for the ‘accuracy’ of an existing 
reality depicted in the study, but rather to describe my ‘ordering’ of French markets for wind 
power. This ordering, as an activity, points to the reflexivity of the process of doing research 
and prompts questions as to how the material at hand got ordered in the manner it did (Law 
1994). In what follows, this ordering is described as a gradual crystallization of an object of 
research as something which may resemble a chronological account, but a process which has 
continuously moved back and forth between theory, fieldwork, and the formulation of a 
research question (see Andersen et al. 1995). In this sense, there is no intention to depict a 
linear process of a research project, but rather to describe its choices and challenges as they 
appeared over time, and to stress the gradually emerging understanding of what a 
marketization of wind power could mean and practically entail.   
As such, I will begin by describing the assemblage of the object of research, both as a product 
of being interested in the phenomenon of the ‘political market’ as well as the distinct 
understanding of markets outlined in the previous chapter. Without presenting all the detours 
and retours of the ‘tiresome journey’ out of which this study has grown, I will begin to draw 
out the distinctive way of approaching marketization developed here. This also means that a 
description of the marketization of wind power could potentially have appeared in a variety of 
ways. The argument stressed here is that the methods I have used, and the way I have gone 
about doing my fieldwork, is intimately linked with the results I produced: “We can 
distinguish a way of acting, and discuss it by itself; but the way exists only as a way-of-
dealing-with-material” (Dewey 1916: 165, emphasis in original). This chapter is dedicated 
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precisely to ‘the way of acting’, i.e., the methods as phrased by Dewey; however, as he 
insists, this way exists only in connection to the material at hand. In other words, this chapter 
provides a description of the ways in which the material and the methods have become 
mutually constitutive.  
3.1TowardsanObjectforResearch
The underlying curiosity feeding this study is framed by two contrasting discourses. On the 
one hand, the way in which market failure is routinely blamed for creating the issue of global 
warming (the most prominent being Stern 2006), and on the other, an insistence that the 
market provide the best means for organizing possible solutions to this issue, e.g., renewable 
energy technologies. One result of this ‘double shuffle’ is the creature referred to as the 
‘political market’, something which I conceptualize via the view of markets as assemblages, 
but a notion that seems to imply a knitting together of two distinct, and easily separable, 
spheres: politics and economics. However, by drawing on the idea of the market assemblage, 
as outlined in the previous chapter, agency is seen as being the effect of heterogeneous 
networks. This is constitutional to the framing of the research object. What allows wind 
power a role or status as an economic good, not to mention the exchange of wind power 
between producers and consumers, is a web made by the electrical infrastructure, i.e., the grid, 
transformer stations, rules and legislation on roles and identities of those involved in 
generating electricity, and the maintenance of the market setup. The notion of the political 
market seen from this perspective becomes a somewhat odd creature; it seems to single out 
and praise two distinct domains, the political and the economic, rather than acknowledging
the heterogeneity of the elements which make up the network. Most, if not all, of the nodes in 
the network could easily be tied to the sphere of politics, or economics, or technology, etc. 
But rather than discarding the claim that wind power markets are political markets, I have 
chosen to follow some of these devices that are simultaneously central to the functioning of 
the market, and on the other hand, devices that are seen as (politically) prosthetic in some 
way.
59
Taking an interest in the notion of the political market prompted me to inquire into the 
making of a price and the ways in which the value of wind power is negotiated. Theoretically, 
the label ‘political market’ is first and foremost associated with the tariff, a price regulated to 
reach specific ends. During some of my early interviews, I encountered rather different 
accounts of what a price is seen as representing, e.g., a politically tinkered number (Int. 
Durant and Int. Lawaetz) or a well-qualified, calculated, objective ‘valuation’ (e.g., Chabot 
2000). These different versions of a price, for instance, as a feed-in tariff, represent an 
underlying theme in Chapter 4, which stresses the valuation of wind power in France.
Furthermore, I was curious about the ways in which the grid contributed to the framing of 
wind power, or one could say the specific politics of the grid, and the first round of interviews 
I conducted included meetings with several grid operators such as Energinet.dk, RTE19, and 
EDF. These interviews focused on the specific ways in which the infrastructure connects 
supply and demand, and thus allows exchange to take place, and at the same time addressed 
the pressing question of the disciplining of wind power to behave in a manner ‘compatible’ 
with the workings of the existing energy system. During the interviews at both RTE and EDF, 
the ZDE-device kept surfacing for at least two reasons: Firstly, the device could potentially 
become a tool for the grid operators to plan/predict future investments in the grid; and 
secondly, the ZDE was relatively new at the time of the interviews, which is why 
uncertainties regarding its practice and effects were predominant. An example of how the 
device could be introduced is described in the quote below:
“Lebfevre: So, now when you want to connect a project [to the grid], we enter a procedure… 
which is justified, because at the beginning of wind power no procedure existed, and that was 
a struggle. Well now there is a procedure, which we know. Except with the ZDE it ... 
Me: the ZDE? 
Lebfevre: Well, EDF do not know how to manage the ZDE today in terms of connection. 
Normally, there is, on the one hand, the process of rating projects with a building permit one 
by one, and where a connection request is made, here the procedure is clear. And then, on the 
other hand, there is the ZDE that simply aims to make the communities agree on where they 
want to put the turbines and that it is consistent with the capacity of the grid. But the two 
19 The French Transmission System Operator (Réseau de transport d’électricité). 
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things are done in parallel. So, when we set up a ZDE today, alongside a request for a 
building permit is made, and therefore both arrive at EDF, and they do not know if it is the 
same project or not” (Int. Lebfevre, my translation).
So, what eventually became a decision to build the study around two distinct devices was 
partly the effect of getting engaged with the field and my empirical material. In other words, 
my inquiry into the ways in which the grid took part in the framing of wind power kept 
referring me to the ZDE, not only as an obligatory passage point to the feed-in tariff but to the 
practice of getting turbines connected to the grid, in general. Furthermore, the ZDE seems to 
add another layer to the notion of the political market, as it connects wind power to 
landscapes and local populations in new ways. This account serves to illustrate how a version 
of the ‘follow the actor’ mantra (Latour 1987), or maybe rather following traces of a certain 
durability (Callon 1992), made me stress one instance or modality of grid connection. And 
this instance made me turn towards landscapes and local democracy rather than the qualities 
of the grid, such as the balancing of supply and demand, the presence and materiality of 
power lines, and eventually made me travel around small villages in Picardie rather than the 
centrally organized Transmission System Operators.  
Making the two devices my entry point into rendering wind power as an object to be 
transacted in the market obviously drags some aspects of the marketization programme to the 
forefront, whilst hiding others (see Miller 1997). In this respect, the construction of the 
research object is not an external reality there for me to describe but rather the outcome (or 
the reality) of the ways I have gone about making the study (Law 2004). In what remains of 
this chapter, I will discuss the methods I have drawn upon and describe their outcome in more 
detail; in other words, I will focus on how the reality presented in the wording of this thesis 
has been crafted.
So, from an initial interest in markets for wind power as political markets, the inquiry has 
taken me beyond the ‘political market’ as a distinctive theoretical category to be made an 
object of inquiry in and by itself. Rather, the gradual emphasis building up during my 
fieldwork and readings towards two of the devices are at the heart of the qualification of the 
market as a distinctively political market. In other words, the adjective ‘political’, in this 
perspective, is considered a (temporarily stabilized) state of the network, which points exactly 
to the tools and devices put in place to enable a specific modality of market transaction.       
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3.2TheMarketDeviceasanObjectofStudy
“Markets are probably the least researched form of coordination – and, at the same time, 
perhaps the most enigmatic. This may appear strange, but there is one clear explanation of 
why this is the case in economics … since markets are “natural”, and therefore a starting 
point, they are often used to explain other phenomena rather than considered as objects in 
need of explanation” (Aspers 2011: 40).
What Aspers describes here is, to economic sociology at least, amongst the fundamental 
fallacies of economic theory. The ambition of the present study – to follow the two devices as 
they contribute to the marketization of wind power – is to demonstrate the constructedness of 
the ‘natural’ market; it is exactly what the notion of the political market points to, i.e., it is 
nothing but natural and only kept alive because of political will and ambitions. Both the feed-
in tariff and the ZDE are examples of that which is political in the political market; i.e., they 
are distinct framings of obstacles to wind power development. Why then refer to them as 
market devices rather than policy devices or governance devices (e.g., du Gay et al. 2012)? 
This decision is not simply a pressing empirical reality so much as a choice motivated by 
interest/ambition:  
“Contextualization works in more than one direction. The trick is to select the paths you wish 
to follow, and those you wish to ignore, and do so according to the assemblage you wish to 
chart” (Miller 1997: 363).
As in their study of three ‘governance devices’, du Gay et al. describe the devices as operating 
as ‘interrealm translation apparatuses’ (du Gay et al. 2012: 1086), combining the sphere of 
economics and politics. Associating the two devices with the marketization programme helps 
construct one among several possible realities. Furthermore, this construction is dual; on the 
one hand, taking an interest in marketization leads me to stress certain aspects of the two 
devices, and on the other, addressing marketization from the perspective of the two devices 
narrows my vision to whatever negotiations and emerging practices unfold within the world 
of the feed-in tariff and the ZDE. This is not, I believe, a reduction of the devices, i.e., 
stressing their relation to the market and its transaction:    
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“For scientific, political and even moral reasons, it is crucial that enquirers do not in 
advance, and in place of the actors, define what sorts of building blocks the social world is 
made of ” (Latour 2005: 41). 
To sum up, the choice to look at these devices as market devices is partly based on the 
empirical material and partly a choice based on interest. As I argue elsewhere, these devices 
have effects on markets through their reconfiguration of profitability, responsibilities, and 
agency in general. Thus, referring to these as market devices is no stretch. On the other hand, 
they could have been referred to as governance devices too, as stressed by du Gay et al.:
“It can be claimed that the leakage of concepts should not come as a surprise. If indeed 
governance devices are assemblages then as such they do posses certain agentical 
characteristics and thus it cannot be expected that they would simply ‘obey’ the wills of the 
different ecologies that created them” (du Gay et al. 2012: 31).
As such, adopting a marketization approach is a way of narrowing down my study; 
meanwhile, accepting the ‘agentical characteristics’ of the devices implies an openness 
towards the leakages, or overflows, as they may occur.  
Finally, the devices not only intersect but also perform different realms such as the political 
and the economical. My study started out as a study of the construction of markets for wind 
power; as I argue elsewhere, the ‘market’ remains the organizing arena on which we rely to 
develop wind power. However, referring to the devices as market devices implies an 
acknowledgement that they have effects on the marketization, rather than referring to some 
essential characteristics of the devices. The devices are best described as assemblages, and 
from the perspective of marketization, they become part of a larger market assemblage.  
3.3AssemblingMarketDevices
Referring to the feed-in tariff and the ZDE as ‘simply’ two devices may seem to imply that 
they have the same status in the larger assemblage as well as how they are approached in the 
study. However, a few differences relating to the their history and design should be stressed. 
The feed-in tariff is a device that was developed in the US in the 1970’s, and has been 
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adopted in a range of European countries from the 1990’s, specifically to define a price for 
wind power, but also other renewable energies. As such, the feed-in tariff is, if not a generic 
tool, then at least a widespread device sharing some basic functionalities (e.g., fixed price per 
kWh, guaranteed access to the grid, purchase obligation, long term contracts, etc.), which may 
be structured in different ways (e.g., the targeted technologies, fixed price versus premium 
price, decreasing tariffs over time). The ZDE, on the other hand, is a recent French invention 
developed specifically for wind power development and is of a more experimental nature. As 
a consequence, the feed-in tariff was relatively stable both in terms of design and the role it 
might play in energy markets. Controversies unfolding around this device were related to its 
level, i.e., the price to be defined within the frame of the feed-in tariff, and whether it was the 
most appropriate device (compared to other devices such as tendering or certificates). The 
ZDE, on the other hand, had not become stable at the time of the fieldwork; to some, the 
device was a tool for local democracy, to others a tool for energy planning, still others saw it 
as a means of protecting the landscape. Also, the actual practice of making zones on the 
specific territories was emerging and constantly being modified by the engineering 
companies.    
These differences have effects both on the networks of the two devices and on the way I have 
approached them; during the valuation process leading to a definition of the tariff, the success 
(measured in terms of its capacity to boost wind power development) was stressed. 
Meanwhile, these associations were also targeted by opponents of the feed-in tariff through 
attempts at disconnecting resemblances between the French system, and, e.g., Denmark 
and/or Germany, as will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 4. The network of the feed-in 
tariff was thus both its strength and its weakness.
But these differences also affected the way I approached and designed my study of the two 
devices. The study of the feed-in tariff emphasizes the valuation of wind power as a process 
of qualification, a process addressing both the ‘cleanliness’ and the performance of the 
energy, as well as the specific network configuration of the French electricity system, which 
is either opened and debated or black-boxed. The tariff was defined six years before my 
fieldwork started, and gathering data was done mostly in the form of reports and documents 
supplemented by interviews. Given the leap in time between the process of valuation and my 
inquiry, the documents were crucial as a way of capturing the richness of debates and topics 
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addressed during the negotiations of defining a price. The recollection of the interviewees 
could sometimes be triggered from fragments of the reports or communications written at the 
time of the negotiations. The ZDE was made an obligatory point of passage for all wind 
power projects eligible for the feed-in tariff at approximately the same time as the fieldwork 
began. This timing has possibly increased the attention paid (mine as well as those I 
interviewed) to both the origins of the device as well as its practice under development. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of the device is organized around these phases, which are also 
stressed by Foucault as crucial to the dynamic of the device as dispositif; its conception and 
its practice (Dumez and Jeunemaitre 2010). Making this distinction makes sense in the case of 
the ZDE, as the conception of the device presents a framing to which the practice must obey, 
all the while remaining flexible as to the distinct ways in which it may perform the practice. 
As one engineer put it:
“The ZDE has three criteria: the wind, the grid connection and the landscape, or more 
precisely, the landscape and the protection of natural heritage. But it does not have a 
technical aspect. That means that we can propose a ZDE which is entirely impossible, from a 
technical point of view, because of other constraints than those defined in the legislation”
(Int. Piedvache, my translation). 
On several occasions, I was met with similar accounts that pointed to the distinct framing via 
the three criteria, and the need for additional criteria developed by the engineers.  
 The analysis of the ZDE is primarily based on interviews as well as the documentation of the 
practice of zone definition in a specific case, i.e., the CdC du Pays de la Serre. As such, the 
inquiries take different forms and stress quite different elements of the device, which is partly 
conditioned by the device itself and partly by my research interests. My choice of how to 
organize the analysis of the two devices, and how to structure the gathering of data, then 
became constitutive of my accounts and descriptions of them both. As Dewey put it, “Method 
means that arrangement of subject matter which makes it most effective in use. Never is 
method something outside the material” (Dewey 1916: 165).  As such, the way I have 
arranged my studies of the two devices is not simply the effect of an existing reality; it is not 
the ‘nature’ of the devices that defines the ‘how to’ of conducting the inquiry. It is, as stressed 
by Law, my interactions with the world that create (my) reality by focusing on some elements 
and networks, all the while ignoring others (Law 2004). The studies to be presented and their 
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role in the overall research design were not the only ways to organize the studies, rather this 
organizing takes part in creating the ‘subject matter’; “Method is not antithetical to subject 
matter; it is the effective direction of subject matter to desired results” (Dewey 1916: 165). 
The outcome of this process of co-construction is presented in the following two chapters, but 
for the present, I will briefly comment on the process. 
3.3.1DevicesasPerformed
The feed-in tariff, in the account to be presented here, has become a device for framing 
valuation. Whether the price to be defined was presented as ‘purely’ a political number or as a 
carefully calculated price based on the costs of constructing wind parks, a number had to 
eventually be settled for and at least temporarily stabilized. As I started to inquire into the 
making of the tariff, it was clear from the outset that it was a controversial number, and it was 
contested in various places (Poignant 2003; CRE 2001 and 2006; Le Monde 2007; Le Figaro 
2008). As I will describe in more depth in the following chapter, once I reached what I 
thought to be my final destination, the DGEMP20 (who eventually signed authorship for the 
tariff), the fabric of the number disappeared. From the interview with an employee at 
DGEMP, actual calculation, he assured me, was behind the number – but I could not be 
allowed to see the calculation. Therefore, my inquiry into the price-making became a question 
of finding traces of inputs, which are used to the make the tariff, rather than opening the 
black-box of calculation. Some of these traces would be counter-calculations, others simply 
manifest non-calculating, e.g., refusing the ‘efficiency’ or ‘accuracy’ of prices generated at 
desks rather than through the market. Following these traces, five specific attempts of 
valuation kept appearing as reference points or simply spurring controversies, such as: “Well, 
in principle you could fix a tariff, as for example CRE’s weird methodology” (Int. Durant, my 
translation). Common to them all is that they, in some way, address the value of wind power 
as well as the role of the tariff to the development of wind power. This creates a patchwork of 
qualifications of wind power, electricity systems, and price mechanisms, and eventually 
creates what Callon refers to as a polyphonic narrative:
“The choice of method obeys no epistemological imperative, since it is entirely dictated by the 
state of the network. If the network standardizes itself then one is bound to count and 
20 Direction Générale de l’Energie et des Matières Premières, a French agency for energy and natural resources. 
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calculate. If it is divergent and reversible, then excessive simplification (and quantification) 
will betray the state of the network, and it is better just to tell a story! Each actor is relatively 
unpredictable because any translation is constantly being undone. Here, then, the only 
faithful – indeed intelligible – method is that of literary description. Such description 
multiplies points of view to form a polyphonic narrative distributed over as many voices as 
there are actors, and recovers all relevant details” (Callon 1991: 152). 
Assembling these accounts, which do indeed multiply points of view’, into a narrative 
contributes to the construction of an object, i.e., the feed-in tariff as a device for controversial 
valuation via qualifications of wind power.
The study of the ZDE-device unfolds in a somewhat different way. Starting as a case study of 
an emerging practice of zone-definition, the very different views of the role and identity of the 
device that I constantly met during my interviews and readings of legislative documents, 
journals, and academic papers made me follow it back to its conception. This, as I will 
describe in detail in Chapter 5, became yet another version of the device, and thus simply 
added to the polyphony. Eventually, I chose to construct the account of the ZDE around two 
phases, taking inspiration from the Foucauldian distinction between the conception and 
practice of a device as creating its dynamics (see Dumez and Jeunemaitre 2010). This ties the 
ZDE to a network opposed to wind power development on French territory, all the while 
following the emerging practice of engineers as they delineate zones favourable to wind 
power development. Organizing the study around these phases drags to the forefront a certain 
tension in the device, a tension which at the same time problematizes wind power through its 
relation to the territory/landscape, and at the same time transforms the issue into a 
manageable practice of breaking down the landscape into single variable layers. But 
representing the device as two phased is not innocent in the process of the creation of reality, 
which also holds true of the choice to represent the feed-in tariff device as a polyphonic 
account. This is not to do away with the studies as perspectivalism, “we are not dealing with 
different and possibly flawed perspectives on the same object” (Law 2004: 55, emphasis in 
original), but to stress how the objects – the two devices – are performed through my 
theoretical lenses and my interaction with the field. Accordingly, different objects are 
produced by different method assemblages; they may overlap, but they are not the same 
(ibid.).
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3.3.2CdCduPaysdelaSerre
The inquiry into the practices of defining wind power development zones is studied through 
the case of CdC du Pays de la Serre. Settling on this particular case, rather than the two other 
cases (CdC du Pays Neslois and CdC de Rosieres en Santerre, both situated in Picardie) that I 
also followed in the initial phase, was primarily a question of the stages of the process in 
which the projects were at the time of my fieldwork; one being already accepted by the 
prefect, the other still in its early phases of negotiation. I conducted interviews with mayors 
from both CdCs as well as the engineers in charge of the process. Though my plan was to do 
observational studies of the practices of the engineers, my stay in France heading towards its 
end, forced me to limit my study to interviews. And settling with CdC du Pays de la Serre, 
who had just finished their proposal, I was allowed to address questions towards the entire 
process of making the proposal while people were still around and able to remember the work 
they had contributed to. Interviews may not be the best way of grasping practice, so to 
construct a situation that could evoke rich accounts, I would use the maps (the outcome of the 
practice) as a way of ‘triggering’ descriptions. 
Amongst other criteria that led me to eventually end up with the case of CdC du Pays de la 
Serre was its location in the Picardie region. The region’s proximity to Paris, where I was 
living, allowed me to visit the field frequently (nine visits in all) as well as the large number 
of ZDE projects emerging in Picardie (partly due to its good wind regime), as I mention in 
Chapter 5. Furthermore, the CdC du Pays de la Serre had hired an engineering company, 
Airele, to undertake the project. Airele had been conducting other ZDE projects for several 
other CdCs, and thus the experience and the distinct practice they were developing allowed 
me to consider my findings; not as generalizable, but as anchored in a practice extending 
beyond my specific case. Plichon, the engineer responsible for the project in Airele, would on 
several occasions speak of his and his colleagues’ work as a practice under constant 
evaluation and continuous development.  But these criteria of selection were, at the same 
time, providing some of the distinctiveness of the case; whereas the study does not find many 
traces of a strong local opposition, be that qualified as NIMBYism or something else (for a 
further discussion, see Chapter 5), this would probably have been different for other ZDE 
projects. To CdC du Pays de la Serre, CdC du Pays Neslois, and CdC de Rosieres en Santerre 
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(the two cases of my preliminary studies), some ‘regional’ characteristics were repeated; land 
as being an integral part of a production regime – whether agriculture, energy production or 
mining – as well as an aging population scattered over large territories, which created a need 
for income to cover the growing expenses of caring for the elderly. The engineer responsible 
for the ZDE project in CdC de Rosieres en Santerre had conducted a survey of the social 
perception of the landscape, and when she asked the inhabitants: “Can you tell me about your 
landscape? Well, they do not know. To them, Santerre is not a landscape! You know it's silly, 
but for them, it [a landscape] is the valley of the Somme, it is the sea, or the mountain, but 
Santerre, it is flat and, well just flat!” (Int. Piedvache, my translation). This perception of the 
landscape – or the lack of landscape – is likely to facilitate the planning of wind power 
projects on the territory, at least in terms of acceptance by the population. Had my studies 
involved ZDEs in other locations, where the landscape was actually regarded as such, 
opposition would potentially have been a more central issue in my findings.   
3.3.3CaseStudies–MultisitedandMultitemporal
The inquiry into the ZDE-device has made me visit many sites, from the offices of the French 
Parliament to engineering companies, as well as the offices of the CdC, DRIRE21, EDF and 
RTE, and eventually, the (very) small village of Autremencourt. Therefore, as a case study, it 
was not easily delimited within a single location or organization (Bryman 2004), but rather 
took place in multiple and fragmented contexts (e.g., Marcus 1995; Czarniawska 1998). All of 
these places have been important to my gradual understanding of the ZDE as device, both in 
terms of its origins and the issues it associates with, but also the practice of engineers as they 
analyse and deconstruct the landscape until they eventually present a map of zones favourable 
to wind power development. But it was an ‘open-ended’ process where one interview or 
document would guide me to the next, rather than a well-defined list of people to speak to or 
reports to read. The three reports produced by Airele as the project went on (Airele 2006a, 
2006b, and 2007) were the anchors in this process; they would help me ask about different 
particularities of the practice, e.g., why zones would change status (from constrained to 
favourable). Also, the reports would help me frame questions about the production of the 
21  The Regional Office for Industry, Research and Environment. 
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maps or follow traces to agencies or people to interview by following those consulted during 
the process (e.g., RTE) or those receiving the final report (e.g., DRIRE).
Both the devices of the study are distributed over time and place, but this is particularly 
relevant to the ZDE-device: Stressing its conception as well as its practice, the device is both 
the effect of work and debates in the French Parliament (as well as in its corridors), and it is 
the outcome of the emerging practice of engineers in small towns distributed around France. 
In each of these places, the device is something different, and constructing an account of the 
device, then, becomes an outcome of often incoherent descriptions. For example, as 
mentioned earlier, the ZDE may be a tool for planning electricity development, organizing 
local democracy, etc., and likewise the feed-in tariff may be a monetary compensation for the 
market failing to take into account the pollution of fossil fuel technologies, a support of an 
emerging industry, a statement against nuclear power, etc. By no means is the aim here to 
conclude on the ‘essence’ of the devices, but rather to create a description that does not 
discriminate between these descriptions. In other words, the study strives towards a 
symmetrical gathering of material without any differentiation between statements as to their 
consistency with other accounts (Law 2004). Though this may have created substantial 
confusion several times during my fieldwork, when statements appeared to be contradictory, 
rather than discarding the interviews that appeared inconsistent with my emerging 
understanding of the devices, they were included – as will become apparent throughout the 
two following chapters. To me, the devices are the outcome of these different realities; they 
do not exist in spite of them. They are what John Law terms non-coherent realities (Law 
2004). Or, as Miller referencing Paul Veyne states, it may be a true account, but an account 
that comes about as a ‘fabric of incoherences’ (Miller 1997: 356).
However, though we may accept our accounts as made up of incoherencies, they must still 
relate to the phenomenon that is the object of study, and Miller’s comment to Latour’s famous 
mantra of ‘follow the actor’ becomes crucial: “It presupposes that we know the boundaries of 
the project at the outset. While the territory of a project may not be limitless, neither is it as 
clear-cut as you make it” (Miller 1997: 363). This is the never-ending challenge to anyone 
doing research with an ANT-inspired point of departure, and crucial to the ways we move 
around in the field and gather our materials. 
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3.4GatheringFieldMaterials
This study is based on fieldwork undertaken in France between 2007 and 2008. Before 
leaving for France in July 2007, I conducted seven interviews with employees at the Danish 
Energy Agency, the Danish TSO (Transmission System Operator), and the Danish wind 
industry association, and another two interviews after my return. These interviews served as 
an introduction to my broader understanding of issues at stake in getting wind power 
connected to the grid, as well as tracing the history of the Danish feed-in tariff. After arriving 
in France, and over the course of the next year, I interviewed twenty-four people, some on 
several occasions. They covered a broad range of professions, e.g., developers, consultants 
from engineering companies, grid operators (from both RTE and EDF), economists from 
agencies such as DGEMP and ADEME, politicians (local and national) and members of the 
bureaucratic staff of the French Parliament, and DRIRE.  Furthermore, I followed a seminar 
at Ecole des Mines on renewable energies in the grid, and read through a variety of legal 
documents and debates in the senate.  
3.4.1Interviews
The interviews were all semi-structured (e.g., Kvale 1997, Bryman 2004). The first round of 
interviews was related to my inquiry into the tariff, and I would use each interview to find out 
where to go next, not unlike ‘snowball sampling’ (see Noy 2008). Given the distributed 
character of my objects of inquiry, in particular the fact that they could not be located within a 
single organization such as a particular hospital ward or a distinct unit of a company, I would 
use the accounts as a way of detecting new places and new people to talk to. It was during the 
interviews themed around the feed-in tariff that the ZDE kept surfacing, and I eventually 
decided to follow the trajectory of this device too. As an example, a developer would tell me:
“The instatement of the ZDE, which is presently happening, will have the effect that EDF, 
especially through RTE, will decide on the construction of large electrical transformer 
stations” (Int. Lamarre, my translation).  
This would take me to EDF and RTE to pursue this line of inquiry, and as such, the ‘follow 
the actor’, though this was not a material object that I could simply follow as it moved 
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around. Rather, it was the lines that were drawn as I moved around in the field that guided me 
to the next person to see. Whereas the feed-in tariff was defined by a national agency – on 
behalf of the government – and seen almost as a historical event, the access to the engineers 
behind the ZDE, at the time of the fieldwork an on-going negotiation with the prefect, was at 
first a more delicate balancing act in which participation should constantly be accepted by the 
hosting institution, the CdC. In other words, whereas the valuation followed in Chapter 4 is 
following contributions to the valuation of wind power, regardless of the institutional 
affiliations of the contributors, the analysis of the ZDE-device was not limited to the interior 
of the CdC but kept moving back and forth between the CdC and Airele (the engineering 
company), DRIRE, etc. The CdC constantly needed to confirm their acceptance of my access 
to the practices unfolding around their case, which was not problematic but time consuming. 
Getting access to the people I interviewed was generally uncomplicated, and my nationality 
(Danish) was often a facilitator; Denmark is and was known for its very successful 
development of wind power, and many of the interviewees were eager to learn about the 
Danish case or simply wanted to discuss differences and similarities between Denmark and 
France. Meanwhile, this constant presence of black-boxed ‘macro-actants’, i.e., the Danish 
energy system and the French energy system, would also frame the accounts towards a rather 
distinctive comparative modality:  
“Well, in Denmark you started out by having a co-ownership model, where the locals were 
asked to buy shares in the projects. That is what makes the difference; we [in France] do not 
have that. That is one reason for the local opposition” (Int. Lamarre, my translation).    
As such, what served me as a ‘way in’ to the worlds of the interviewees was simultaneously 
framing the accounts constructed throughout these interviews. No doubt, this way of getting 
my interviewees ‘interested’ has influenced the data but by continuously pushing questions of 
‘how’ something was done rather than why (Becker 1998). Asking how a zone moved from 
‘constrained’ to ‘favourable’ (to wind power development), rather than why, a question which 
could potentially prompt a more defensive reaction, allowed rich descriptions of a practice 
evolving in between the ‘objectivity’ of the engineering of the zones and the politics being 
played out in the CdC.
Most of the interviews were transcribed. In the early phases of the fieldwork, all interviews 
were transcribed from start to finish, literally, but as I was pinning down the particular 
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analytical perspective, and moving towards well-defined research objects, I was getting 
increasingly selective as to the time-consuming activity of transcribing and started writing 
summaries of parts of the interviews. Two interviews were not entirely recorded, because they 
took place while visiting Autremencourt and its surroundings and the facilities of RTE in 
Lille. During these visits I would take notes, and pictures, and note down quotes that appeared 
particularly interesting. After the interviews, I wrote elaborate summaries of these ‘touring’ 
interviews. Eventually, these transcripts would form the ground for the analyses, and they 
would become subjected to ordering exercises, which I will briefly return to below.
3.4.2DocumentsandMaps
In both analyses, documents, reports, and memos were central to mapping either the valuation 
process or the practice of the ZDE. Given that the valuation of the feed-in tariff was taking 
place years before my fieldwork, the reports and memos were central to following the traces 
of those contributing to the process. That being said, contributions that did not make their way 
into these documents were less likely to be made visible – and thus heard – in the study of the 
feed-in tariff. Often, the reports and memos would include calculations or counter-
calculations and are often referenced in other documents. My intention has been to approach 
calculations and statements symmetrically, by essentially stressing the qualification work of 
the individual valuation processes, as something not necessarily expressed in numbers. The 
‘relaxation’ of calculation into the notion of qualculation (see Chapter 2) enabled the 
symmetrical approach to these statements as ‘equal’ expressions of qualification, whether 
expressed in numbers or as statements.   
In the study of the ZDE-device, the three phases of the practice, well-documented in reports, 
are used as background for interviews as well as the analysis. A central element of these 
reports are the maps, which both mediate the zone definition and are the tools of the 
engineers; mapping layers of constraints according to distinct criteria is at the heart of the 
engineering of the landscape as it was demonstrated to me, and as such, the maps perform the 
engineers emerging practice. During the interviews we would flip through the maps, and the 
engineer would point out how constraints would produce zones unfavourable to wind power 
development, something that I would note down on the printout of each map. Few of the maps 
are used in the analysis, but they become illustrations of the results of the practice. As I began 
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writing up the analysis, the extent to which these maps became an objectification of the 
messiness of the landscapes they were analysing became clear to me. However, as I had left 
France and my fieldwork had been forced to end, I could not pursue this line of inquiry 
further. But the constant dualism in the accounts of the engineers, between the local 
populations’ emotional relation to their landscape and the objectivity of their own process, is 
discussed throughout Chapter 5.
Both analyses make use of official documents authored by government agencies as well as 
transcripts of debates in parliament. The two devices are, to some extent, merely textual 
devices, either specifying the level of the feed-in tariff, as well as the conditions under which 
it may be paid, or the guidelines for making a ZDE proposal. These documents would serve as 
the framework from where I started opening up their black-boxes: The tariff as number and 
the origin of the ZDE, as well as the emerging practice for defining zones, which takes place 
outside the government agencies authoring the guidelines. I would bring these documents 
along when interviewing and ask specific questions about the texts and the ways in which 
they would affect the work of the engineers.
3.4.3FromFieldworktoAnalysisandTexts
My empirical analysis is framed around the two devices, but in many ways, this distinction – 
though guiding me throughout the fieldwork – was not clear-cut during the interviews. Many 
interviews would include discussions on both of the devices regarding their intersections, but 
also as some of the primary tools of organizing wind power development in France. 
Therefore, writing the two analyses included an element of differentiating and sorting the 
accounts provided around the two devices into two separate studies; though inter-related, they 
were still made singular studies. As I went through the transcripts of the interviews, and I 
realized the extent to which the accounts of the devices were intertwined, I nonetheless 
ordered the sequences of the interviews according to the two devices and eventually wrote 
two separate analyses. The way I have structured the two analyses (Chapters 4 and 5) attempts 
partly to capture some of these connections; firstly, they are presented chronologically as the 
devices were adopted, and secondly, the landscape as a matter of concern being partly the 
effect of the feed-in tariff is discussed as a motivation for developing the ZDE-device. This 
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dynamic of the two devices may be lost to some extent because they are made two separate 
studies.
As I started to tap into the accounts, the controversies and incoherencies between them began 
to surface, and this prompted me to think about how to make sense of the different realities 
that they represented. Also, there seemed to be an emerging interest in the notions of 
politicization and economization (Callon 2009; Callon 2010; Muniesa 2011). Though these 
concepts were still rather undeveloped, and unexplored empirically, they eventually became 
the hooks I employed to untangle some of the controversies and trials of strength I met during 
my fieldwork. Therefore, the concepts were not yet explicit to me during the interviews, but 
rather became a way of making sense of the material gathered from the fieldwork. 
Admittedly, putting these concepts to use has been a challenging and often frustrating task; as 
processes, they seem to constantly feed into each other and constantly displace the object 
submitted to either politicization or economization. For example, wind power may be made 
‘politicized’, i.e., be made debatable and pushed towards political decision-making, by 
‘economizing’ CO2-emissions from different energy technologies. The object is replaced, 
from the renewable energy technology to emissions, and it all comes down to the network 
associations that these processes build upon. The discussion of politicization and 
economization is unfolded in the discussion and is only vaguely present throughout the two 
analyses. In the discussion (Chapter 6), I will elaborate on the ‘explanatory power’ of these 
notions as well as their limitations.    
3.4.4OnBeingLostinTranslation
Finally, a few words need to be said about the many translations of this inquiry. Though 
translation – both from the technicalities of a distinct profession as well as from one language 
to another – is often the conditions for doing research, these studies present an abundance of 
translations; the technicalities of the grid, of lines, electrons and their transformations, and the 
economists and their tools and models, all of which were very unfamiliar to me. My approach 
in these situations has been to make my status as the ‘ingenuous outsider’ a resource for 
asking naïve questions, something that has often prompted interesting answers. This would 
often need some explanation, as in France I was a researcher from Ecole des Mines (an 
engineering school) and therefore often taken for a ‘knowledgeable insider’. Therefore, I 
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would stress my background in the social sciences. As a result, during an early interview, the 
interviewee took this information as an opportunity to improvise a presentation of the grid as 
an ‘electrical grid for dummies’. This introduction became a structuring understanding to the 
fieldwork that followed. Also, the French political system, and the many agencies I have 
visited, was new to me, and the many interviewees took it upon themselves to inform me – 
often in very judgemental ways – in order to demonstrate aspects of the French political 
system and bureaucracy unfamiliar (and often surprising) to me.  
Finally, the translation from French, via Danish, to eventually end up as an English text may 
potentially have created some misunderstandings or lapses along the way. The interview 
transcripts were in French, and only the sequences used as quotes have been translated into 
English. The strategy I have chosen, hoping to minimize misunderstandings, was to be as 
literal as possible in my translations, something that occasionally compromises the 
‘eloquence’ of the quotes.  This is a choice of style, but I wish to stress that to the extent that 
my translations make the interviewees less well-articulated falls back entirely on the work of 
putting their accounts into English. 
3.5AndSoWhat?
So what does all of the above do for a study, a scientific account, like the one at hand? Well, 
first of all, the result has become a demonstration of the nitty-gritty details of two market 
devices, the controversies they span, the trials of strength that they eventually fold, the 
relating to landscapes as well as the technicalities of those involved in defining prices and 
zones for wind power projects. A quote by Homer Simpson, referenced by Liz McFall, 
immediately comes to mind: “[y]ou take forever to say nothing” (McFall 2009: 276). 
Obviously, I believe that something is to be gained from a study such as the one at hand, but I 
also believe that the criticism underlying Homer’s statement should be addressed. As McFall 
continues:
“Despite all the jargon and terminological novelty the main result [of the ‘new’ new 
economic sociology] has been regarded, in some quarters and with some justification, as a 
plethora of banal description of processes and objects of limited, if any, general interest. This 
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criticism is related to a broader concern that in departing from the heartland of political 
economy analyses of categories like class and capital the field championed research that was 
not only banal but apolitical” (McFall 2009: 276). 
I am very aware that it might seem ignorant to plunge into a study of so-called political 
markets without paying credit to all those who have researched production and consumption 
at the intersection of economics, law, and political science for decades. Starting out by casting 
away the qualification ‘political’ of wind power markets is not, however, an attempt at 
depoliticizing the construct, but rather a question of remaining open to how and what kind of 
politics is being played out. From the point of view of this dissertation, all markets are 
necessarily political, and here I believe that Fligstein’s contribution to economic sociology is 
a crucial contribution, though our perspectives on what ‘markets as politics’ means are far 
from identical. To me, the idea of greenhouse gas emissions and their associated market 
failures are endowed with politics, which also holds true for the electrical grid;  it eventually 
constructs the movements and behaviours of electrons and thus becomes disciplining and 
performative as to the suitability and not least profitability of energy technologies.
And this brings me to a second point, namely, the extent to which this study may say anything 
about markets other than the French market for wind power. The label ‘political market’ is 
one that is easily extended to, and used to describe, many markets for renewable or 
sustainable products. But given that this thesis does not present an inquiry into the ‘political 
market’ as a category, to what use may we put the details of site-specific controversies and 
negotiations unfolding around the two devices studied here.
 Making more general claims is often a critical question for those conducting case-studies and 
at best turned into a question of case selection (e.g., Flyvbjerg 2004, Silverman 2005), and 
thus rather a question of categories and representativeness. In the hands of Latour, drawing on 
Isabelle Stengers and Vinciane Despret, generalization becomes a quest for the proliferation 
of differences rather than their elimination; instead of seeking to decrease or minimize 
alternatives and variations of a given phenomenon, generalization should strive to “be a 
vehicle to travel through as many differences as possible” (Latour 2004: 214). According to 
Latour, this distinction illustrates what should be made a differentiation between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ generalizations and thus has epistemological consequences: 
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“The good ones are those who allow to connect widely different phenomena and thus to 
generate even more recognition of unexpected differences by engaging a few entities into the 
life and fate of many others. The bad ones are those who because they had had such a local 
success try to produce generality, not by connection of new differences, but by the discounting 
of all remaining differences as irrelevant” (ibid.).
In that respect, the two devices investigated in the chapters to follow do connect widely, both 
in terms of the places mobilized as part of their networks as well as the phenomena they 
attempt to order. From the ordering of territories and landscapes to the ordering of prices and 
profitability levels, the study demonstrates the constant economization and/or politicization of 
matters of concern. Is this suggesting that the devices of these ‘political markets’ always 
unfold and refold issues according to the same modalities of ordering? No. But it does suggest 
that the practices and processes involved and involving these devices are so much more than 
simply ‘political’; i.e., a rational strategic means of obtaining a politically sought result.
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4.ASSEMBLINGVALUE–ORVALUABLEASSEMBLAGES
Christian Riisager was happy to see, that the experimental connection of his backyard wind 
turbine to the electrical, mentioned in the opening of this thesis, led to his meter running 
backwards. But an economic compensation was neither the driver nor the first priority for 
either Riisager or the utility. Therefore, a price on wind power was not the immediate result of 
his successful connection to the grid. Rather, Riisager, at least retrospectively, argued that 
renewable energy as part of the energy sector could prove valuable, not least in light of the 
energy crises of the 1970’s. As such, the connection of the small wind turbine to the grid was 
yet again a connection to a larger societal frame of value, in particular, independence from the 
dominant owners of fossil fuel resources. Today, however, wind power producers in many 
European countries have, over the last few decades, received compensation through different 
governance models such as feed-in tariffs, call to tender programs (bidding systems), and 
sometimes green certificate systems. These systems imply that wind power has become 
priced, albeit in different ways, and it is this process of valuation that is stressed throughout 
the following chapter. As such, this first analysis addresses one central theme of both 
economics as well as the marketization programme, namely, that of pricing.  
This chapter presents the making of value for wind power through the feed-in tariff. By means 
of inquiring into the device, the analysis also produces insights on the marketization of wind 
power, in general. Firstly, the chapter retraces the making of the French tariff; from the black 
box of ‘8,38 c€/kWh’ emerges a process of qualification of both wind power as well as of the 
device (the feed-in tariff) through which value, in some sense, is articulated. Here, the 
underlying concept of the assemblage points us to the links that are made with the nuclear 
energy market as well as the configuration of the device itself. Through the assemblage with 
the nuclear power system, prices are made comparable and become inputs to qualifications of 
the proposed device, i.e., the feed-in tariff. These qualifications are traced through five 
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different valuations, which all have in common that they address the value of wind power in 
some way, as well as the device and its framing of wind power.  
Before addressing the distinct valuations, however, this chapter will start with a brief 
description of the early French wind power development history, after which the theoretical 
backdrop for discussing value(s) and price will be presented. 
4.1ImagesofaNumber
At the outset, one aim of my fieldwork was to follow the emergence of the French feed-in 
tariff system, and not least the negotiations involved in finally reaching 8,38 c€/kWh of wind 
power. Voting for a certain governance system, in this case the feed-in tariff, is one thing, but 
settling on a tariff – or a price – to express the tariff is another thing. Having read a number of 
articles by former ADEME employee, Bernard Chabot, and his discussion of the calculative 
methods leading to the French feed-in tariff (Chabot 2001a; Chabot and Saulnier 2001; 
Chabot et al. 2002; Chabot and Buquet 2006; Gipe and Chabot 2006), I set out to find the 
calculation used to ‘value’ wind power in France.
This chapter is about the making of the French feed-in tariff. However, my interest in the 
‘calculation of a tariff’ was partly raised earlier, before arriving in France. While I was 
conducting an interview with a bureaucrat from the Danish Energy Agency, I asked him how 
the Danish tariff had come about, and he answered with the following comment: “It is not a 
calculation as such … it is a politically fixed number” (Int. Lawaetz, my translation). He 
continued: “… if you have offered [the wind power developers] 10 øre, and nothing comes 
from it, well, then you have to come up with a higher number” (ibid.). So, on the one hand, I 
had an elaborate presentation of a calculation method (called the Profitability Index Method) 
developed by Bernard Chabot and his agency (ADEME), which was argued to have been part 
of fixing the French feed-in tariff. On the other hand, the tariff was presented as a ‘politically 
defined’ figure by a Danish bureaucrat, and not the conclusion of a calculation or a method. 
The latter presentation again raises the question: How does one define a number politically? 
Does it mean that it reflects the political climate, or ‘simply’ that it is the outcome of a 
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political struggle? According to the Danish bureaucrat, it could potentially involve a process 
of trial-and-error (“if nothing comes from it, you’ll have to put out a higher number”), where 
the tariff is corrected until the desired outcome is achieved.  
Having met these rather different accounts of the procedures behind the making of the tariff 
sparked my interest in the calculation – or perhaps rather, the making of the number. The two 
accounts seemed to be in opposition, with one stressing the ‘objectivity’ of the calculation and 
its ability to safeguard against inefficiencies by ensuring ‘fair profitability’ to the developers 
(i.e., cancelling undue rents), and the other as a political process involving trial-and-error.
Both, however, seemed intriguing fabrications of a figure. Put differently, my initial questions 
at some point resonate with the (rhetorical) question raised by Marion Fourcade in her 
discussion of the pricing of an environmental disaster, the Exxon Valdez accident and its 
despoiling of Alaska’s Prince William Sound: “Was this a ‘rational’ number?” (Fourcade 
2011: 52). Though my aim was not to conclude on the rationality of the number, but rather the 
construction of an assemblage in which rationality could be measured, I decided to follow the 
negotiations leading to a price of 8,38 c€/kWh.  
However, let it be said from the beginning that I never found the calculation. I found other 
calculations in favour of the tariff and calculations disqualifying it. Having tried to follow the 
tariff back to its origins (Latour 1996), I eventually ended up ‘in the right place’, i.e., in the 
house where the calculation was actually performed, as I was told. However, I was refused 
access to the actual calculation. But rather than abandoning the field when denied access to 
the calculations of the tariff, this story became a story of ‘who’ uses calculation and ‘how’ 
they use it, as well as a story of how to politicize and/or economize this governance system. 
Whereas this discussion may resemble questions of ‘trust’ (Porter 1995) or ‘distrust’ (Power 
2003) in numbers, this chapter stresses the whereabouts of calculations – they are made public 
at some places and hidden at others. 
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4.2From‘CallstoTender’Towards‘FeedinTariffs’–DevicesatPlay
Historically, France has generated little impetus in relation to renewable energy22 (Szarka 
2007). But in 1996, a tender program called ‘EOLE 2005’ was launched. The formulated aim 
was to trigger the development of the French wind power capacity to reach a target of 250-
500 MW by 2005 (Laali and Benard 1999). However, following four rounds of calls to tender, 
only 70 MW were issued (though submission and selection rounds accepted up to 324 MW) 
(Cochet 2000; Nadaï 2007; Szarka 2007). In a report in 2000, Yves Cochet named the limited 
success of the EOLE 2005 programme “the [French] invention of virtual wind power”
(Cochet 2000: 41, my translation).   
Later in 2000, the EOLE 2005 was abandoned23 and the Electricity Act set the scene for a 
new dual system that combined calls for tender and feed-in tariffs. This turn towards feed-in 
tariffs was influenced by the Green party and was motivated by the success seen in other 
European countries, such as Germany and Denmark, with regard to their relatively high rate 
of wind power development (Int. Yves Cochet).
The dual system made the distinction between smaller wind parks, with a maximum capacity 
of 12 MW, and large projects beyond 12 MW24. Only the small installations qualified for the 
tariffs (fixed in 2001 at 8,38c€/kWh). Larger installations remained organized according to a 
call for tender principle. In practice, however, this has generally resulted in developers 
breaking down their projects into smaller projects not exceeding the 12 MW limit (Int. 
Lamarre; Int. Lefebvre) simply because the feed-in tariff appeared more ‘economic’ than the 
uncertain price that emerged from the call to tender.  
In its main features, the French system reproduced the German Renewable Energy Sources 
Act of 2000 (Szarka 2007; Int. Cochet). Firstly, the feed-in tariff contains a ‘purchase 
obligation’, i.e., that all wind power projects accepted as qualified for the feed-in tariff are 
22 Apart from the large hydro projects undertaken between the two wars (Szarka 2007).  
23 Though the general argument for calls for tender is that it keeps costs controlled, it was criticized for lowering 
the price below what was feasible for the developers (Cochet 2000; Nadaï 2007). 
24 The 12MW threshold was described as a pure coincidence, as Cochet described it: “There was put a cap on – 
one was not entitled to more than 12 megawatts […] the 12 megawatts, it was an amendment to the Act of 
February 10, 2000, 8 years ago, an amendment that was voted at 3 am during a parliamentary debate. People 
were going crazy at 3 am, you lose your reason: we said 12 megawatts, it could have been 50 megawatts, it 
could have been 100. People voted anything! Well, it has remained arbitrary, it is not based on technical studies 
at all, it is purely one can say random” (Int. Cochet, my translation). 
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assured that the electricity they produce will be bought, in the case of France, by EDF at the 
price defined through the device. The first definition of the tariff introduced the principle of 
‘degression’ into the fixing of the tariff, based closely on the German tariff. However, the 
three ways in which the feed-in tariff was articulated in France were distinctive, namely: 
 a reduction of 3.3% in the tariff each year after 2003; 
 a further reduction of 10% once a threshold of 1500 MW of capacity was installed 
(these lower rates being applicable to new constructions); 
 a ‘price tier’ system whereby the same initial tariff was payable in all cases for the 
first five years, but for the following ten years, tiered tariffs were applied in relation to 
output. Rates were calculated according to a sliding scale based on full-load hours 
(using an average of three years of the first five, discarding the best and the worst 
years). Up to 2000 hours, the rate remained at 8.38 c€/kWh, dropping to 5.95 c€/kWh 
at 2600 hours, and to 3.05 c€/kWh for 3600 hours and above. 
Although the ‘degression’ element was criticized for lowering incentives over time to switch 
to renewable energy technologies, it stimulated interest from developers by offering higher 
tariffs early. Tiered pricing also favoured dispersal to lower wind sites, discouraging the 
‘wind rush’ phenomenon of excessive concentration in high wind-speed areas.
This brief outline of the feed-in tariff is fleshed out in the sections to follow. In particular, the 
feed-in tariff is discussed as the outcome of negotiations and the conflicting processes of 
valuations. But before unfolding the processes of valuation leading to the French feed-in 
tariff, I will briefly comment on recent developments within the sociology of prices and 
valuation.
4.3PriceandValue(s)
If we consider the feed-in tariff to be a price, and we do, the description made by Weber of 
the price system as the result of a market struggle (between men); i.e. the result between 
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conflicts and compromises25 (Weber 1978), is a quite precise description of the making of the 
French feed-in tariff (as will be illustrated below). But it is a price not determined in the 
market, per se, in that it is not the outcome of supply meeting demand. Rather, the pricing of 
wind power is found in the right side of the figure below. Though Weber described the 
struggle of the left-hand side of the figure, i.e., a market struggle, the point here is that a 
somewhat similar struggle is taking place in the forums of the right-hand side of Fourcade’s 
model.
Figure4.1:Thetworolesofeconomics
                   (From Fourcade 2011: 47)
With the figure above, Marion Fourcade makes a point of the role of economics in processes 
of valuation26; economists have, for some time now, moved into the valuation of goods 
25 Weber described prices and the “the price system as a struggle of man against man … and prices are 
expressions of the struggle; they are instruments of calculation only as estimated quantifications of relative 
chances in this struggle of interests” (Weber 1978: 108).
26 It is important to stress that the distinction between the two roles of economics made in the figure is a 
distinction between the role of the economists as well as the tools and technologies enrolled in the process of 
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outside the market sphere, operating “…by and large as if non-market goods were priceable 
… as if they were being traded on markets” (Fourcade 2011: 46, emphasis in original). 
Fourcade’s illustration of the two modes of valuation/pricing is also a comment on the so-
called Parsons’ Pact (see Stark 2009); a pact made between Talcott Parsons, as a sociologist, 
and the economists at Harvard, according to which economists would appropriate the study of 
value, and the sociologists the study of values (Stark 2009). According to Fourcade, this pact 
is long gone: From the point of view of the economists, values may be collapsed into value, as 
all objects may be subjected to an economic valuation process (Fourcade 2011). Whereas a 
critique of this ‘economization’ process of all domains of human existence is ongoing (e.g., 
Ackerman and Heinzerling 2004), quite a different point emerges from my fieldwork. Though 
the tariff may be expressed as value in the singular, the process of defining this value is a 
process in which values (in the plural), are mobilized, created, debated, and aligned – in other 
words; rather than being a straight-forward process of economists peacefully defining the 
price of wind power (collapsing values into value) outside or on the fringe of the market, the 
process includes qualifications and disqualifications of wind power, its value(s), not to 
mention greenhouse gas emissions and their sources. As such, in my study the processes of 
economization and politicization as intertwined are underscored.
A range of techniques are involved in the valuation of wind power as determined through the 
tariff, e.g., the IRR and PIM. Stressing these ‘valuation devices’ (see Doganova 2012) is 
central to shifting attention from value, as a subjective or objective property of the subject 
matter, towards valuation as a process (or an action). This shift in attention corresponds to the 
recently renewed interest in valuation as viewed by pragmatism, and in particular valuation in 
the work of Dewey (e.g., Muniesa 2007; Muniesa 2012; Stark 2009). Here, the distinction 
between value and valuation is stressed: 
“Value can be understood as something that something has by virtue of how people consider 
it (how they personally like it, in particular), but also as something that something has as a 
                         
deriving a price. As such, the figure does not mean to describe the market as a self-sustaining mechanism for 
deriving prices, or ignoring the negotiations and assembling that goes into making markets. Rather, it pays 
attention to situations in which economists, with tools such as cost-benefit analysis, contingent valuation, etc., 
make price(s) happen and to “a focus on economic valuation processes, where the value problem is much more 
general and encompasses everything that people care about (or are believed and made to care about)”
(Fourcade 2011: 46, emphasis in original). Therefore, the distinction is more of a distinction in practices of the 
economists undertaking pricing/valuation, as well as the situations in which they occur; e.g., in cases where 
markets do not exist and sometimes are not sought to exist.  
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result of its own condition and of its relation to other things (for instance, in relation to work 
or to money, or to any sort of standard metric). Valuation, in turn, refers to something that 
happens to something, and this happening can be a matter of consideration or of relation, or 
both at the same time” (Muniesa 2012: 26).
Centring attention on valuation, rather than value, involves a simultaneous attention to action 
because “valuation is a costly and irregular activity that brings value about” (ibid.: 27). Thus, 
value is the result emerging from processes of valuation. In the following, the price of 8,38 
c€/kWh is followed in the making, i.e., we follow the controversies, the calculations, the 
valuation devices, and the qualifications undertaken to associate wind power to a specific 
value – or no value at all. As part of this valuation process, the environment is often 
mobilized as something valuable in the image of prices of CO2 quotas, costs of emissions, or 
the qualities of the landscape, and monuments, etc. Factors such as these are sometimes made 
part of the calculation and are at other times absent. As Andrew Barry notes: 
“[t]hose involved in the market do not worry about morality or politics, not because they are 
immoral or apolitical, but because enormous efforts have been made to make morality and 
politics calculable, and make them happen in other places” (Barry 2002: 273).
Accordingly, it would be expected that market transactions involving wind power do not 
involve negotiations regarding the moral or political aspects of renewable energy, per se, 
because the calculation – or non-calculation – of tariffs or climate change consequences has 
been made, at least partly, calculable by economists on the fringe of the market. Therefore, 
wind power enters the market as an already valued configuration as in the right part of the 
figure above rather than being valued through the transaction in the market (as the left half of 
the figure illustrates).  
So, on the one hand, this is a story of a market device, and on the other hand, it is a story of 
value – in particular, the value put on wind power through the device. Whereas sociologists, 
according to Barry, often draw an opposition between calculation and politics (Barry 2002), 
this study attempts to go beyond such an a priori divide. Stressing the associations that are 
made, and unmade, the analysis demonstrates that valuation, whether in the hands of 
politicians or economists, is centred around the construction of assemblages in which 
associations between different values and wind power are made; furthermore, this chapter 
illustrates how the valuation is central to the assemblage of a market: Through the valuation, 
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associations are made or cut off, and categories are stabilized, all of which eventually affect 
the assemblage of the market, and in particular, its relation to competing markets. 
In the following, the framing of the feed-in tariff system and its translation into a specific 
price will be followed through different valuation propositions, offering or proposing 
themselves as ‘centers of calculation’ (Latour 1986).   
4.4QualificationandDisqualificationsoftheTariff–Tracing
Controversies
In the following, five different approaches to the tariff as a price are followed. These are (1) 
Yves Cochet, former minister and member of Parliament, and the author of the 2000 report 
“Stratégie et moyens de développement de l’efficacité énergétique et des sources d’énergie 
renouvelables en France”; (2) Bernard Chabot, former employee at ADEME; (3) CRE, an 
independent Commission charged with the surveillance of the electricity sector; and (4) 
DGEMP (Direction générale de l’énergie et des matières premières), the place where the tariff 
was actually defined; and finally (5) Serge Poignant, member of Parliament, and the author of 
the 2003 report “Rapport d’information sur la politique de soutien au developpement des 
énergie renouvelables”.   
These five approaches towards the feed-in tariff have continuously appeared during my 
fieldwork, through interviews, in reports, as well as in academic articles. Their selection is 
based on their strength in seeking to reconfigure the existing system, and at other times, 
attempts at reconfigurations that remained visible, as they left traces in the shape of 
references, calculations, qualifications, etc.27 Certainly, other approaches could have been 
added, e.g., SER (Syndicat des energies renouvelables), a French industrial organisation for 
renewable energy, who did participate in the working group leading up to DGEMP’s 
definition of the tariff. However, traces of their participation seemed to vanish in the field. 
Rarely were they mentioned, and never in relation to attempts at defining/altering the 
governance model or the tariff.
27 All of the following accounts of value were continuously referred to during field visits, in reports, or 
sometimes in academic articles (e.g., the Cochet report is referred to in a number of articles on French energy 
policy; Poignant and Chabot are also referred to frequently in various materials). 
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The five approaches are quite diverse in their morphology: For example, Yves Cochet was 
delegated the task of investigating the future of the energy-sector by former Prime Minister 
Jospin; Chabot was a senior-consultant in ADEME, a government agency concerned with 
environmental and energy issues, but nonetheless appeared to be working ‘in the wild’ as a 
researcher. DGEMP was purely delegated the task of articulating the tariff and the texts 
surrounding it. The differences in status and strength may seem striking, but for the present 
purpose, they have been followed because of the traces they have left in the field. The 
apparent morphology is therefore less important than the ways and whereabouts of their 
(dis)qualifications; they have become part of networks and have become representative of 
these through their translations.
The various qualifications/disqualifications of the feed-in tariff referred to here did not appear 
at the same time; there are three years between the report authored by Yves Cochet (2000) 
and the report of Serge Poignant (2003). But the existence of the feed-in tariff in the period of 
investigation was never an entirely settled and stabilized configuration. Again, it has been the 
traces of the work of qualification left behind that has been the selection criteria rather than a 
consistent time line.      
Finally, the (dis)qualification work unfolding around the feed-in tariff device is constantly 
related to the tender device in general, and the Eole 2005 discussed above in particular. The 
two devices are constantly juxtaposed and related; organization of the market through price 
(feed-in tariff) or quantity (call to tender) emerges as two opposing logics of market ordering. 
Furthermore, the two devices are related in such a way that a qualification of one of the two 
devices is a simultaneous disqualification of the other.
4.4.1Cochet–FramingtheForumforValuation
The feed-in tariff as a means of governing the French wind power production was set in 
motion in a report authored by Yves Cochet in 2000. Cochet was at that time a Member of 
Parliament representing The Green Party, and vice-president of the National Assembly. In 
July 2001 (to May 2002) he became Minister of Environment and Regional Planning, and he 
is today a member of the French National Assembly. In 2000, Prime Minister Jospin gave 
Yves Cochet the task of drawing up an account of the renewable energy situation in France. 
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Cochet was also asked to work out concrete ideas and recommendations for the government 
in order to implement further the EU Electricity Directive (Cochet 2000). 
To Cochet, electricity produced from renewable energy technologies, and in particular wind 
power, had proven successful in the years leading up to the time of his report. This success, he 
stressed, was anchored in its compatibility with the energy system, the recent industrial and 
societal development, and was accompanied by the ‘birth of a true market’ (Cochet 2000). 
However, this positive development was tightly connected to the governance systems 
organizing renewable energies, and in France the Eole 2005 had been at the heart of the 
invention of virtual wind power as mentioned above (Cochet 2000). In his evaluation of the 
development perspectives of renewable energy, Cochet proposed an objective of the 
installation of 10 000 MW wind power (onshore as well as offshore) by 2010.  Crucial to 
attaining this ambition was the choice of governance system:
“Only a support mechanism based on guaranteed purchase, at a sufficient level and duration 
of time, is likely to give vigorous impetus necessary to achieve this ambitious goal, but a goal 
not out of reach” (Cochet 2000: 115, emphasis in original, my translation).  
Crucial to Cochet’s valuation is thus his problematization of the Eole 2005 program (leading 
only to ‘virtual wind power’), and his proposed solution: A guaranteed price modelled on the 
German feed-in tariff.  Later, after the adoption of his proposal, the first feed-in tariff system 
often became referred to as the Cochet ruling (Cochet-arrêté). But the proposition of shifting 
from a bidding system, organized by EDF on behalf of the French state, was met by a firm 
opposition from various quarters:  
“These were the issues, we can say both ideological and technical at the same time, of people 
from the CRE, people from RTE, people from EDF, even people from the DGEMP, or people 
behind minister Christian Pierret; they said “Look, we already have too much nuclear 
electricity in France, we sell electricity [to neighbouring countries], why are the 
environmentalists going to annoy us with buying much more expensive renewable electricity, 
when we have the cheapest nuclear power in Europe… and we will be forced to buy much 
more expensive electricity from the environmentalists, with their shitty wind turbines… this is 
madness!”… There was this techno-ideological blockage, saying "we are the best in the 
world at nuclear electricity" which is true, we are the best in the world” (Int. Cochet, my 
translation). 
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This was the very hostile environment described by Cochet in which he was trying to 
introduce the feed-in tariff. Though the blockage or barrier he confronted might very well 
have its source in a nuclear techno-ideology (or ‘technopolitical’ regime, see Hecht 2009), the 
argument is fixed on prices. Nuclear energy is cheap, wind power is expensive. Making the 
connection between the feed-in tariff and the price of nuclear power, the respective 
technologies could be compared. But to do this, the energies must be ‘made one’. The account 
of the opposition retraced by Cochet is one in which prices are made the only difference; 
electricity is simply electricity, no matter the source of it. Recalling Riisager’s experiments, 
the connection of the wind turbine to the grid might have detached the good from its 
producer, but it simultaneously performed a qualification in which wind power electrons 
became simply electricity. In other words, the detachment performed through the connection 
to the grid is not simply a detachment from the producer, but also from the technology of 
production. Cochet, who did not believe in the merits of nuclear power, was opposed to the 
idea that prices alone should settle the controversy; to him the source of the energy was 
paramount. Therefore, Cochet’s account designates different values: nuclear waste, 
renewability, and the creation of new industries. Cochet translates wind power into different 
values and defies the ‘economist’s act’ of collapsing values into value. The opponents he 
describes, on the other hand, argue along a single value, namely that of price. The 
introduction of the tariff device becomes the pivotal centre around which these opposing 
arguments are launched, all the while creating the possibility of (re)translating wind power 
into a single value: a price.
Yves Cochet’s primary argument for the abandonment of the call for tender governance 
system was based upon the system’s inability to prove itself efficient: As mentioned above, 
the system had so far only led to ‘virtual’ wind power (Cochet 2000). To illustrate the 
inefficiency of the call for tender system and the success of the feed-in tariff system, Cochet 
presented the following table, summarizing the wind power status of a set of European 
countries:
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
Table4.1:WindPowerDevelopmentandPrice
Procedure Country Average price 
(cF/kWh)
MW connected 
in 1998
MW connected
in 1999
Guaranteed price 
Guaranteed price 
Guaranteed price 
Guaranteed price 
Calls to tender 
Calls to tender 
Calls to tender 
Green certificates 
Germany 
Denmark 
Spain
Italy 
France
Great Britain 
Ireland 
Holland 
57
50
49
45
32
30
29
Unknown
793
264
395
54
7
10
9
 42 
1569
289
346
101
0
18
4,7
45
                      (Cochet 2000: 42, my translation)
Tables like the above are often seen in discussions between different governance systems, 
linking governance systems to success/failure of the development rate as a function of the 
price they produce. Whereas the call to tender system has often been vented as the most 
‘market-like’ governance system (see e.g., Hvelplund 2001b), the way Cochet mobilizes the 
table is rather that of ‘proof of efficiency’. Whereas the economist in vitro concluded on the 
suitability of the calls to tender system in a market economy, Cochet mobilizes an in vivo 
demonstration of the efficiency of feed-in tariff system. In other words, in the presentation 
made by Yves Cochet, the value (here a price) put on wind power, and the device, i.e., the 
feed-in tariff, are entangled. A high construction rate is itself made the success criteria, and 
choosing a tariff rather than a bidding system reflects a commitment to developing wind 
power. But Cochet is not unaware that economists discuss the ‘market-likeness’ of the 
governance systems: 
“Normally, the device that is a spontaneous market device is bidding, because in principle, it 
does not distort the market. Now we have twisted the market with guaranteed tariffs – a 
protected market in a way. Obviously we told Jospin and Pierret and the people of DGEMP 
"this is normal for a new emerging technology in which France could be champion because 
we have good engineers in France, it is normal to help it initially". Me, I always take the 
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example of nuclear power in France, how much was a nuclear kilowatt-hour in France worth 
in 1950?  It was very expensive!” (Int. Cochet, my translation). 
In the language of Boltanski and Thevenot, one could say that Cochet shifts the underlying 
regime of worth from that of the market world to that of the industrial world: Including the 
temporal dimension, i.e., investment in a future activity, is not conducive to the market 
arrangement and its underlying regime for justification (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). 
Furthermore, he stresses the temporal dimension in technology development (and price 
development) by referring to the early days of nuclear power and making the parallel to its 
first price.
Continuing his disqualification of the market as an instrument for developing new energy 
technologies, Cochet comments on the so-called virtues of competition:  
“The proponents of calls to tender generally stress the ability to accelerate the lowering of the 
price of the production, thanks to competition, which is for the occasion dressed in all its 
virtues, and as proof they cite that the contractual prices of the EOLE 2005 as the lowest in 
Europe. In doing so, however, they confuse the notion of costs with the notion of price: if the 
latter reflect, as everyone knows, the strength relation in a commercial negotiation between a 
buyer and a seller, in time T, it is not automatically related to the real costs, undertaken by 
one or the other part” (Cochet 2000: 40, my translation). 
With this comment, Cochet attempts to unfold the ‘merits of competition’ (as well as the 
tender schemes). By making this relation between costs and price, Cochet stresses that even 
though competition drives down prices, someone still has to pay for the development of new 
technologies, i.e., undertake the costs. Costs are retained as real, whereas prices are seen as 
constructions that may – or may not – reflect the realities of costs. In other words, the 
developers are expected to carry the costs of developing RETs, which should be in the interest 
‘of all’. But even though Cochet stresses the pitfalls of the belief in ‘optimizing competition’, 
he sees arguments from the market sphere as central to the discourse that could potentially 
convince the Prime Minister and others:  
“… we convinced them with arguments on the one hand ecologist, but also with market-
arguments by saying… when we have an emergent market, we need a market instrument 
which is a price signal to guarantee that the investors, the private investors, the capitalists 
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who wants to invest in wind parks are guaranteed that their market will be sustained 
degressively, but for a certain period of time, and in a way that, after 15 years, they’ll be 
competing with the nuclear… so it was partly ecologist arguments, and market arguments 
that convinced Jospin and his counselors” (Int. Cochet, my translation). 
Though the argument still seems more in line with Boltanski and Thevenot’s (2006) 
‘Industrial world’ by referring to the temporal frame, with its investment in the future 
argument, Cochet stresses the importance of making a strong relation between wind power 
and the market. The feed-in tariff does not exclude competition between wind power and 
nuclear power in the future. 
Eventually, having set the scene for the feed-in tariff system, Cochet makes the proposition of 
a price to be offered to the developers. However, rather than calculating the tariff, he adopts 
the German tariff as his proposition for a level for the French tariff. During the interview, 
Cochet indicates that he is not a ‘number-cruncher’, but that the German tariff has proved its 
worth (Int. Cochet), and therefore the design (the tiered system) as well as the tariff-level is 
eventually proposed to be copied into French law by Cochet. Having made the case for the 
adoption of the feed-in tariff, Cochet is reluctant to undertake the actual translation into a 
specific number – or price. Rather, the tariff is a means of allowing new (or old) matters of 
concern to surface, and be framed, if not directly then indirectly, into the exchange of energy. 
This move is the politicization of wind power as a good, as well as that of its competitors. 
Acknowledging that a politicization process must eventually lead to an economization, i.e., 
the feed-in tariff must have a single price, seems less important to Cochet – though it must 
have a ‘sufficient level’: “The table [above] clearly shows the direct link between a sufficient 
level for the guaranteed price and the increase of installed power …” (Cochet 2000: 42, my 
translation). Seven years later, however, in his article “Why is There No Wind Rush in 
France” (2007), Joseph Szarka concludes that institutional frameworks, industry structures, as 
well as the mobilising discourse have upset the development of wind power in France, despite 
the adoption of a feed-in tariff system resembling the German system. 
Thus, Cochet sets the boundaries of a forum in which the valuation of wind power is to take 
place. His disqualification of the Eole 2005 device, and the proposition of its replacement by 
a fixed tariff, sets the frame within which the definition of the price for wind power is to be 
negotiated. In doing so, Cochet produces an important problematization; the choice of policy 
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instrument in the shape of a bidding system, i.e., Eole 2005, has kept prices under a realizable 
level, and thus stalled wind power development. In other words, though prices resulting from 
the Eole 2005 are reportedly the lowest in Europe, their effects were equally low. According 
to Cochet, the failure of the Eole 2005 reflects the core of the problematization, namely the 
relation between price and cost. This is stressed as he draws on the example of the price of the 
first kWh of nuclear power produced in France, which was probably more expensive than the 
price would reflect (I would argue that this is still the case even though nuclear power 
technology has matured). With the association between the first kWh of nuclear power, and 
wind power, Cochet asks the question: Who is to pay for emerging technologies? Whereas the 
Eole 2005 device, and the call to tender governance system in general, lead to individual 
prices for each project, it is said to reflect the costs of a given project. But because the specific 
costs are assumed to be framed within the individual bid, they remain concealed. On the other 
hand, making one single price (a universal framing, so to speak) has the effect that matters of 
concern emerge. In other words, it is the translation into a single price (rather than the 
individual project-related prices of the bidding system) that allows different values in the 
plural to emerge and be mobilized.   
To Cochet, the value driving his contribution is the climate and a wish to cut carbon dioxide 
emissions. However, the frame he sets up for the valuation of wind power, i.e., the definition 
of a single price, opens a space within which controversies are to be played out and other 
values emerge.  
4.4.2Chabot–MakingFairnessandEfficiencyCalculable
An important contributor in the forum set up by Yves Cochet is Bernard Chabot. Chabot is an 
engineer and economist, recently retired from the French Environment and Energy Agency 
(ADEME), where he worked as a senior expert. ADEME is an industrial and commercial 
public agency under the joint supervision of the Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable 
Development and Spatial Planning (MEDAD) and the Ministry for Higher Education and 
Research. Today Chabot works as an independent consultant. Chabot has published a number 
of articles on the calculation of the tariff (Chabot 2001a, 2001b, 2002), and is often referenced 
in the field (e.g., Int. Cochet, Chrupek, Durant) as well as in academic articles (e.g., Szarka 
2007a; 2007b; Nadaï 2007). The following discussion is based on interviews with Chabot, his 
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contribution to a course for engineering students at Ecole des Mines in Paris, and a number of 
articles he has published over the years.  
In his opening of a seminar on wind power held by ADEME in 1992, Bernard Chabot 
finished his speech by paraphrasing the famous French novelist Victor Hugo: “Nothing is 
stronger than an idea whose time has come” (“Rien ne peut s’opposer à la force d’une idée 
don’t l’heure est arrive”) (Chabot 1992: 1). The idea he is referring to is wind power as a 
large-scale source of electricity. Thus, Chabot’s commitment to wind power goes back a long 
way, and he warmly welcomed Cochet’s proposal to adopt a feed-in tariff system. Unlike 
Yves Cochet, however, Chabot primarily emphasizes the distinct definition of the price, and 
his contributions primarily aim at translating the framing set up by Cochet into a specific 
figure. In doing so, however, Bernard Chabot frames his fabrication of the price as a response 
to the hostile environment described by Yves Cochet; ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ are made 
qualities of his calculative method.  
In a number of articles, Chabot presents what he calls the ‘Profitability Index Method’ (PIM), 
which has been used by ADEME to set the French tariffs (Chabot 2001a). According to 
Chabot, the PIM is a simple and powerful method to define ‘fair and efficient’ tariffs (Chabot 
2001a; Chabot, Kellet, and Saulnier 2002). The method, Chabot et al. say: “ … is simply the 
ratio between the net present value (NPV) and the required initial investment (I): PI = NPV / 
I” (Chabot, Kellet, and Saulnier 2002: 1), and he sums up the advantages of using the PIM in 
the table below:  
Table4.2:SummaryoftheProfitabilityIndexMethod(PIM)anditsbasictools:
The linear model allows: 
 To describe a single project’s economic profitability from its costs and performance 
ratios and to give access to the simple and related "PI - Tariff" linear graph. 
 To determine directly the value of the Overall Discounted Cost (ODC, the 
"manufacturing cost") of a product or a service delivered from the investment and to 
assess its structure (variable cost part, O&M cost part, investment cost part). 
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 To determine the relevant selling price (the tariff) and the related profit margin to 
apply on this cost (the margin on cost MOC) to get a targeted profitability of the 
project expressed in PI value. 
 To clarify the linear link between the PI of a project and its margin on cost (MOC). In 
the case of power production, this link allows the demonstration of the "Free fuel cost 
energy sources paradox", which should be at the basis of the definition of a sound 
market regulation in order to favour renewable energy sources versus fossil based 
ones.
 To determine from a dynamic "Markets/Technologies Matrix" the minimal weighted 
mean value of the profitability indexes for the investments of a company active on 
global expanding markets and using advanced technologies in order to ensure a stable 
and strong long-term development of this company. 
 To establish the links between the PI and the other profitability parameters (direct 
payback time, discounted payback time, internal rate of return (IRR), benefit-cost 
ratio) in order to assess their minimum or maximum required values from the above 
rational minimum values of profitability index. 
 To easily integrate the valuable inputs from advanced profitability methods such as 
CAPM (capital asset pricing model) or ROV (real options valuation). 
               (Chabot 2004: 1) 
At the heart of the PIM is thus a classic discounted cash flow analysis: An analysis of future 
cash flows discounted into a so-called ‘net present value’ (based on the principle of ‘time-
value’ of money according to which a cent is worth more today than a cent tomorrow). As 
future cash flows of a wind power project benefitting from a feed-in tariff is a function of the 
production of the number kWh and the tariff itself, these are in turn set in relation to the costs 
of constructing the wind power project. Chabot’s proposal is therefore based on a very well-
known and used project valuation tool, familiar to most project developers and policy makers. 
Furthermore, the weight put on the description of the method is substantial; the legitimacy of 
the tariff definition is entirely bound up with the method, and as illustrated in the table, 
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Chabot creates links to a variety of additional methods such as discounted payback time, IRR, 
benefit-cost ratio, and so on.
Very central to Chabot’s calculation is, as illustrated in the table, the possibility of assessing 
the profitability of the wind power projects. This emphasis addresses the heart of the critique 
raised towards the assemblage of the feed-in tariff; the absence of competition means that 
there is no means of safeguarding against ‘undue’ rents gained by the project developers. The 
notion of ‘undue’ rents refers to the gap between cost and price discussed by Yves Cochet. To 
address this problematization, Chabot enrols the profitability level of other energy 
technologies and makes them part of his calculation: “In liberalised electricity markets, the 
minimum margin on cost for coal power plants is around 10%. As this margin corresponds 
for a modern coal plant to a profitability level PI = 0.3...” (Chabot et al. 2002: 3). As such, 
the coal-fired plant is made the reference on which to base the profitability of wind power 
producers or to make a legitimate case for their level of profitability.  
However, within ADEME certain disagreements regarding the level of the tariff arose, and in 
an internal letter, one of Chabot’s colleagues proposed a tariff of 43,3 centimes de francs 
rather than the 47,2 proposed by Chabot, noting: “The justification for this difference ... could 
be explained, according to the author, by the desire to provide investors with not only a fair 
return on their investments, but also a comfortable margin to ensure continued innovation 
and research investment, development, and production” (Internal correspondence 2000, 
emphasis in original, my translation). The ‘fairness’ of a PI of 0,3 is thus questioned by other 
employees at ADEME, who argued that an ‘extra’ margin was included by Chabot to sustain 
the further development of the technology. In his reply, where Chabot retains the PI of 0,3, he 
also writes: “By the way, historically all the tariffs having led to wind power success stories 
(DK, Germany, and Spain), ‘by chance’ lead to PI superior or equal to 0,3” (Chabot, internal 
correspondence, June 2000, my translation). Though his main arguments for a result of a PI of 
0,3 remains vested in the PIM method, Denmark, Germany, and Spain are again enrolled as 
models to follow.
According to the above, what is entailed in the PIM is a calculation of ‘fairness’ and 
‘efficiency’, respectively. To illustrate the ‘fairness’, Chabot (2001a) and Chabot and Saulnier 
(2001) present the following two graphs of the profitability index (Figure 4.2) and the internal 
rate of return (Figure 4.3). 
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Figure4.2:ProfitabilityIndex
              (Chabot 2001a: 4)
Figure4.3:TheInternalRateofReturn
               (Chabot 2001a: 4) 
Both graphs are made illustrations of the fairness of the tariff, and even more so when 
inflation (i) is considered:  
“As it can be seen in each figure … profitability is not always beyond the proposed minimum 
value of PI = 0.3. But profitability is increasing with Nh, as designed in order to give 
incentives to developers using good sites (which often imply higher costs) and using wind 
turbines with high productivity and availability” (Chabot 2001a: 4). 
98
Chabot thereby demonstrates that the ‘fairness’ of the tariff implies certain qualities of the site 
as well as choosing turbines with particular capabilities. In other words, wind power 
developers must possess certain skills to earn profits from developing their projects; it is not 
simply enough to choose a random site and erect any turbine on the site. Finally, Chabot 
concludes:
 “With this new tariff system, France can now develop its huge wind potential at a pace as 
high as experienced recently in other countries with ‘fixed premium prices’. A minimum of 
five and up to ten GW could be installed in France in 2010, provided that all potential 
problems for grid connection and public acceptance are solved” (Chabot 2001a: 4).
Chabot’s method as well as the calculation of the French tariff is made widely accessible 
through articles and conferences, in which he constantly stresses ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ as 
the main objectives for the construction of the tariff. His PIM is presented as an illustration of 
how exactly to ensure this ‘fair and efficient price’, thus fairness as well as efficiency are 
made calculable. Anchoring his contribution in the (positive) association between wind power 
and the fight against climate change, his method proposes to replace the resource allocation 
optimum allegedly produced through a free market by ensuring fairness and efficiency 
through his calculation. The PIM folds these qualities as calculable qualities of the tariff, and 
thereby offers a direct response to proponents of tender schemes as described by Yves 
Cochet, and not least the valuation put forward by CRE to be discussed next.
4.4.3CRE–DisassociationandDisplacement
The frame of valuation set up by Yves Cochet was not, as indicated, uniformly accepted as 
legitimate. One opponent to the framing of the device is CRE, the French Energy Regulation 
Commission (Commission de Regulation de l’Énergie). CRE was established in 2000 as an 
independent public organisation charged with the surveillance of the proper functioning of 
French energy markets. In particular, CRE is charged with managing the access to the grid, 
monitoring the transactions between suppliers, producers and traders within energy markets, 
and ensuring the consistency of their offers. 
Of interest here, CRE has published so-called notices on the rulings (arrêtes) fixing the feed-
in tariffs in France in both 2001, following the first tariff, as well as in 2006, following the 
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modified tariff. Emphasis in the following discussion will be on the first notice, but CRE’s 
advice remains the same: Abandon the tariff system that provides undue rents to the 
developers and return to a competitive call for tenders system. The arguments articulated by 
CRE are associated with two problematizations: Firstly, they consider the renewable energy 
technologies that benefit from the purchase obligation, and their (negative) relation to 
greenhouse gas emissions; and secondly, they critique and (re)calculate the tariff.  
To start, CRE addresses the contribution of the purchase obligation (i.e., the feed-in tariff) to 
the “fight against the greenhouse effect” (CRE 2001a: 3, my translation). To reach this 
evaluation, CRE translates the most common energy technologies in France into their costs of 
production and their costs in pollution (see table below).
Table4.3:Technologies,TheirCostsofProduction,andCostsofPollution
Overall cost 
of production 
(€/MWh) 
Fixed cost
(€/MWh) 
Variable cost  
(€/MWh) 
CO2-emission 
value
(€/MWh) 
Value of air 
pollution
(€/MWh) 
Nuclear
power
30 21 9 0 0,3-2,5(*)
CCGT(**) 33 8 25 8 6-35
Coal-fired
plant
DOM(***)
90 55 35 20 25-150
Fuel-fired
plant
DOM(***)
90 35 55 15 25-100
         (After CRE 2001a: 4, my translation)
(*)These figures include the negative externalities of nuclear power other than air pollution.     
(**) Combined Cycle Gas Turbine. 
(***) Corsica and overseas departments. 
Distinguishing two categories of technologies potentially benefitting from purchase obligation 
schemes, namely those providing a ‘guaranteed production’ (e.g., co-generation), and those of 
‘non-guaranteed’ production (e.g., wind and solar), CRE concludes that the latter category 
does not allow for the avoidance of a supplementary construction of centrals with guaranteed 
production. In other words, wind and solar power cannot substitute any of the technologies of 
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the table above, because their volatility conflict with the planning and management of the 
energy system. This point of view represents one side of a long-lived controversy, and though 
it is not the ambition to follow the controversy here, it should be mentioned that the relation 
between fluctuating technologies, production planning, and grid management remains 
controversial (e.g., see EWEA 2005). CRE concludes that since these fluctuating technologies 
cannot decrease the number of conventional centrals, “the avoided cost of production is 
therefore limited to the variable costs, mainly the costs of fuel” (CRE 2001a: 4, my 
translation). Furthermore, given that nuclear power has low variable cost, no greenhouse gas 
emissions, and hardly any air pollution, the contribution of wind and solar power is close to 
none in continental France (ibid.). Again, the cases of Denmark, Germany, and Spain are 
mobilized, and it is argued that these countries, well known for their renewable energy 
development profiles, benefit from renewable technologies because they have different 
technology configurations, and these are largely based on fossil fuels. CRE thus cuts the 
association between wind power and greenhouse gas emission reductions, though the 
dissociation remains contingent; i.e., the contribution of wind power to the fight against 
climate change depends on the energy technology configuration in which it is introduced. 
However, the (dis)qualification of wind power is a simultaneous qualification of nuclear 
power. Rather than stressing ‘renewability’, ‘emission-free’ becomes the category to be 
stressed. This replacement of the category allows the two energy technologies to be 
compared, as well as their value; here value is an expression of the relation between (variable) 
costs and costs of emissions. As such, CRE questions the assumed causality of the feed-in 
tariff device by problematizing the association between fluctuating technologies and the 
reduction of CO2-emissions in an energy system dominated by nuclear power. In other words, 
Yves Cochet was wrong in his translation of wind power into cuts of CO2-emissions.       
Having concluded that the increase of wind power (and solar power) is unlikely to contribute 
positively to the fight against greenhouse effects, CRE problematizes the feed-in tariff, both 
as a device as well as its level. Firstly, CRE lists the economic value of avoided externalities:
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Table4.4:TariffRelatedtoCostsofExternalitiesAvoided(ContinentalFrance)
Variable
costs 
(€/MWh) 
Value of 
CO2-
emissions 
(€/MWh) 
Value of air 
pollution
(€/MWh) 
Total cost of 
avoided
externalities
(€/MWh)
Average
tariff – 
2400 hours 
(€/MWh)
Difference 
(€/MWh) 
Nuclear
power
9 0 2 11 70 59
CCGT 25 8 6 39 70 31
      (CRE 2001a: 7, emphasis in original, my translation)
This leads CRE to conclude that the tariff offered to wind power producers, whether 
compared to nuclear power or gas powered stations, is highly superior to the avoided costs of 
environmental externalities. Furthermore, CRE adds, “wind power, however, also has 
negative externalities that strictly speaking should not be overlooked” (CRE 2001a: 7, my 
translation).
Lastly, CRE attends to the issue of rents, or profitability, to be gained by the wind power 
developers. The first step is to illustrate the gap between the average tariff and the cost of 
wind power production. As input to these calculations, CRE lays out its foundation:
“The hearings conducted by the CRE showed that the investment costs specified by the 
various concerned actors are between 838 €/kW and 1143 €/kW, and annual operating costs 
between 2 and 3.5% of the costs of investment” (CRE 2001a: 8, my translation).  
To calculate the gains to be upheld by wind power producers, CRE retains ‘value couples’ of 
915 €/kW and 23 €/kW (investment costs/operations costs), and 1067 €/kW and 38 €/kW. 
Both numbers fall within the spectrum of the costs resulting from CRE’s hearings mentioned 
in the quote above. Furthermore, it is said that the ‘value couple’ 1067 €/kW and 38 €/kW 
“corresponds approximately to the average defined through the Eole 2005 program” (CRE 
2001a: 9, my translation). In other words, the former bidding program, Eole 2005, is 
mobilized as an indication of ‘true’ prices, though the replacement of the system was arguably 
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to be found in its failure to create wind power in France (see Cochet). The numbers used by 
CRE are the basis for the following graph:  
Figure4.4:TariffComparedtoWindPower’sCostofProduction
                        (CRE 2001a: 8) 
With the X-axis representing hours of operation of a given installation, the upper curve 
illustrates the gains based on the tariff, and the two lower curves represent the costs based on 
the ‘value couples’ mentioned above. The graph leads CRE to the conclusion that “[t]he 
proposed tariff is evidently superior to the cost price of the sector, regardless of the 
assumptions made” (CRE 2001a: 9, my translation). Furthermore, the ‘value couples’ are 
substantially higher than costs reported from neighbouring countries where wind power has 
developed at a higher pace; thus, the numbers alone should be upper limits in the years to 
follow (ibid.).  
CRE then turns to the profitability of wind power projects benefitting from the tariff. The 
annual return is calculated in relation to the quality of the site (i.e., wind qualities). The graph 
below illustrates the return along the Y-axis and hours of operation along the X-axis, and 
demonstrates that: 
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“[s]ites that are correctly or well winded, i.e., from 2600 hours and up, are offered annual 
after-tax returns of more than 20% per year, quite excessive given that the average rates in 
15 years are without risk of default” (CRE 2001a: 9, my translation). 
Figure4.5:Profitability
                  (CRE 2001a: 9) 
Again, the Eole 2005 program is mobilized as a disqualification of the tariff, as the last call 
resulted in an average price of 48 €/MWh for the twenty-four retained projects, operating 
2900 hours per year. According to CRE’s calculations, the replacement of the Eole 2005 by 
the tariff will lead to global over-costs of 170 million euros over fifteen years compared to the 
remuneration demanded initially by the producers (ibid.). CRE concludes their judgment of 
the proposed tariff-system by the following statement:  
“Given all the above elements, the CRE considers that the proposed tariff causes undue rents 
for the wind power producers that will result in a significant increase in electricity prices in 
France, and represents an excessively costly means for the community to achieve the 
objective of developing the industry set by the government. CRE, therefore, emits an 
unfavourable opinion on the ruling” (CRE 2001a: 14, my translation).  
Rather, CRE advocates that a call for tender scheme (such as Eole 2005) be withheld because 
of properties inherent in both the tariff-device as well as the call for tender-device. Firstly, the 
tariff system is criticized for neither allowing the prediction or the control of the production 
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capacity nor the costs brought on to the community and consequences for the market (CRE 
2001a). This critique of the feed-in tariff governance model is a general theoretical critique 
raised by economists (e.g., see Finon and Menanteau 2004). The argument is anchored in the 
difficulties of getting the tariff ‘right’: If the fixed price is too low, the technology will not 
develop; if it is too high, it will develop above the objectives (CRE 2001a). Only through the 
presence of competition may the price be revealed. Chabot’s claim that his method ensures 
fairness and efficiency is thus contested; CRE’s calculation demonstrates profitability levels 
of 20% (not 10% as Chabot would circulate).
All the while, the comment leaves alive the idea that such a thing as ‘the right’ price may 
exist, but competition alone is given the power to determine what is right. Secondly, CRE 
comments on the advantages of the call for tender governance system: Control of production 
capacity volume, and possibly of the geographical location of the production unit(s), keeping 
the power over other quality criteria of the projects, and taking account of other subventions 
from which a project might have benefitted.   
“The substitution of market mechanisms (such as tendering or markets for green certificates) 
to an administered price mechanism is a safeguard for the community to achieve the desired 
objectives at the minimum cost” (CRE 2001a: 1, my translation).
In this statement, CRE categorizes call for tenders (together with green certificates) as 
‘market mechanisms’, thus disqualifying the tariff system from this realm. Here, CRE echoes 
a discussion within environmental economy in which price-models (with fixed prices) are 
deemed less market-like than quota-models (fixed quotas) (Hvelplund 2001a). Competition 
between bidders is supposed to drive prices down and thus reveal the ‘real’ price: 
“To achieve the objectives of wind power development that the government has set, the CRE 
recommends the use of tenders, which reveal the real prices and allow the adjustment of the 
location and the volume of production, all the while avoiding the creation of unjustified rents”
(CRE 2001b: 1, my translation). 
This quote is a rather precise example of what Cochet calls a confusion between cost and 
price. To CRE, market mechanisms (i.e., tendering and green certificates) reveal real prices, 
and at the same time, they allow the upholding of control over the development of wind 
power (in the hands of centralized institutions).   
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CRE’s contribution thus problematizes the framing proposed by Cochet: Dissociating wind 
power and decreasing carbon dioxide emissions (at least not in Continental France). Given the 
‘emission free’ quality of the dominant energy technology, nuclear power, the substitution of 
nuclear power with wind power has no positive effects in terms of decreasing emissions. 
Also, the tariff as a device blurs ‘true’ prices, and will eventually raise electricity prices in 
France. In other words, the objective of the feed-in tariff (sparking wind power development) 
as well as its realization (into a specific price) is made controversial. The valuation of wind 
power proposed by CRE is a simultaneous re-qualification of nuclear power: Displacing the 
category of ‘renewability’ by ‘emission-free’ along which to value energy technologies, 
nuclear power and wind power are made directly comparable. As such, CRE problematizes 
both the framing set up by Yves Cochet as well as its translation into a specific price by 
Bernard Chabot; however, the unfolding of the device, and not least the dissociation of 
greenhouse gas emission cuts and wind power, is undertaken by a several alternative foldings, 
e.g., contribution to air pollution by different energy technologies, profitability levels, etc. 
CRE presents these foldings representing the costs of externalities related to each energy 
technology as uncontroversial and well-framed inputs to new calculations regarding the costs 
of wind power. These numbers, presented as objective and well-framed values of externalities 
and costs, are at best controversial. The externalities of nuclear power, for example, seem 
marginal, and no mention is made of the costs of disposing of nuclear waste or the risk of 
accidents at nuclear power stations.  
4.4.4Chrupek,DGEMP–StabilizationasBlackBoxing?
The fourth account is based on an interview with an employee, Chrupek, at DGEMP 
(Direction Generale de l’Energie et des Matieres Premieres). Part of the Ministry of Industry, 
DGEMP (General Directorate for Energy and Raw Materials) is responsible for defining and 
implementing French energy policy and policy for the supply of raw materials. DGEMP 
hosted the working group undertaking the initial discussions around the first French feed-in 
tariff, and they defined the tariff of 2001. As such, the DGEMP is the centre of calculation, 
the place from where the tariff is actually diffused. 
Getting the interview is a bit difficult, and I am finally referred to Mr Chrupek by his head of 
department. Once we arrive in his office, I ask for permission to record the interview; 
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Chrupek seems to be intimidated, and this influences the remaining interview. At times, he 
seems almost hostile.  
During the interview with Chrupek, Bernard Chabot is mentioned as a participant in 
formulating the French tariffs. However, Chrupek laughs, rather contemptuously, when it is 
suggested that Chabot has undertaken the calculations leading to the French tariff. He 
continues by stressing that the model behind the tariff is different from that of Chabot – there 
is a method, IRR (TRI in French), and a calculation, but this is not publicly accessible. In 
other words, I had eventually found the place where the tariff is fabricated but cannot access 
the numbers going into the model. Getting the numbers that feed into the calculation is very 
crucial to understanding the number that eventually comes out. This is acknowledged by 
Chrupek thus: 
 “After all, as everything else, once you have a method, everything depends on the 
assumptions you use and the numbers... everything depends on what you put behind, on the 
inputs… Do you take before tax, or after tax? Do you consider potential subsidies that may be 
granted, like ADEME offers… So, it all depends on what you take into account, just like all 
the numbers, you can take them just as you want” (Int. Chrupek, my translation).  
So, though the principle may seem straightforward, estimating the inputs is often quite 
complicated: Both the costs and the benefits of the project remain estimates. So, how is this 
done? “There are no miracle remedies! What one does is to do a benchmarking; you look at 
what they do in the other countries, what is their tariff level and we look at cost 
development…” (Int. Chrupek, my translation). As such, Chrupek explains the differences in 
calculations made by Chabot, CRE, and DGEMP, not surprisingly, to be an effect of inputs. 
Yet again, the tariffs offered in other European countries are mobilized as an important input 
to the definition of the French tariff. Even though the method is quite precise, once Chrupek 
discusses the inputs to the method, the result seems more like a process of ‘tinkering’ than a 
simple calculation. Anyway, Chrupek stresses, the numbers you can take them anyway you 
like.    
According to Chrupek, the use of the IRR method was first and foremost aimed at eliminating 
undue rents. Here lies the strength of the IRR because it can be made the basis for comparing 
the rate of return between different projects or different technologies. In principle, the IRR of 
wind power projects can be compared to the IRR of other energy technologies, and thereby 
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measure the relative profitability of wind power projects. This argument for choice of 
calculative method resonates with Chabot’s ‘fairness’ of tariffs; safeguarding against undue 
rents to the wind power developers is made a calculable property of the tariff. However, 
Chrupek uses another argument to prove that the calculation (and the tariff) was targeted 
correctly by mobilizing the French wind power development statistics:   
“Until now, when you see the development of wind power, you could consider that there are 
no undue rents, and there is not a multitude of projects on the sites, however, the tariffs allow 
a very satisfactory development of wind power in France, as you can see, because currently 
France is the third [fastest growing] market in Europe, according to the numbers of EWEA”
(Int. Chrupek, my translation). 
Thus, the question of ‘undue’ rents is solved by referring to the ‘actual’ development (there is 
not a multitude of projects on the sites), and not by referring to similar IRRs between wind 
power and, for example, thermal power projects (this was the argument of Bernard Chabot, 
which was that the rate of return of wind power projects should be targeted at the same level 
as a coal-fired utility). Similarly, the tariff’s so-called satisfactory level is based on the 
relative development situation in France vis-à-vis other European countries. Being among the 
countries presenting the fastest growing wind power sectors seems to be of value in itself – 
and an indication of a well-defined tariff-level.
To Chrupek, the choice of the tariff as a governance device is central to this development – it 
is made an example of a ‘true’ wish to increase wind power installations: “You should use a 
device that is pertinent” (Int. Chrupek, my translation). Commenting on the Danish state’s 
attempts at defining green certificates in the early 2000’s is the consequence of a ‘saturated’ 
landscape according to Chrupek.  Therefore, the choice of device is indeed related to one 
objective that is “purely installed power” (Int. Chrupek, my translation). But there are other 
objectives too:
“…it is appropriate to do wind power under good conditions, so you have this objective, but 
we also have the objective of preserving the landscape, preservation of the wildlife flora, for 
example you have the Natura 2000 coming out… So we have these objectives that we have to 
reconcile” (Int. Chrupek, my translation). 
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So, whereas the feed-in tariff as a device may indeed bring forward wind power development, 
to Chrupek, the feed-in tariff calls for other devices such as the ZDE and Natura 2000. 
Landscape and wildlife flora emerge as values which call for a new set of devices to control 
the overflows of wind power development:  
“If you have purely an economic vision, I do not see why you would take the landscape 
integration into account, for example if you have a church, a monument, a castle, if you have 
that sort of reasoning [economic] there and you put, well ... If a potential, a wind corridor, 
and a grid that allows you to put a large wind farm precisely there, then you put a wind farm 
next to the castle!” (Int. Chrupek, my translation) 
Thus, the (ambitious) objective of 25GW of wind power installed by 2020, and with 19GW of 
these on land prompts the use of a tariff system, acknowledged to be the most efficient. 
However, it is seen as maybe too efficient: “Having a purely economic orientation – we 
would go towards disaster” (Int. Chrupek, my translation). However, this does not mean that 
the approach is opposed to the market according to Chrupek:  
“Altogether, ultimately… so this boils down to that it is precisely the government, the state 
that decides, not the individual bearer of the project so the state becomes ... the knot, and 
precisely the rates ... to say that we do not have a vision oriented towards the market, would 
in my opinion not be right for the simple reason that on the one hand we have the wind 
development which is a private initiative and secondly we regularly adjusts our tariffs - the 
level of these rates and that we also provide goals, so we do have an economic vision” (Int. 
Chrupek, my translation).
Private initiative and the adjustment of tariffs are translated into an ‘economic’ attitude on 
behalf of the DGEMP and the French state. It is, however, a specific modality of being 
economic, i.e., one that pairs societal goals (defined by the state) and private enterprise.
DGEMP’s act is one of stabilizing the framing set up by Cochet as well as its translation into 
a specific price; however, profitability levels as well as the desired rate of development 
remains hidden to the observer. Though the calculation of the tariff is admittedly entirely 
dependent upon the assumptions made, as well as the numbers mobilized in the calculation, 
the tariff becomes a black box and a number difficult to question because we do not know 
what goes into its fabric. Chrupek and DGEMP’s task was to undertake the specific 
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translation from feed-in tariff as a device to its specific price. Sealing off the assumptions may 
be a strategy for stabilizing the figure and sealing off against problematizations; however, the 
tariff remained a somewhat controversial framing.  
4.4.5Poignant–DefyingCalculation
The last contribution to be presented here is a report authored by Serge Poignant on behalf of 
the Committee for Economic Affairs, Environment and Territory. Serge Poignant worked out 
his report, “Information report on the support policy for the development of renewable 
energy” in 2003. Poignant is, and was at the time, a member of the National Assembly and of 
UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire). The discussion below is based on his report as 
well as an interview with Durant, a bureaucrat from the Commission for Economic Affairs 
who specializes in the energy area and provides technical assistance to the members of the 
National Assembly. Durant played an active part in preparing the report. 
The main conclusion of the report is that French renewable energy policy, at the time of 
writing the report, was unsatisfactory in the fight against intensifying climate change 
(Poignant 2003). However, in suggesting distinct policy areas to target, Poignant and his co-
authors elaborate the problematizations made by CRE. In his report, Poignant makes an 
important distinction between electricity and the rest of the energy sector, stressing in 
particular transportation and the residential and tertiary sectors as primary targets for new 
energy policy initiatives. He bases this proposition on studies demonstrating that French 
electricity production was responsible for only 5,3% of the total volume of carbon dioxide 
released into the atmosphere in France (2001 numbers). Thus, potential policy instruments 
should accordingly target the sectors responsible for the major carbon dioxide emissions. As 
such, stressing the fight against climate change as the principal value, Poignant disqualifies 
wind power as a technology that may contribute to decreasing carbon dioxide emissions. 
According to this contribution, the value of wind power is negative in the French electricity 
sector, as it only increases costs for the consumers but has no environmental effect – or, as 
stressed by Durant, wind power may even increase carbon dioxide emissions because 
fluctuations in production means falling back on thermal production technologies to obtain 
balance in the grid (Int. Durant). In other words, Poignant continues the problematization of 
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the association between carbon dioxide emission and wind power argued by CRE by 
unfolding the CO2 calculus according to the distinct sectors of the energy system.  
Then, turning his attention towards the governance model, i.e. the feed-in tariff, Poignant cites 
CRE for claiming that Denmark, Germany and Spain – represented as the three most 
successful wind power developing countries (e.g., see the table presented in the Cochet report 
illustrated above) – are countries that have a quite different electricity production profile, as 
all three countries produce an important part of their electricity by CO2-emitting technologies 
(Poignant 2003; CRE 2001a). This is a response to Cochet, Chabot, and Chrupek’s arguments 
in favour of the feed-in tariff system through ‘proof of efficiency’, i.e., that the tariff has 
demonstrated its ability to spark the development of wind power. Referring to the numbers of 
installed wind power in Europe (June 2003) with nearly 85% situated in Germany (52%), 
Spain (20,5%) and Denmark (12%), he rhetorically asks: “These figures are indisputable. 
Should we conclude on the effectiveness of the purchase obligation?” (Poignant 2003: 49, my 
translation). No, he answers, there is no systematic correlation between the device and the 
development of renewable energy based on the following observations: (1) These same three 
countries have not succeeded in developing other renewable energy technologies at the same 
rate using the same governance model; (2) neither have other countries than the ones 
mentioned, though developing similar feed-in tariff systems obtained the same steep increase; 
and (3) other renewable energy technologies have strongly developed without such a system 
(e.g., biomass in Finland and Sweden). Hereby, he attempts to disentangle the association 
between the device and the successful increase in wind power installations anchored in the 
‘proof of efficiency’ demonstrated by Cochet, in particular.
From the effects of the feed-in tariff, Poignant turns to the framing of the device: 
“First, an administered price, by definition, does not allow the game of competition to weigh 
on prices. The tariff is the same for all producers: Those who have the lowest production 
costs simply earn more money than the others” (Poignant 2003: 48, my translation).  
With this comment, Serge Poignant mobilizes the recurring theme of competition, whereas 
economic theory prescribes that the price will level with the marginal cost of producing yet 
another good, within this governance model, costs and price are disconnected. Whereas, in 
theory, competition should force developers with higher marginal costs to learn – or vanish; 
the tariff system simply makes some developers earn higher profits. Thus, “[t]he central 
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problem of the purchase obligation is fixing the tariff. It is a harmful complexity” (Poignant 
2003: 49, my translation). This argument against the feed-in tariff is further developed during 
the interview with Durant:  
“Either the tariff is too low, and it won’t work, or it is too high, and you give an undue 
advantage to the producers. There is no reason to believe that it is at the right level – 
necessarily it is too high or too low” (Int. Durant, my translation).  
In other words, there is such a thing as a ‘right’ price, but this cannot be found at the desks of 
economists in the offices of DGEMP; this price can only be found through competition in the 
market or in the call for tenders. According to this discourse, there are limits to what 
calculations can do. Opposed to Chabot’s claim that the calculated tariff assures fair and 
efficient prices, Durant underscores that it is impossible to calculate such a figure. On the 
other hand, the call for tenders will push down prices and thus recreate the virtues of 
competition. 
“It’s a bad instrument [the tariff], because after all, how do you define the tariff? In theory, 
you could fix the tariff by following the CRE’s bizarre method…fixing a certain set of criteria 
and then you try to put a value in euros on these criteria – already, this is difficult. But let’s 
imagine that we do something like that and we then get some number. It’s a rational number 
and then ‘hop’ we’re on… But this is not at all how it is done. The problem is that the 
minister, he does his ‘ruling’… when he does his ruling, he either finds a level where the wind 
power industry says ‘you’re assassinating wind power, you just want to sustain the nuclear 
power system…’ Otherwise, the minister finds a level where people are, maybe not satisfied, 
but at least, they do not complain” (Int. Durant, my translation). 
The recalculation performed by CRE to demonstrate that the tariff-level is too high is thus 
mobilized because it is an attempt at providing a ‘truer’ price than the one DGEMP had 
proposed. CRE’s method is qualified as ‘bizarre’ because it folds a set of criteria into figures, 
and uses these as input to the calculus. However, according to Durant, constructing the tariff 
is a question of demonstrating political will rather than finding the ‘right’ level. To Durant, 
the level of the tariff has as its aim the cooling down of controversies rather than fairness or 
efficiency, as claimed by Chabot. Acceptance (not least between wind power proponents) is 
the goal. According to Durant, the level of the tariff is sought to be at a level where it does not 
spark controversies and keeps the door shut for critique of political support for the nuclear 
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power system. In this case, the level of the tariff is not about calculating the ‘right’ level but 
rather finding the level where controversies are silenced, which seems to be a number even 
more difficult to produce. 
Poignant and Durant create a link between wind power and a value of zero – nothing seems to 
be gained from wind power in the French system. This valuation is not targeted at wind power 
per se, but wind power in the French electricity sector. As such, Poignant and Durant sidestep 
the question of the value of wind power at a global level but disqualify it in the French 
configuration.
This contribution refuses the possibility of calculating a rational tariff. Instead, it points to the 
tender system as the only system to avoid undue rents. Competition, referred to as the game of 
competition, is the guarantee that profitability is not undue, something which cannot be 
calculated. One price for all simply distributes the undue profits unevenly. 
Finally, according to Durant, the approach to renewable energy in general, and wind power in 
particular, is intimately linked to the nuclear power regime. French pro-wind power people 
are first and foremost anti-nuclear power. A similar argument was raised by Cochet, an 
argument claiming that attitudes towards renewable energy technologies are determined by 
one’s attitude towards nuclear power. This description resembles the notion of 
‘technopolitics’ (Hecht 2009) through which political goals become intertwined with 
technology, and according to the version presented by Durant, wind power is advocated as a 
means of disqualifying nuclear power and not because of its inherent qualities.
Paradoxically, by stressing the decrease of CO2-emissions as the main ambition, Poignant and 
Durant disqualify wind power as being a valuable technology. According to this approach to 
valuation, the particular assemblage of the French energy sector does not contribute positively 
to the valuation of wind power. This emphasizes an important aspect of the valuation process, 
namely that the practice of valuation is made an effect of the assemblage rather than an 
inherent property of the technology.
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4.5Discussion
Viewed through the lenses of the marketization program outlined in Chapter 2, we eventually 
get a glimpse of the ‘messy’ business of making a price. Valuation, as it unfolds within the 
frame of the feed-in tariff device illustrates the investments and the controversies entailed in 
price-making; it is a ‘costly and irregular activity’, as stressed by Muniesa (2012). If we 
accept the premise that goods do not possess value a priori, and that goods may experience 
changes of status (Caliskan and Callon 2009), then the five accounts depicted above become 
more than an exercise of visualizing or identifying ‘inherent’ value. The five attempts at 
framing the tariff described above, in some sense, all place a value on wind power, and this 
value is related to the feed-in tariff. In other words, price and value are continuously collapsed 
and separated, made the same and ‘unmade’ the same. As this study illustrates, valuation may 
be seen as a process of folding, unfolding, and refolding value in the singular, and values in 
the plural. And even though two of the valuation approaches (Poignant and CRE) stress 
valuation as a matter of configuration of the electricity system (wind power has one value in 
systems dominated by fossil fuel technologies, and yet another value in systems dominated by 
nuclear power), value or price is still presented as something that should be ‘unveiled’ 
through the market. So even though they conclude that wind power might have one value in a 
Danish or German setting, and yet another in the French setting, they still point us towards an 
understanding of value as something that may be ‘dragged out’ from the distinct assemblage, 
e.g., the particular configuration of national energy technologies. What we miss from this 
account is the construction of value and values as two intertwined processes, as well as the 
role of the methods and devices mobilized throughout the process. 
The idea that the price should reflect an inherent value which may be made visible through 
(pure) market transactions makes the price somewhat comparable to the notion of ‘facts’ 
described by Latour: “Scientists define facts… they leave to politicians and moralists the even 
more daunting task of defining values” (Latour 2004: 95). Making this (rather daring) parallel 
between scientists and facts, and economists and prices, we end up in the separation of 
spheres discussed in the opening chapter: the economic and the political. When CRE and 
Poignant argue for prices to be defined by markets and not at a desk, they advocate for the 
existence of these distinct spheres; numbers created at the desk of economists, be it at 
DGEMP or ADEME (i.e., Chabot), are ‘political’ numbers and not true prices.  However, 
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Latour says, that when using the word ‘facts’, we are obliged to omit the work that goes into 
their making. By contrasting facts and values, he continues, “one is obliged to limit ‘facts’ to 
the final stage in a long process of elaboration” (Latour 2004: 95). But if we acknowledge 
that prices, like facts, are made, they pass through a long range of stages in which they are 
“uncertain, warm, cold, light, heavy, hard, supple…” (ibid.), and during these stages the 
distinction between the spheres is not upheld. On the contrary, values are central elements in 
the making of what eventually becomes known as facts, and arguing along a similar vein, we 
could then see the values described above as politicizations and economizations that 
eventually lead to the folding of values into a single value in the shape of a price:  
“[T]he notion of facts does not describe the production of knowledge (it neglects both the 
intermediate stages and the shaping of theories) any better than the notion of values allows us 
to understand morality (it takes up its functions after the facts have been defined and finds 
itself with no resources except the appeal to principles that are as impotent as they are 
universal)” (Latour 2004: 99).
Emphasising the intermediate stages rather than the result, we are allowed to see the 
interconnectedness of these processes. The problematizations undertaken through the 
valuations unfold and refold values by cutting some associations and proposing new 
connections. Therefore, I will now turn to some of the values that emerge during the valuation 
processes as they unfold and become refolded.  
4.5.1FiguresofValuesintheProcessofValuation
Though this chapter represents an attempt at following and sketching a process of valuation, 
one key element is the continual attempt at establishing ‘value’ as an objective category. Each 
of the five contributions to the valuation presented above has one or more version(s) of value 
or translates wind power into a distinct figure of value. These figures are framed as certain 
properties of the technology itself or as qualities of a certain exchange form, and when I 
choose to refer to them as figures, it is because they seem to emerge as strong categories that 
are referred to as distinct and accepted references for undertaking valuation. Furthermore, the 
five valuations all refer to at least one of these figures of value as definitive for the price of 
wind power.
115
Value is about CO2: Wind power is framed as an answer to climate change and greenhouse 
gas emissions, which is the point of departure for both Cochet and Chabot. However, CRE 
and Poignant disqualify the value of wind power by framing the question to which wind 
power may be the answer as a question of fighting climate change. This categorization of 
wind power as non-emitting in terms of CO2 rather than, for example, a renewable energy 
allows for a comparison between wind and nuclear power. According to the calculations of 
CRE, nuclear power has no costs related to CO2-emissions28 (see Table 4.2). Wind power, 
however, eventually becomes associated with an increase in CO2 emitted into the 
atmosphere: Wind power does not replace existing technologies because of fluctuations in 
production (following the wind). Therefore, increasing the level of wind power will increase 
CO2-emissions because it increases demand for coal-fuelled energy to compensate for the 
fluctuations in the wind to meet demand. If value, then, is about decreasing CO2, wind power 
should be associated with a negative value according to CRE and Poignant.
Value as renewability: A second figure of value intimately linked to the figure described 
above is framed as renewability. With this framing, reducing CO2-emissions is important, but 
just as important is the renewability aspect of wind power. Fossil fuel resources and uranium 
are resources that will eventually become exhausted, and they are increasingly difficult (and 
costly) to access. From this figure of value, the costs of exhausting limited resources are 
crucial, though they are not included in the pricing of the energies. To Cochet and Chabot, 
renewability is an essential quality of wind power, and according to their framing, CO2-
emission and renewability are equally important qualities. Stressing the renewability quality is 
what prompts, for example, Durant to conclude that wind power proponents are essentially 
nuclear power opponents; in other words, adding renewability to the CO2-figure of value is 
basically an attempt at disqualifying the dominant technology, nuclear power.   
Value as being at the forefront: One figure of value is about being at the forefront of wind 
power development, therefore, to be developing wind power at the same scale as other 
‘successful’ European countries becomes a meaningful measurement in itself. Cochet, in 
particular, attaches value to the relative accomplishments of the French industry vis-à-vis 
28 For an account of the association of nuclear power to categories such as ‘emission free’ or ‘sustainable’, see 
Garud et al. 2010.  
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other European countries. Chrupek, too, stresses the relative success of developing wind 
power in France. 
Value is nothing but supply and demand: For several of the contributions above, the devices 
at play should be as close to ‘market principles’ as possible. This figure of value is maybe 
better described as a figure of value that refuses the attachment of value to objects outside of 
the market sphere. According to this framing, value is the result of supply meeting demand as 
described in economics, and attempts of pricing outside of the market (as illustrated in figure 
4.1 by Fourcade) will never reflect ‘true’ value. It is stressed several times throughout the 
contributions that prices should not be calculated at a desk, but instead they should emerge, or 
be subtracted, as a function of costs and supply and demand. The presence of competition is 
the ‘economic condition’ that safeguards against unfair profits. Accordingly, the introduction 
of the feed-in tariff device blurs the picture of the role of wind power. Yes or no to wind 
power, is a question that should be answered by the market – not politicians and bureaucrats.
Value of the landscape: The protection of the French countryside presents itself as an 
emerging value that was raised several times during interviews. The image of the famous 
Mont Saint Michel with nearby turbines is drawn as an example of how wind power 
development could potentially pose a threat to the beauty of historical monuments and the 
landscape in general.
To sum up, these figures of values are dominant categories at the centre of the valuation 
processes discussed throughout this chapter. They are presented as categories against which to 
undertake the valuation, or around which to fold the price. But none of these values are 
directly translatable into a common metric, namely, a number of euro cents paid for a kWh of 
wind power. On the other hand, the qualifications/disqualifications presented by the five 
valuation contributions would not appear without these values. The ways in which these 
values are associated with or dissociated from wind power into specific valuable assemblages 
that may eventually be folded into a price are amongst the activities of valuation, which may 
eventually bring about value.  
Generally, the control of CO2-emissions is the overlying value addressed by all five 
valuations. But whereas Cochet, Chabot, and Chrupek attempt to fold this value as a quality 
of wind power, as well as the quality of renewability, into a specific price, Poignant and CRE 
rather unfold and problematize the value of CO2-emission control in relation to wind power. 
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To Cochet, Chabot, and Chrupek, this folding is framed as ‘sufficient’ (Cochet) and ‘efficient’ 
(Chabot and Chrupek) in meeting the defined target. To all three, this efficiency/sufficiency 
(itself a rubric) entails mobilizing the tariffs defined in other countries (benchmarking), and a 
calculation safeguarding the ‘fairness’ of the price through means of different calculative 
methods. They frame an assemblage in which the device and the successful development of 
wind power are associated with decreasing carbon dioxide emissions, as well as connected to 
‘fair’ profitability levels. Meanwhile, the analysis demonstrates that these links between wind 
power, CO2-reduction, and the tariff are by no means stable or fixed, but rather these 
associations are framed as part of the valuation process. Though these foldings attempt to 
close or cool down the links between wind power, CO2-reductions, and tariff, they remain 
somewhat fragile framings.  
The fragility of the framing is emphasised through the valuation of Poignant and CRE; both 
contributions seek to unfold the links between wind power and the value of CO2-emission 
reduction by recalculating wind power as a (potentially) positive contributor to CO2-
emissions (i.e., increasing emissions). The relation between renewability and CO2-emission 
reduction is cut, or made a contingent relation, an effect of the distinct configuration of an 
energy system. Poignant’s and CRE’s valuations problematize this qualification of wind 
power, and thus the framing in which wind power, the war against climate change, and the 
feed-in tariff device were associated. Instead, they argue that supply and demand, and in 
particular competition at the supply side, should drive the fixation of prices. In other words, 
through market exchange, demand is made to express their values in terms of readiness to 
buy. Finally, the purchase obligation and the level of the tariff as properties of the device are 
recalculated. The result, indicating very high profitability levels, makes a new value or matter 
of concern emerge; the protection of the landscape. The problematization fosters the existence 
of a link between the device and the pollution of the landscape because of high concentrations 
of wind turbines.
Following the valuation of wind power makes it clear that constructing prices and undertaking 
calculations entail both acts of economization as well as acts of politicization. Each of the five 
valuations propose an assemblage of associated values and models for exchanging these. 
Chabot’s method, for example, presents an attempt at economizing the feed-in tariff device; 
everything is made calculable, and profitability levels are measured against and compared to 
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other (conventional) energy technologies. Profitability levels are illustrated to be equal to 
levels found elsewhere in the energy sector, allowing conclusions about the ‘fairness’ of the 
price. CRE, on the other hand, uses calculations for quite the opposite purpose. They calculate 
the greenhouse gas effects, recalculate the profitability level, and reach a very different 
conclusion: Wind power does not contribute to the fight against climate change, but creates a 
niche in which uncontrollable costs will be transferred to electricity consumers. The only 
forces that may stop wind power development from going wild are the difficulties of 
acceptance, locally, and the capacity of the grid to evacuate the produced wind power (CRE 
2001a). These calculations politicize the role of wind power in the French electricity 
configuration and contest calculations made by Chabot and DRIRE concerning the rents 
upheld by wind power developers. CRE recalculates the profitability level to be derived from 
the feed-in tariff by the developers – and their conclusions demonstrate levels twice as high, 
at least, as the calculations made by Chabot. The idea of selling ‘wind at the price of gold’ has 
been raised more than once in the French public (e.g., Le Figaro Magazine 2008; Le Point 
2007), stressing the absence of risk and total visibility of the projects, due to the purchase 
obligation and the fixed tariff. Thus, the design of the device is designated as a major source 
of the problem of the high costs associated with wind power development.      
4.5.2TheDevice,Value,and‘Fairness’
As a device, the feed-in tariff sets a very specific frame for the exchange of wind power; as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, roles and identities are defined, and property rights and the 
conditions for transferring these become articulated. The purchase obligation, which is a 
central element of the feed-in tariff device, instates and enforces the roles of exchange 
between producers and EDF: EDF is forced to buy all electricity from wind power producers 
eligible for the feed-in tariff. This element is one of the qualities of the device that remains 
highly criticized by, amongst others, CRE. Furthermore, the cost associated with this purchase 
obligation is transferred to all electricity buyers, i.e., the consumers, equally and through their 
electricity bills. All electricity consumers thereby become contributors to the development of 
wind power. Finally, the prices to be paid for wind power decrease according to two 
principles: (1) Production rates, i.e., after the first five years, the numbers of kWh produced 
determines the rate at which the producer is paid; and (2) over time the rate decreases. As 
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such, the device frames a certain modality of economic behaviour from wind power 
producers, for example, in terms of choosing the location according to its wind speed 
characteristics. However, the connection of wind power to the feed-in tariff device is an 
important association affecting some of the valuation contributions presented above; Cochet 
seems to attach value to the choice of the feed-in tariff as a device – rather than stressing the 
distinct price (he is not a number-cruncher, he says). To him, the device itself becomes of 
value because it has proven efficient elsewhere. Therefore, the device becomes translated into 
a manifestation of political will. On the other hand, CRE and Poignant seem opposed to the 
tariff amongst other things because of the design of the device; first and foremost its 
‘administered price’ quality. Poignant and CRE insist that only market-like forces in the shape 
of competition should be employed in the making of prices. When derived from a game of 
competition, price reflects the ‘true’ value of wind power. A price is not simply a price. For 
example, a ‘true’ price cannot be calculated at a desk. This is important, because the 
disqualifications made by Poignant and CRE designate the device rather than wind power. In 
their final recommendation, CRE argues for the abolishment of the feed-in tariff – not of wind 
power in general.
In this case, the quality of ‘fairness’ or ‘unfairness’ is linked to the device, and the modality 
of calculation, as much as to the price itself (for similar observations, see also Guyer 2009; 
Caliskan and Callon 2010). Or, to put it another way, the controversy is placed in the 
opposition between the ‘fairness’ of the price (Cochet, Chabot and Chrupek) and the 
‘unfairness’ of the device (Poignant and CRE). Those properties of the device that disqualify 
it as fair are the purchase obligation and the administered price (inevitably), argued to lead to 
high costs. Instead, CRE suggests the return to a tender system in which competition will 
keep costs at a minimum. In the opposition of the two governance systems, the ‘singular-
quality’ of the price becomes important. Whereas the tariff leads to a ‘universal’ price that is 
applicable to all producers of wind power, the bidding system leads to different prices 
varying, at least in theory, according to the different conditions of a given project at which the 
bid is given. The universality of the price creates visibility and security for the developer but 
also creates the possibility of making undue rents. Meanwhile, the singular-quality of the 
tariff becomes the driver of a set of matters of concern; the possibility of making undue rents 
is said to create a burst in development, which will eventually pose a threat to the landscape. 
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This concern is associated with the device and the modality of economic behaviour it 
constitutes.  
The present study demonstrates the complex associations between value and values, as well as 
the alterations of the object of the valuation, from the valuation of wind power to that of the 
device. Disqualifying the valuation of wind power into a single number (8,38 €/kWh) is not 
the same as disqualifying the device and its translation of the value of wind power into a 
single price. That the price is ill performed (which they seek to demonstrate through their own 
(re)calculations) is but a distinctive quality of the formulation of the device because it fixes a 
single price to wind power. In other ways, the (re)calculation of the profitability levels 
possibly achieved by the developers at the fixed tariff simply becomes a demonstration of the 
impossible task of ‘getting a price right’ as an exercise performed at a desk.  
4.5.3TinkeringorCalculation?
Throughout the five valuations described above, calculation plays a central role. As already 
stressed, calculations are made both as part of the economizations and politicizations. 
However, some of the valuations are distinguished by the ‘absence’ of calculation or avoiding 
the proliferation of calculations. During an interview with Bernard Chabot, he stressed that 
EDF, during the discussions of the tariff, avoided sharing the calculations and assumptions 
but simply proposed a price. This sealed off any possible critique of the fabric of the number. 
On the other hand, his own contribution seems to be merely a presentation of a calculative 
method. This illustrates one important aspect of making the calculation public; it makes the 
extracted result open to contestation. Chrupek admits that calculative devices such as PIM and 
NPV, and the result they may generate, are highly dependent upon the numbers and prices 
they mobilize. Presenting simply the extracted result, e.g., the price rather than the production 
may then be a strategy of forestalling attacks. The prices and numbers mobilized to perform 
the calculation are prosthetic forms “produced, deployed, resisted and at times, abused…”
(Caliskan 2007: 257). At some points, the tariff of 8,38 €/kWh itself becomes a prosthetic 
price when mobilized in the calculations of CRE to demonstrate the ‘unfairness’ of the tariff.
In the opening pages of this chapter, I described the seemingly opposed descriptions of 
making a tariff: One as a politically fixed number without any calculations; a number that 
could be adjusted until the development of wind power reached an acceptable level. On the 
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other hand, the tariff was described as simply a calculation of ‘efficiency’ and ‘fairness’. The 
five valuations above seem to have elements of both ‘tinkering’ and calculation. When 
Chrupek argues for the accuracy of the tariff, the result of DGEMP’s calculation, he points to 
the absence of “a multitude of projects on the sites”, and “France is the third [fastest 
growing] market in Europe”. The justification of the tariff points to its effects, not its fabric, 
per se. This comment seems to allow for both descriptions of the making of a tariff, entailing 
both tinkering and calculation.
Furthermore, the methods of calculation, such as the PIM, the IRR, or the NPV, are important 
tools in the production of the numbers and so is the opposition between these tools. When 
Chrupek stresses that DGEMP did not use the method developed by Chabot, the distinction 
between different calculative methods becomes important. To Cochet, the fabric of the price 
seems secondary; it should simply spark the development of wind power. He takes no interest 
in the tools to be mobilized, and his own proposition simply copies the German tariff because 
it has proven its worth.
Chabot’s valuation presents both a proposition of the distinct French tariff as well as a method 
developed simply for the fixation of feed-in tariffs. In other words, it is an algorithm for 
constructing feed-in tariffs. Since its development, Chabot has conducted a large number of 
workshops and seminars where the PIM is presented and explained. In the valuation of the 
French tariff, the explicitness of the presentation of the PIM makes it an example of an 
interessement device: “Interessement is the group of actions by which an entity… attempts to 
impose and stabilize the identity of the other actors it defines through its problematization. 
Different devices are used to implement these actions” (Callon 1986: 8).
As an interessement device, the ‘huge wind potential of France’, the future objectives of the 
European Union in relation to renewable energy development, as well as ‘farmers, citizens 
and local authorities to be involved as investors in wind projects’ are all connected to the 
existence of ‘fair and efficient’ tariffs as the one proposed through the PIM. The transfer of 
over-costs, equally and to all consumers, makes the tariff system ‘compatible with the 
liberalisation of the electricity sector’ (Chabot 2001b). The PIM and its algorithm tie together 
a net of possible actors and identities as well as measures for efficiency, fairness, and 
liberalization. Not physically, as the towlines fixe the scallops of St. Brieuc (see Callon 1986), 
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but the PIM is a framing in which actors and a modality of being economic, which is 
compatible with liberal markets, are tied together.   
4.6ConcludingRemarks:PricesandValues
This study has followed the making of prices as processes of folding and unfolding value and 
values. Rejecting a priori distinctions between the political and the economic as distinct 
spheres, or the opposition between calculation and politics (Barry 2002), and instead stressing 
the associations and dissociations between wind power and emerging values, the study 
demonstrates how the process of translating wind power into a price includes opposing 
qualifications of the technology: ‘Wind power reduces CO2-emissions’ or ‘wind power 
increases CO2-emissions’. Also, the feed-in tariff is qualified as a device allowing the 
construction of fair numbers as well as a device of ‘unfairness’.  The object to be qualified is 
replaced: from wind power, to its defined price, and eventually to the device itself. 
Values, of the sort that we would often relate to moral or political agendas, are made 
reference points in all five valuations presented. This is maybe not surprising; after all, 
markets for wind power are often referred to as political markets. But the making of the price 
fold (or unfold) these values with notions of efficiency and fairness, expressing sizes of 
development rates (and market shares) and profitability levels. As such, the extracted result is 
a folding of a long range of concerns, sometimes expressed as numbers and at other times as 
concerns. Stressing these rather complex associations going into the making of the price, the 
study contributes theoretically (and empirically) to explicate this new understanding of price 
making as a highly controversial process of qualifying wind power and device as well as the 
values to be made reference points. The valuation process portrayed in this chapter 
demonstrates how the making of the price draws (or cuts off) relations between wind power 
and other forms of energy as well as transaction formats and CO2-emissions. Finally, the 
valuation process is central to the making of matters of concern; wind power as the source of 
increasing CO2-emissions, costs to be paid by the French electricity consumers, and not least 
the ‘pollution’ of the landscape. This matter of concern and its framing through yet another 
device (the ZDE) is addressed in the following chapter. However, before directing my 
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attention to the unfolding/refolding of the landscape, I will briefly connect the valuation 
followed above to an ongoing discussion within my theoretical field regarding the concept of 
‘singularity’/‘singularization’29.
The entrance of wind power into the grid, as already mentioned, stabilizes wind power as an 
‘electricity-good’. This highly material connection between the turbines and the grid, via the 
transformer stations, is one that makes wind power not only compatible with electricity from 
other sources but also comparable in terms of prices, fluctuation/predictability, etc. The 
effects of making the connection is an important step in what Callon refers to as 
singularization, “positioning it [the good] in a space of goods, in a system of differences and 
similarities, of distinct yet connected categories” (Callon et al.: 198). Thus, singularity in 
Callon’s understanding points to the combination of “characteristics that establish its 
singularity” (ibid.), all the while it is relational and thereby connected to other categories. In 
this argument, Callon draws on Chamberlin’s work on ‘monopolistic competition’ 
(Chamberlin 1962), stressing the simultaneous singularity and similarity between products at 
all times. Therefore, according to Chamberlin, the contrast between pure competition and 
monopoly is meaningless. In the electricity system, the co-existence in the electrical grid of 
wind power and nuclear power (or electricity from other production technologies) becomes a 
driver of qualifications of each of the two categories.   
Lucien Karpik has developed a somewhat different version of singularity – and its valuation 
(Karpik 2010; 2011). For Karpik, singularity points to the good’s ‘uniqueness’ as defined by 
three characteristics: multidimensionality, incommensurability, and radical quality uncertainty 
- examples hereof could be a painting, a film, or a scientific paper (Karpik 2011). Central to 
Karpik’s development of ‘singular’ goods is the role of valuation because of the uncertainty 
of quality. The valuation of singularities is based on judgement: “When products are 
singularities, when actors give more weight to qualities than to the price… choice takes the 
form of judgment” (Karpik 2010: 39). To reduce the uncertainty (or opacity), people make use 
of ‘judgement devices’ that act as aids or guideposts. Karpik (2010) lists five such types of 
judgement devices: Networks, appellations, cicerones, rankings, and confluences.
29 The notion of ’singularity’ is associated with theoretical contributions referred to as ‘economics of quality’ 
(e.g., Karpik in Musselin and Paradeise 2005), or ‘the economy of qualities’ (Callon et al. 2002).  
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Perhaps the controversy is slightly exaggerated; after all, Callon and Muniesa define 
calculation (qualification) in rather broad terms and explicitly allow it to embrace judgement, 
too:
“Depending on the concrete achievement of each calculative step, calculation can either meet 
the requirements of algorithmic formulation or be closer to intuition or judgement. Such a 
definition establishes a continuum between qualitative judgement and quantitative (or 
numeric) calculation” (Callon and Muniesa 2005: 1232).   
With this broad definition of calculation (or ‘qualculation’), Callon and Muniesa add that the 
primary distinction is no longer located between judgement and calculation, but between 
arrangements allowing calculation and those making calculation impossible (Callon and 
Muniesa 2005). By getting rid of the distinction between calculation and judgement, Callon’s 
framework proposes itself as an ‘all-inclusive’ explanatory framework, whereas Karpik 
addresses a very specific type of market, namely, ‘markets for the unique’. 
This discussion may be informative in relation to the valuation of wind power; throughout the 
valuations, the qualification and requalification of wind power is contested, and its properties 
remain somewhat unstable.      
These two opposing definitions of singularization seem well suited for the description of the 
valuation of wind power, with one stressing the difficulties or even impossibilities of making 
comparisons, and the other stressing the relational characteristics and comparability. Bringing 
these two versions of singularization back to the valuation of wind power allows us to see 
how wind power is sometimes treated as a singularity (Karpik) qua its role in a larger 
assemblage in the fight against climate change; thus choice is a question of judgement 
(Karpik 2010: 39). To Cochet, a price might be necessary to allow transactions, but the choice 
of introducing wind power in the electricity system is rather a judgment of environmental 
responsibility. The association between wind power and climate change connects wind power 
to a network which could well be described as multidimensional, incommensurable, and 
radically uncertain in relation to quality. What are the effects of climate change? Can wind 
power be part of postponing/eliminating some of these effects? (And if yes, to what extent?). 
How are effects measured? And so forth. On the other hand, if wind power is qualified as 
electricity, the three dimensions are no longer well-fitted descriptions of its properties. This 
holds true of the valuations of CRE and Poignant; singularization as a process of defining 
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characteristics related to, yet distinct from, seems to be a more appropriate description: 
Classifying wind power as simply electricity makes it directly comparable to nuclear power, 
and the commensuration through a common metric and exchange format seems inevitable.  
What seems important from the opposition between the two definitions of singularity to the 
discussion here is that they are both present. This is possible because the qualification is 
unstable. And if we see the valuation of wind power as entailing all five contributions 
described above, then both forms of singularization at some point contribute to the value 
attached to wind power. The controversy remains; wind power is still seen by some of its 
proponents as carrying a value (almost) beyond price, and the choice for wind power is a 
question of judgment, and possible judgement devices are for example reports on the effects 
of climate change, etc. To others, the association between CO2-emission reduction and wind 
power is cut, and the formatting of the electricity market should simply form the grounds for 
valuing wind power; in other words, its connection to the grid becomes performative in 
relation to its valuation.
This discussion demonstrates that all the while the qualification of wind power is unstable, 
both versions of singularities are present, though in different versions. Multidimensionality, 
incommensurability, and radical quality uncertainty are not inherent properties of wind power 
but could potentially become the effect of a process of qualification. And one is tempted to 
ask how a wine or a painting becomes multidimensional and incommensurable, etc.    
The feed-in tariff device eventually defines the price at which wind power may be sold. 
However, the price is simply one element of the process of marketization during which wind 
power becomes a good configured in such a way that it may become part of market 
transactions. I will now turn towards a second device, dealing with the location of the 
turbines, but also a device that is connected to the feed-in tariff. To become qualified for the 
feed-in tariff, the producer must be located within a specific zone. The making of these zones 
are the object of the following chapter.   
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5.ASSEMBLINGLANDSCAPES:THEZDE
In the previous chapter, the landscape emerged as a value from the process of valuation 
centred on settling a price for wind power. This chapter pursues this question of valuing 
further by studying a device (the ZDE30) for developing specific development zones for wind 
power projects in France. The ZDE has been organized as a very manifest obligatory passage 
point to the feed-in tariff; from July 2007 and onwards, only wind power projects constructed 
within a ZDE are eligible for the tariff. Thus, the idea of the landscape as a valuable entity, 
and its qualifications, serve as a backdrop for the following analysis.
The ambition of the following chapter is twofold: Firstly, the making of the device, i.e., the 
wind power development zones, is described as a process of politicization. During this 
politicization, the ‘pollution’ of the landscape is one among several disqualifications of wind 
power; secondly, the practice of defining wind power development zones performed by 
engineers is followed. This practice transforms the landscape into one-dimensional layers of 
constraints that are eventually piled up to become zones of no or only small constraints to 
wind power development. By stressing these two moments of the device, i.e., its conception 
and its practice, this chapter illustrates the somewhat unanticipated effects of the device. 
Echoing the discussion by Dumez and Jeunemaïtre (2010) of Foucault’s and Callon’s work on 
the ‘dispositif’, they stress how the dynamics of a device emerge as the effect of the 
structuring of a given device along two phases31:
“The creation of devices is marked by an ‘urgent need’ (as Michel Foucault puts it). Then, 
during the second phase, new, unanticipated functions, strategies, and processes emerge and 
contribute to stabilize and entrench the device (if it does not rapidly disappear). So Michel 
30 In the following, ZDE and wind power development zones will be used interchangeably.  
31 Dumez and Jeunemaïtre argue that the dispositif of Foucault and Callon, respectively, has strong 
resemblances, not least its heterogeneously assembled nature, but the dynamics of the two phases seem to be 
lost, at least partially, in the contributions made by Callon (Dumez and Jeunemaïtre 2010).  
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Foucault’s vision is an invitation to focus on two distinct moments: the appearance of the 
device, and its stabilization, a strategy that uncovers continuities and discontinuities” (Dumez 
and Jeunemaïtre 2010: 31). 
In the case of the ZDE-device, it makes sense to stress this distinction between the two phases 
of the device, as they frame the location of wind power projects in rather distinct ways; the 
appearance or conception of the ZDE will be described as an attempt at politicizing wind 
power through location, and the construction of spaces in which local populations may oppose 
the development of wind power on their territory. On the other hand, the second phase, i.e., 
the practice of the engineers of defining these zones, may be better described as an 
economization of the territory; they break down the landscape according to single-variable 
dimensions and they ration the landscape to eventually conclude on the relative favourability 
of the zones as wind power territory. To capture the dynamics of the device constituted by 
these different processes, this chapter is organized around these two phases, i.e., the ZDE’s 
conception and its practice. 
5.1SituatingLocation
To Riisager, the connection of his turbine to the grid involved connecting a wind turbine 
situated in his own backyard to an outlet in his home. Thus, the location of his early 
configuration of wind power as an economic good was not a concern affecting the calculative 
agency emerging around wind power. To wind power developers today, however, location is 
among the most important concerns in wind power projects (Int. Lebfevre, Lamarre, 
Legrand). Choosing the location in which the turbines are constructed often implies 
qualifying the site according to several dimensions, such as: wind potential, distance to the 
grid, willingness of landowners to sign long-term rental agreements, etc. Land, or location, in 
the hands of the wind power developers is transformed into a calculable entity, singling out a 
distinct set of qualities. This comment of a developer, referred to in the first chapter, stresses 
the ordering of these qualities: 
“As a wind site, it [North of Orleans] is actually horrible! There is not much wind. But the 
area is so far from beautiful, even ugly, and therefore no one objects to the construction of the 
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turbines. And finally, the existing electricity lines between Orleans and Paris facilitate the 
connection, and that is why you see so many turbines in the area” (Int. Lefebvre, my 
translation). 
Thus, the developer ordering the qualities of wind power projects pushes the driver of 
production, i.e., the wind, into the background, emphasising the presence of a grid and the 
absence of local opposition. In Lebfevre’s account, the location of projects is valued 
according to qualities of grid presence and ‘ugliness’, and it demonstrates the framing and 
qualification process of the site for wind power development undertaken. The same criteria 
are found in a study of developers in Sweden though their ordering is somewhat different: 
“When asked how they start developing wind farms, developers usually answer that they 
begin by looking for a site with good wind conditions, since this is a key requisite for the 
profitability of a project. The costs for constructing and developing the farm and connecting it 
to the power grid should also be reasonable. As one developer put it: We have three criteria 
for assessing the suitability of a site: first that the wind is good, second that we are not too far 
from the grid so that the operation does not become unprofitable, and third, of course, we 
must always make sure that it is at least 400m away from any habitation. For example, for a 
site to be of any interest, it should not be close to any dwellings, or too close to any place of 
Swedish national interest” (Corvellec and Risberg 2007: 310). 
So, whereas the landscape in terms of aesthetics, (undisturbed) nature, flora and fauna, is 
often stressed as a value to those inhabiting it (people and animals), it has yet another value to 
the developer, who stresses qualities such as proximity to the grid, wind resource, and 
willingness of landowners to host wind turbines. This framing of the landscape performed by 
the developers may be overflowed by migration patterns of birds (Nadaï and Labussière 
2010), or the presence of (rare) animal species threatened by the construction work or by the 
functioning of the turbines.
This chapter addresses the process through which the landscape is qualified and economized 
through its enrolment in the wind power market assemblage: Firstly, by its inscription into the 
ZDE-device, and secondly, by following the making of a ZDE in Picardie (Northern France). 
Engineers, landscape architects, and regional and local administration are all part of the 
process, which allows the making of zones for wind power development. This work is 
followed in relation to a specific set of zones emerging in the Communauté de Commume de 
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Pays de la Serre (from now referred to as CdC du Pays de la Serre). This chapter is based on 
interviews with a variety of actors involved in making the ZDE as a device, as well as 
documents, and not least the maps produced during the process of qualification.
This chapter proceeds as follows: It starts by contextualizing location through a discussion of 
the association between price, i.e., the feed-in tariff, and location, as well as the notion of 
NIMBYism and how this concept is related to wind power development. Building on this 
particular framing of location as a problem for wind power development, what could be seen 
as the ‘urgent need’ marking the conception phase of the device (Dumenz and Jeunemaitre 
2010), this chapter describes the emergence of the ZDE as a politicization of wind power. 
Moving through debates in parliament, the device is slightly reshaped as various interests are 
brought along, and the result in the shape of a legal device is introduced. This chapter then 
proceeds to the second phase pointed out by Foucault; i.e., its unfolding into a practice on the 
territory of CdC du Pays de la Serre. Finally, the findings are briefly discussed. 
5.1.1AssociatingtheFeedinTariffandtheLandscape
As mentioned, since 2007 eligibility for the feed-in tariff requires that wind power projects 
are situated within a ZDE; i.e., the ZDE is made an obligatory passage point to the tariff.  This 
association goes even further; the feed-in tariff is proposed as central to the making of the 
ZDE as a device in at least two ways: Firstly, the matter of location, and secondly, the level of 
the tariff. Concerning the former, the replacement of the tender device by the feed-in tariff 
effaces the central planning element of future wind power projects, which was part of the 
tender device. Whereas the tender system would invite proposals for wind power projects in 
predefined locations, the feed-in tariff was, from the early days, eligible to all projects 
otherwise following the prescribed legislation (from 2001 to 2007, where the ZDE was made 
an obligation). The feed-in tariff may therefore be said to lead to ‘anarchy’ regarding the 
location of wind power projects. Thus, the transition from one market device to another is 
arguably amongst the triggers of an emerging matter of concern, namely, the location for the 
development of wind power projects: “The ZDE is there to avoid what we call ‘sprawling’. 
Sprawling is the anarchistic construction of turbines destroying the landscape – its 
everything, anywhere, and anyhow” (Int. Lamarre, my translation). Secondly, the feed-in 
tariff, and more precisely the level of the tariff, is said to lead to anarchy, too; the level of the 
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tariff is suspected as attracting an increasing number of developers in their quest for ‘undue 
profits’:
“And with all the projects coming out – and there have been no bankruptcies yet, because it is 
too recent. The entire population, and in particular the public authorities, are under the 
impression that it is a ‘cake’. They say: ‘it is not normal that we continue to subsidize a thing 
like that, which makes the investors grow fat, and they are not even French’. That is what they 
say; they make 20% profitability easily, and on top, its Canadian or German investors. That’s 
not normal” (Int. Lefebvre, my translation). 
This description may be seen as a demonstration of the ways in which a market, and here its 
particular organization through specific devices, triggers the emergence of new matters of 
concern (Callon 2007a). The framing of the French wind power market through the 
construction of the feed-in tariff becomes associated with the so-called anarchy of wind power 
developers; it is profitability-levels which are seen as the source of ‘anarchistic development’; 
and the device is argued to lead to the “proliferation of numerous projects scattered around 
the territory” (Le Monde 2005). The turbines and their disfiguration of the landscape are 
made a political issue, which in turn affects the reconfiguration of the market, i.e., by 
developing yet another device, the ZDE. This dynamic aspect of ordering economic activities 
is well captured by Callon:
”…markets trigger the emergence of matters of concern to which they are not always able to 
provide satisfactory answers. These matters of concern may then evolve into many 
(potentially) political issues whose solutions may, in turn, impact on the organization of 
economic activities” (Callon 2007a: 139).
One of the matters of concern to be discussed here is the landscape threatened by wind 
turbines and the local opposition this is expected to spur. This is often discussed under the 
heading of NIMBYism. This notion, though not uncontroversial, and its role in the ZDE is 
briefly examined in the following section. 
5.1.2NIMBYismandPublicGoods
The idea of the landscape being a threatened value has often been raised in relation to wind 
power development, and local opposition to projects is said to be amongst the major obstacles 
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to its expansion (e.g., Hvelplund 2006; Gosset and Ranchin 2006; Jobert et al. 2007; Szarka 
2007): “Landscape is among the principal reasons invoked by the local administration for 
rejecting projects” (Nadaï and Labussière 2009: 4). This local opposition is sometimes 
referred to as NIMBYism (not in my back yard) (e.g., Nadaï 2007; van der Horst 1994 and 
2007). The NIMBY syndrome positions hostility as locally anchored rather than as a general 
opposition towards wind power, per se:  
“A survey … conducted in September 2007 showed that 90% of the French population 
supports their [wind turbines’] development. For many, the turbines have a good image and 
good looks. Some consider them to participate in the organization of the landscape, as, in 
their time, aqueducts, viaducts, windmills, roads ... But for those who are at the foot of the 
tower, they are first and foremost machines placed on a base of more than 1000 tons of 
concrete, up to 150 meters high, who massacre their local environment, overshadowing and 
noisy. For comparison, the largest electricity pylons rise 48 meters. "Whereas a wind turbine 
is maybe not unaesthetic, but their multiplication becomes catastrophic for the landscapes," 
says Paule Albrecht, president of the Society for the protection of landscape and aesthetics of 
France” (Figaro 2008, my translation). 
So, whereas wind power may be framed (as a valuable) solution of the pollution problem of 
CO2-emissions, the turbines become the source of a somewhat different pollution problem, 
namely, that of the landscape. This could be described as an example of the 
framing/overflowing dynamics stressed by Callon (1998b). Common to these overflows (i.e., 
CO2-emissions and pollution of the landscape) is that they are both, arguably, connected to 
the most common source of market failure, namely, the association to a so-called ‘public 
good’. In what Hardin (1968) termed the ‘tragedy of the commons’, the public good (here the 
land, or the landscape) is prone to overuse, when too many owners have the privilege to use a 
given resource, and no one has a right to exclude others. Framing the countryside or the 
landscape as a ‘commons’ transforms the wind power developer into a figure resembling a 
‘free-rider’, something that is accentuated by the existence of the feed-in tariff (see Chapter 
Four).
On the other hand, the NIMBY concept seems to build on the reversion of the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’, namely, what Heller and Eisenberg (1998) refer to as ‘the tragedy of the 
anticommons’ in which a resource (e.g., wind potential) is prone to underuse when multiple 
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owners have the right to exclude others from the resource (Heller and Eisenberg 1998). In 
other words, the so-called proponents of the NIMBY argue that the landscape is ‘polluted’ by 
wind power developers in their quest for profit maximization, whereas the proponents of wind 
power argue that the locals are too restrictive in their protection of the landscape – and have 
too much power vis-à-vis their means of excluding project developers from their ‘backyards’. 
Thus, shifting the public good of the equation from that of the landscape to the wind, allows a 
reframing of the problematization facing either the locals or the developers.
Concentrating on the problematization around the ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ and its 
translation into NIMBYism, is often described as a way of discrediting project opposition 
(e.g., van der Horst 2007). The reference to NIMBYism dissolves all (local) opposition into a 
one-dimensional evaluation of the landscape; that of ‘self-interest’, i.e., the proximity 
between a given construction and one’s own land is made circumscribing32:
 “The implication is clear: this opposition is based purely on self-interest; and because 
standing up for one's own interests is seen as selfish, it may be safely disregarded. 
Proponents of this argument do not distinguish between the interests of the opponents and 
their motives” (Wolsink 1994: 853).  
Acknowledging that the opposition may be anchored in a variety of arguments, an a priori 
reduction into one dimension, i.e., NIMBYism, discredits the opposition, all the while 
disguising the variety of possible sources of concern. The approach adopted here seeks to 
remain open to the many different ways in which the landscape may be qualified as well as 
the ways in which these qualities are ordered. Whereas the NIMBY syndrome is often 
discussed in relation to wind power projects (e.g., van der Horst 2007; Nadaï 2007)33, the role 
it takes up in the present analysis is rather a framing/representation taking place outside of the 
local environment of the CdC Pays de la Serre followed here. Rather, the NIMBY syndrome 
becomes a figure in the formulation of the ZDE as a device34. In other words, the following 
analysis will demonstrate how the dynamics of framing-overflowing-reframing in the case 
32 Wolsink (2000) identified four different categories of opposition towards wind farms in Holland and 
quantified their relative importance; he concludes that NIMBY is a myth and that institutional restraints are more 
important than public acceptance. 
33 Wolsink (1994) describes how the NIMBY concept became a political issue in the Dutch political debate over 
the disposal of nuclear waste in leading to the adoption of a ‘NIMBY bill’ as well as ‘NIMBY instrument’.   
34 Chrupek stressed that the ZDE was an instrument developed to avoid NIMBYism (Int. Chrupek). 
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studied here may be seen as an attempt at constructing NIMBYism (centrally) rather than 
responding to it. 
5.2TheMakingoftheDevice
The legal text of the ZDE argues for its introduction as a means of continuing the positive 
French development of wind power seen in 200535: “We must now consolidate this dynamic 
by pursuing this growth, within a framework favoring the good local integration of the [wind 
power] projects” (Ministere de l’Ecologie et du Developpement Durable et al. 2006: 1). The 
origins of the device, however, seem to have emerged out of a somewhat different ambition, 
as will be described below. As such, this section addresses the first phase feeding the 
dynamics of the device stressed by Foucault. In the following, the conception of the device is 
described as an act of politicization, i.e., an attempt to problematize wind power by 
associating it with emerging issues related to the landscape. Next, the device as it eventually 
took shape is described, and finally it is discussed in terms of ‘planning’ and ‘siting’ as two 
distinct approaches to wind power policies (Nadaï 2007). 
5.2.1AnActofPoliticization
During an interview with an official of the French Parliament, Durant36, regarding the 
qualification of wind power and the fixing of the feed-in tariff, the conversation touched upon 
the ZDE. Durant immediately claimed to be the ‘father’ of the device and presented an 
elaborate description of the birth of the ZDE. During his presentation of the making of the 
wind power development zones, it was unfolded as a strategic device aimed at putting an end 
to, or at least slowing down, French wind power development: 
“…when the second PPI37 ... it was in 2003, something like that… it set an already very 
ambitious goal, but at the time everyone thought it was pure display. It's a bit like.... there is 
35 400 MW installed in the year 2005 (Ministere de l’Ecologie et du Developpement Durable 2006). 
36 Durant is identical to Durant from the previous chapter.  
37 The PPI (Programmation Pluriannuelle des Investissements de production électrique) is a multiannual 
investment program for electricity production.  
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this permanent double discourse, where you announce that you are going to make 10 
megawatts of wind power – you do not believe it, but by making the announcement, well 
eventually it makes 10 megawatts of wind power. But at the time we did not believe it would 
happen, we did not think it would work as it worked…  we thought that the wind power 
development zones would considerably put the brakes on the development of the projects, so 
they have been made for that... to put the brakes on, really. Obviously, it does not seem like it 
has really stopped wind power” (Int. Durant, my translation).
According to Durant, wind power development zones emerged as a safety brake on what was 
conceived as a highly ambitious goal. Though the ZDE is presented through law and 
guidelines as an attempt to encounter and eventually, at least partially, overcome local 
resistance, Durant presents the device as an attempt at problematizing wind power by framing 
the issue as a democratic decision. In general, the subject of renewable energy and wind 
power in particular – in France and elsewhere – has been discussed with passion, and it has 
rarely been treated in a rational, cold, and purely economic manner (Int. Durant). 
Furthermore, arguments for and against wind power are often translated into a discussion 
for/or against nuclear power, a long running discussion in France: “Those who now support 
wind power were all former nuclear power enemies” (ibid.). Hence, the discussion of wind 
power is not solely a matter of increasing the amount of renewable energy in the system but 
also a battle of technologies. People are often referred to as being convinced by either one or 
the other technology; e.g., “The new CEO of RTE is a pro-wind power guy, whereas the 
previous was 100% into nuclear power” (Int. Lefranc, my translation). Durant’s account 
makes these issues re-emerge as a possible concern in the conceptualization of the ZDE. To 
Durant, however, the ‘real’ concern of wind power was the feed-in tariff. He describes how 
tariff-opponents as a first step proposed additions to the legal text, so that the tariff could later 
become overridden by the legal system: 
“The basic idea … the idea, from the outset, is to say the subject of wind power is an 
economic issue, and the basic problem is the level of the tariff. If … the tariff is lower, there 
would be fewer projects, which makes good sense - that’s the first point. Second point, one 
cannot, "one" being the Parliament, the legislator cannot reduce the tariff, since it is a 
decree.  However, the legislator did ask the Parliament, the government, to remake a tariff … 
asked to redo the tariff by writing in the law that the tariff should not lead to excessive 
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advantages [to the developers], meaning an entire device made to end the tariff decree, 
precisely because there were arguments to say that the level was excessive, and therefore the 
tariff bill was probably illegal and thereby could have been overridden by a judge…” (Int. 
Durant, my translation). 
Thus, had the decree explicitly stressed that ‘excessive advantages’ were not to be the result 
of the tariff, this would have been an opportunity to bring the controversy on to new grounds, 
i.e., that of the legal system. Here the different calculations of the (undue) rents made by 
developers could have been discussed and possibly led to a reordering of the calculative 
agencies opposed during the debate of the feed-in tariff. Having failed to make these changes 
to the decree, Durant describes how the matter of concern regarding the level of the tariff was 
replaced by yet another matter of concern, namely, that of the national heritage: “Since the 
topic is the tariff… one, it’s the tariff… and two, the political angle of attack by which you can 
touch wind power is the protection of the heritage” (Int. Durant, my translation). Stressing 
this involves an evaluation of three different matters of concern related to wind power and 
their potential for becoming the backdrop of a political discourse impeding French wind 
power development. It is the potential for creating public attention and understanding that 
which is stressed during the evaluation of these matters of concern, and their 
problematization:
“Politically, the discourse: ‘it is useless’ from an energy point of view, it makes no sense, it is 
a political discourse that does not deliver. It does not work, because it is easily returned on 
the mode ‘you defend the nuclear ...’, and furthermore, it is also extremely difficult to defend, 
meaning the idea that when it turns [the turbines] it will release a thermal unit that will 
export to Germany. It is a chain that will be difficult to defend. So, the energy argument is not 
politically viable” (Int. Durant, my translation).
According to Durant, the problematization of wind power as an energy concern does not have 
the potential to mobilize the public against the expansion of wind power in France. Firstly, it 
may be translated into simply a ‘battle’ of energy technologies, and secondly, the complexity 
of the argument makes it difficult to engage the public. To make the argument, the energy 
system has to be represented in some form, including the balance between supply and 
demand, energy technologies, and their production modes (e.g., base load energy, etc.). As a 
‘viable’ politicization, here seen as the ability to mobilize public support, the energy point of 
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view is disqualified.  In other words, a clear distinction is made between the argument’s 
technical qualities versus its political qualities. This is not meant as a disqualification of the 
argument as such, only its qualities as a political argument. Durant continues his account by 
drawing the lines of the second possible politicization:
“And the economic argument that it creates too high profitability, and it comes at very high 
cost… that was not audible because it could easily be answered by saying, but two eurocents 
per invoice, it's nothing” (Int. Durant, my translation).
The ‘economic argument’, which was according to Durant the ‘real’ concern could not create 
the mobilization of the public either, as the effect on the individual consumer simply 
translates into the rather manageable cost of two eurocents. Durant’s politicization, then, 
includes an evaluation of the energy concern and the economic concern, and their potential for 
problematizing wind power. He concludes that these are ‘weak’ problematizations and they 
will not help to slow down wind power, as intended by his politicization. Therefore, Durant 
rejects these as backdrops for the device he is conceptualizing and continues to the third 
problematization:   
“So, the only tenable argument is that it should not disfigure the landscape, because that – 
that is working. People may agree or may not agree, but it is something that holds together 
politically. So, suddenly the ZDE mixes two issues, which is it draws on a landscape 
protection argument, and it affects the price. Because, in fact, the ZDE does not interdict. It is 
not a planning measure, it does not interdict, or it does not frame the realization of machines 
outside of these zones, it conditions the benefiter of the purchase obligation through the fact 
of zoning. So it closes the economic window, which is posed by the level of the tariff, outside 
of zones…The idea is… that it limits a regime in momentum, it effectively frames the location, 
it limits the potentially a bit anarchic initiatives. And the second point: it complicates … it 
allows for more procedural steps, and each procedural step may become an object of conflict. 
So if a local association is against, it gives them points for action to obtain the cancellation of 
acts [construction of parks]. And so it has as its nature to halt the development of the project 
objectively...” (Int. Durant, my translation)   
The disfiguration of the landscape is eventually estimated to be the best possible way of 
mobilizing and enabling the emergence of an opposition. As stressed by Durant, people may – 
or may not – accept that turbines disfigure the landscape, but it is an argument that is easily 
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framed and communicated. The ZDE becomes an opportunity to allow local opposition to 
gain momentum and present their concerns in a well-framed forum. While the developer is 
tied to the ZDE so that he can be eligible for the tariff, it ultimately connects the landscape 
disfiguration concern with the economic concern. Durant’s account of the making of the 
ZDE-device as a series of problematizations, i.e., the fragmentation and division of issues 
“that evolves into the joint formulation of a set of different problems which in a sense, at least 
partially, are substituted for the initial issue” (Callon 2008: 9) draws on concerns that 
emerged along the process of valuation in the preceding chapter, such as the level of the tariff, 
the fact that it is generated at a desk, rather than by the market, and the potential of wind 
power (or lack hereof) to decrease CO2-emissions in the French energy system. Thus, the 
three issues discussed by Durant were not made up during the making of the device; they 
emerged and were refined during the process of valuation unfolding around the settlement for 
a price. But during the formulation of the ZDE-device, these concerns were qualified 
according to their ‘public appeal’, sometimes disqualified as being too technical, etc. 
This account of the conceptualization of the ZDE-device indicates that the NIMBY effect may 
rather be seen as an effect of politicization rather than a way of encountering it. Paradoxically, 
one could say, it seems that local opposition stressed in NIMBYism is constructed centrally, 
i.e., in the halls of Parliament. As such, the opposition seem to be nurtured and enabled in the 
way the problematizations frame matters of concern associated with wind power.
However, for reasons I will address later, the ZDE was less successful in creating the NIMBY 
effect than was expected by its ‘father’: 
“This being the case, the initial idea was to slow down, or constraining through breaking or 
slowing down... but there was a very vigorous press campaign by the union of renewable 
energy and therefore critics were less harsh than originally envisaged, so it's normal that it 
slows less down ...  it does not slow down as it was intended...” (Int. Durant, my translation). 
The framing presented by Durant closely associates wind power and the landscape. As a 
policy device, however, the translation of the device – from its conception to its formulation 
into a policy – passed through two hearings in both chambers (the assembly and the senate) 
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during which other issues emerged38. During this process, the landscape became associated 
with other issues such as decentralization, e.g., the instruction text mentions that prefects 
should be attentive and avoid ‘sprawling-effects’, and the device, in turn, folded around these 
issues. In other words, the ZDE passed through steps of translation and was eventually 
transformed into distinct formulations of requirements and guidelines for regional and local 
administration and framed as a tool for local democracy to emerge.  
5.2.2FromPoliticizationtoPolicy
Following Durant’s conception of the ZDE as a politicization through which the association 
between wind power and the landscape is enforced, the wind power development zones 
became an integrated part of the French law on energy policies, POPE (Programme fixant les 
Orientations de la Politique Énergétique)39, adopted in 2005. From 14 July 200740, the wind 
power development zones were made an obligation to wind power developers in France for 
their projects to be eligible for the feed-in tariff. According to a letter addressed to the French 
Prefects, and the attached instruction letter (La Ministere de l’Ecologie et du development 
Durable 2006), the device “should encourage communities to participate in this form of 
decentralized energy production while taking into account the protection of landscapes, 
historical monuments and remarkable and protected sites” (La Ministere de l’Ecologie et du 
development Durable 2006: 1, my translation). And as such, the development zones are 
argued to be a means of obtaining the overall French objective of increasing the share of 
energy from RETs from the present 15% to 21% in 2010 (presently, wind power represents 
between 1% and 2% of French electricity consumption).
38 According to Nadaï, these discussions were centred on the centralization/decentralization of the French energy 
infrastructure: “The analysis of the French legislative debate over the new energy policy shows that landscape 
and local acceptance have been recurring issues in the debate. However, these issues were not examined as such 
in the political debate. They were pushed forward by the protagonists in order to fight a battle, which boiled 
down to a major issue for French energy policy: decentralization” (Nadaï 2007: 2724). Even though the ZDE is 
argued to be an attempt to allow the local communities to take over the initiative of the future wind power 
development, the planning of the electrical grid, or the infrastructure connecting the turbines to the distribution, 
remains in the hands of RTE. 
39 As such, the ZDE is characterized as an ‘electrical device’ rather than an urban planning tool (dispositif 
d’urbanisme). This ambiguity is born from the fact that the two classes of instruments are coupled in the ZDE 
(5eme colloque national éolien, synthese;32).     
40 The period between July 2005 and 14 July 2007 was made a transition phase during which developers could 
choose under which legislative framework to operate. 
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From 14 July 2007, the feed-in tariff granted to wind power producers guarantees the 
producer not only that all energy produced from his turbines is purchased by EDF, but also 
that he is paid at a fixed price. But these terms only apply for turbines constructed within the 
development zones. The development zones have, in other words, become indeed very 
physical ‘obligatory passage points’ to the economic incentives constructed to attract wind 
power. Furthermore, with the development zones, it has become possible to benefit from the 
purchase obligation even for projects that exceed 12 MW. Therefore, the development zones 
enable the construction of large wind turbine farms without compromising or renouncing the 
fixed and attractive price offered to the wind power developers. Before the POPE law, the 
purchase obligation was limited to smaller projects of 12 MW or less, which forced 
developers of larger wind farms to ‘slice’ his projects into smaller projects under 12 MW and 
submit each ‘slice’ to the administrative procedures of applying for construction permits and 
grid connection permits.  
The ‘basic principle’ of the ZDE is to respond “to the desire of the communities to 
accommodate, in an organized framework, wind power installations on their territory”
(Ministere de l’Economie et al. 2006: 4, my translation). The geographical location of the 
development zones must be proposed by the concerned municipalities or by an inter-
communal cooperation, often referred to as a Communauté de Communes – or a CdC. The 
proposal of a wind power development zone, addressed to the prefect, must be based on three 
criteria (Ministère de l’Economie et al. 2006): 
 The wind potential in the zone. 
 The possibilities of connecting the turbines to the electrical grid. 
 Respect of the landscape, historical monuments, and protected sites.
These criteria should be described in depth in the proposal, and upon these the precise 
geographical perimeter of the development zone is defined. This becomes the specific area in 
which the municipality wishes to allow the development of wind farms in their area, and it 
defines the minimal as well as maximal power that may be installed in the development zone 
(ibid.).
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Finally, once the municipalities have defined a territory as a potential development zone 
based on the three criteria, they propose the development zone to the department41 prefect, 
who must validate the proposal. As such, it is the prefect who holds the final decision whether 
or not to allow a development zone, and thus the final decision of what is to become ‘legal 
turbine territory’.  
At the end of February 200742, eighteen development zones had been created, reaching an 
upper limit of 602 MW of wind power to be potentially installed. Five development zones had 
been refused, with arguments stressing that the zones were small-scale zones and thus not 
avoiding mitigation of the parks. Furthermore, sixty-three (with a maximal power of 4142 
MW) had been proposed and were being processed by the prefects, and finally, at least 
eighty-six proposals (that were known of) were being prepared for submission to the prefects. 
5.2.3Increasing‘RedTape’
The idea of the ZDE is not to undertake a full analysis of the ‘very local’ constraints, i.e., the 
device does not replace the construction permits and the related impact study. As such, the 
device is rather that of territorial planning than an accurate tool for the micro-level insertion. 
As a consequence, the procedure does not investigate whether landowners of the appointed 
zones have any interest in renting their land to the potential developer (Int. Plichon, Int. 
Piedvache):
“So it's not an impact assessment. The study we do as consultants is really a study at the scale 
of a territory, so it's not a local study; that is to say, we will not make accurate census on such 
sites, but it really has to guide a number of areas, taking into account the specificities of 
territories and neighbouring territories…” (Int. Plichon, my translation). 
As such, the device ensures that wind power has been on the local agenda, and that the local 
community accepts the idea of installations. However, it does not, per se, do away with any of 
the procedures that the developer is legally obliged to perform; as argued by Francois 
Pelissiers, director of ERELIA, “The ZDEs seem to represent a supplementary step and may 
41 From the French département, a sub-regional administrative division. 
42 Until 14 July 2007, it was still possible to construct turbines outside of the development zones and still benefit 
from the purchase obligation – as long as the project did not exceed 12 MW. The real increase is therefore not 
expected before July 2007. 
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result in litigation. An increase in case files is possible” (ADEME, Roundtable Amiens, my 
translation).
The ZDE-device does not, however, dictate how the proposals are to be made and thus allows 
a certain flexibility for the CdCs to work out the proposals of wind power development zones. 
It is made an explicit requirement that the proposal addresses ways in which the idea of a 
local wind power zone has been communicated to the local inhabitants. The ZDE is often 
referred to as a device for ‘consultation’, i.e., including elements of cooperation and/or 
dialogue. The framework makes particular mention of this consultation: The final proposal 
should include “a clarification on the modalities of consultation with citizens affected by the 
ZDE would usefully be mentioned in the dossier” (Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et 
de l’Industrie 2006b, my translation). As such, the instructions leave the CdC with the choice 
of how to conduct the dialogue, with examples ranging from a public meeting held by the 
CdC with the presence of bureau d’etude (CdC Santerre) to the invitation of all inhabitants to 
a nearby wind park (CdC Pays de la Serre). In none of the cases was the consultation a 
question of yes or no to wind power development but rather an introduction to the plans 
already made.    
The device may add layers of bureaucracy to defining wind parks, but it remains less concrete 
on the distinct ways in which to make the proposal as well as the form of the ‘consultation’ of 
the local population. As such, there is a certain plasticity to the device (Akrich 1992); though 
the distribution of identities and roles seems well-defined by the device, the exact ways of 
performing the roles remains open to those using the device.
5.2.4TheZDEasaFrameforOverflows
Alain Nadaï, a French environmental economist, has discussed wind power policies 
developed in France since the Eole 2005 program and in particular the local acceptance of 
wind power (Nadaï 2007; Nadaï and Labussière 2009), invoking the concepts of ‘planning’ 
and ‘siting’ (Nadaï 2007). Planning refers to an ‘integrated approach’ of the territory, “which
allows planners to decide on land uses in time and space” (Nadaï 2007: 2716). Methods such 
as the ecological planning developed in the sixties (Mc Harg 1969), also referred to as rational 
planning, implies an analysis of the territory according to a number of criteria and the drawing 
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of maps for each criteria43. Next, maps are superimposed, and the emerging blank zones are 
regarded as acceptable zones for new infrastructural constructions. ‘Siting’ approaches, on the 
other hand, refer to policies dealing with local issues related to the siting of wind power 
infrastructures (Wolsink 1996). For landscape designers, siting is a process that is part of the 
transformation of a landscape. The site on which the landscape engineer/designer works is 
stressed as being in a temporary and unstable state, “a state in which social networks that are 
connected to the place get recomposed” (Nadaï 2007: 2716). During this open process, the 
memory and identity of the place emerges in the course of the process (ibid.). 
Bringing the concepts of planning and siting to work on French wind power policy, Nadaï 
concludes that the intention behind the law of the ZDEs seems to be situated somewhere 
between the two. On the one side habilitating the local communities as definers of their 
territory (siting), all the while leaving final decisions (and control) in the hands of the 
centrally organized prefects (planning); “the question remains open whether or not the new 
policy scheme might provide the right balance between territorial planning and room for 
open participation” (Nadaï 2007: 2716). 
In his article, Nadaï explicitly connects siting and Callon’s concept of overflows as a process 
through which social groups emerge, and not least the proliferation of social links. On the 
other hand, (rational) planning being based on predefined spatial schemes, is seen as close to 
the logic of the Callonian framing. Connecting the ideas of planning/framing and 
siting/overflows to Durant’s account of the ZDE as an attempt of politicizing French wind 
power development, I argue that the association between wind power and landscape is an 
attempted framing of turbines as pollution that is premised on processes of siting, i.e., the 
emergence of concerned groups and their mobilization. Returning to the terminology of 
Callon, the ZDE may then be seen as a frame intended, at least by Durant, for the creation, 
enrolment, and reinforcement of overflows.  
The making of the device, what Foucault referred to as the first phase, may be seen as a 
response to an ‘urgent need’ defined by Durant to be ultimately the price of wind power. But 
rather than problematizing the price of wind power, the ZDE is set up as a platform on which 
wind power and the territory are associated and forced to pass through several ‘trials of 
43 The method proceeds by abstraction as it extrudes from the territory a set of single-variable layers (e.g., 
natural space layer, roads layer…) (Nadaï 2007). 
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strength’: Agreement between neighbouring municipalities to make a proposal; the prefect 
must accept the proposal; and local inhabitants must be consulted on the initiative. However, 
as Durant admits, the ZDE eventually does not put a halt to the development of wind power. 
To grasp the, according to Durant, counterproductive effects of the ZDE-device, I will now 
turn to its practice.
5.3TheMakingofaZDEinPicardie
I will now turn to the second phase of the device as stressed by Foucault, i.e., the practice of 
defining wind power development zones. The practice to be followed is that of engineers, as 
they translate the territory of the CdC du Pays de la Serre into zones more or less favourable 
to wind power development; a process that may eventually be described as an economization 
of the territory. 
The ZDE to be followed is situated in Picardie, a region north of Paris. Picardie covers an 
area of 19,399 km2; consists of three departments, Aisne, Somme, and Oise44; and has a 
population of approximately 1890.000. Within Picardie, the intended politicization described 
above does not seem to have worked quite the way as intended by the originators of the ZDE, 
as already indicated. As illustrated in the figure below, ZDEs have been proposed in most 
Communautés de Communes in the Picardie region and were, at the time of following the 
process of CdC du Pays de la Serre, at different states of preparation.
44 CdC Pays de la Serre is situated in Aisne, and the CdC du Santerre in Somme. 
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Map5.1:WindPowerDevelopmentZonesinPicardieanno2008
       (DRIRE 2008) 
5.3.1CdCduPaysdelaSerre
The CdC du Pays de la Serre regroups forty-two villages (see figure below), working together 
since 1986 and has approximately 16.000 inhabitants. The CdC is placed in the eastern part of 
Picardie, a region often mentioned as one of the best territories in France for wind power due 
to the region’s wind regime. The interest in wind power projects in the CdC dates back to 
2002. In the Journal des Elus, a journal for the elected representatives in the CdC, the 
German developer, Eoles Futur, is described as having approached the CdC for future 
investments in the region and inviting a delegation from the CdC as well as neighbouring 
CdCs on a field trip to Northern Germany in September 2002. In the note, the interest of the 
developer is explained firstly referring to the Kyoto protocol, and secondly making reference 
to the characteristics of the region: 
“Ratifying the Kyoto protocol, France is committed to actively participating in the promotion 
and development of so-called ‘clean’ energy. The company Eoles Futur has therefore realized 
an important research study in the North-eastern part of France, to determine most favorable 
geographical areas for the establishment of wind turbines. The result of this study show that 
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the Serre-valley, and in particular the plateau from East of Montcomet to Marle, combines all 
the characteristics allowing the implementation of wind turbines: 
 Meteorological and aerological conditions 
 Topography (plateaus and plains) 
 Sparse habitation 
 Regulatory compliance constraints (aviation corridors, distance to habitation…)”
(Journal des Elus 2002, in Airele 2007, my translation).
The developer makes a translation from the French commitment to the transnational 
agreement of the Kyoto protocol and into some rather distinct qualifications of the territory 
within the CdC du Pays de la Serre. The preliminary studies of the North-eastern part of 
France allow for the emergence of a valuable framing of the territory, something that is first 
communicated to the elected politicians of the region.
In 2003 the local journal, Pays de la Serre Magazine, published a small note on an upcoming 
meeting organized by the developer, Eole Futur (Airele 2007). However, in spring and 
summer of 2008 (the time of my fieldtrips) there were still no turbines installed in the region, 
but plans for a park at Autremencourt had been granted with the final construction permits, 
and in 2008, construction work was slowly beginning.  
Map5.2:PaysdelaSerre
              (Airele 2007: 8) 
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In 2006, the CdC du Pays de la Serre began a process towards the definition of a ZDE on the 
territory. Though the CdC du Pays de la Serre had the actual expertise in-house to undertake 
large parts of the work required to define the ZDE, they nonetheless chose to buy the service 
of making the proposal from a specialized consulting firm: “It was chosen to sign a consulting 
firm, which is totally new to us - but saying that we will have a new look at the territory” (Int. 
Vonfeldt, my translation). This ‘new look’ on the territory was first and foremost said to 
ensure what the responsible in-house engineer called non-partiality and objectivity that 
separates the actual analysis from the political agenda unfolding between the elected 
representatives, a distinction which is also stressed by one of the consultants hired by the CdC 
du Pays de la Serre: 
“…that is to say that we, the consultants, are there to give advice to the administration of the 
community, being very objective. You can see that in the landscape studies, the technical 
studies, several levels of studies. But behind this is the political aspect; that is to say, that it is 
the community of communes who hands in its file in the prefecture, so it is … it is the file of 
the community of communes, and not that of consultancy firm, we were there to guide them, to 
define the scenarios, and finally after that, they choose” (Int. Plichon, my translation). 
To both engineers, the distinction between the politics of the CdC and the (technical) 
objectivity of the external consultants is stressed and provided an argument for buying the 
service. The consultancy firm Airele, a company based in the region, was hired to undertake 
the analysis of the territory building upon their emerging specialization in the work of making 
ZDE-proposals.
5.3.2AProcessofQualification
In very rough terms, the entire process of analysis may be described as a process of qualifying 
areas of the territory as favourable – or not – to wind power development. The main tool in 
this process of qualification is the map. Mapping the qualities of the territory along a wide 
range of dimensions is what eventually leads to the final proposal together with its definition 
of power limits. Maps are constructed, each delimiting areas of constraints, and eventually 
they are layered allowing areas without constraints to emerge (Int. Plichon). Airele organized 
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the work around three phases (not to be confused with the two phases of the device, stressed 
by Foucault): 
Phase one: Analysis and global synthesis of the data (Airele 2006a). 
Phases two and three: Proposal of the ZDE and recommendation on implantations (Airele 
2006b).
Finally, an official proposal, based on the results of the subsequent phases, was submitted to 
the DRIRE in July 2007 (Airele 2007). 
In the following, the three phases followed by Airele45 are described in more depth. The 
description is based on the three reports and supplemented by interviews. 
Phase One: Global Analysis and Synthesis of Data 
The first phase is first and foremost a contextualization of wind power development on a large 
scale: The political agenda set with the Kyoto protocol, its translation into the European 
directives on renewable energy development, and eventually the French objectives as they are 
defined in the POPE-law; 21% of the French electricity consumption should, by 2020, be 
renewable energy. The report concludes that wind power is, at present, the primary source of 
renewable energy likely to respond to these objectives (Airele 2006a). From this very general 
contextualization of the wind power development, the report moves on to the regulation of the 
ZDEs and the regional development of wind power in Picardie. These chains of translations 
tie the local wind power development to a climate change discourse rather than an energy 
discourse.
The following map ties together some of these issues; from the strong investments required in 
order for France to live up to the objectives, Picardie is described as one of the regions with 
the strongest potential in France. CdC Pays de la Serre is no exception; being a vast 
agricultural plateau that is well exposed to the wind makes it an attractive territory to host 
wind power projects (Airele 2006a). The following map is deployed to illustrate the 
‘suitability’ of Picardie for wind power projects (Airele 2006a).   
45 The process of ETD on the CdC de Santerre was identical to the steps described by Plichon from Airele. 
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Map5.3:CartedeSynthese
             (Airele 2007: 10) 
This map, produced by ADEME and le Conseil Régional de Picardie, illustrates the major 
constraints to wind power development, such as environmental, aeronautical, and, 
urbanizational constraints, in the region.
This first phase of analysis includes collecting a maximum of data from available sources (Int. 
Plichon) but does not include field visits. Analysis is an exercise performed at the engineer’s 
desk, using data to draw maps. The analysis includes what is referred to as the socio-
economic context; the use of the territory (e.g., urban areas, agriculture, and industry), 
infrastructure, natural and technological risk-zones, and existing wind power projects. Then, 
the natural environment is analysed: protected zones, natural environment, and migration 
paths. This first phase is in many ways an early and rough attempt at framing the landscape 
into more or less favourable zones for wind power development. Meanwhile, it is also 
presented as a communication tool:
“It is a global analysis, the synthesis of the data, so there are several chapters: it recalls the 
context – that is a chapter which is more ...which allows the reader external to services of the 
state, and even external to the CdC, to see where we are, and especially in wind power, what 
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is a wind turbine park… it is a chapter, a contextual presentation” (Int. Plichon, my 
translation). 
Still, the first analysis remains global, and is first and foremost aimed at bringing forward the 
major constraints as to where the zones may eventually be placed. The first phase resulted in a 
seventy-eight page document, and in many ways the analysis is summed up in the following 
map: 
Map5.4:SynthesisofHumanandLandscapeRestraints

              (Airele 2006a)
This first phase of defining wind power zones as technically feasible is represented as highly 
objective: “It is objective constraints that we map here, it is actually a Cartesian process”
(Int. Plichon). It is a process much like making the region pass through a kaleidoscope; it 
translates the landscape through different ‘lenses’ and each ‘lens’ results in a map.  
These maps draw out the ‘human activity’ of the region, such as towns, industry, habitation 
and roads, and enable the mapping of distinctions between zones ‘favourable’ to wind power 
and those unfavourable to wind power. Also, cultural heritage sites are mapped such as 
archaeological sites, protected (natural) sites, and monuments. From each site, a protection 
150
zone (i.e., a perimeter around the site) is drawn, depending on the importance of the 
monument. Finally, transformer stations and their availability are considered and mapped.  
Each step is based on existing databases and atlases, often produced by state agencies such as 
DIREN (regional agency for the environment) or DRIRE (regional agency for the industry, 
research and the environment). 
The constraints are presented by both engineers, as well as local politicians, as externally 
given limitations or imperatives. Based on externally produced atlases and maps, the process 
of adding layers of constraints is what brings ‘objectivity’ and legitimacy to the process. The 
process of generating scenarios favourable to wind power zones is argued to be a technical 
process and not a political process, because of the accumulation of the layers of ‘objective’ 
constraints.
Finally, this first phase of analysis includes a selection between the favourable zones: “At the 
end of this multi-criteria analysis, the potentially favourable zones appear as numerous on the 
territory” (Airele 2006a: 20, my translation). Therefore, a selection between two scenarios 
was proposed by the engineering company, which makes the procedure iterate between the 
technical and the political. The chosen scenario allows the definition of a ZDE with four 
sectors, as illustrated in the map below. White areas are described as being fully compatible 
with wind power projects, whereas yellow is compatible but with strong landscape 
sensibilities. 
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Map5.5:ZoneProposal
           (Airele 2007: 18) 
Phases Two and Three: Proposal of the ZDE and Recommendation on Implantations 
The next phase of the analysis is far more local in its orientation and investigates the 
‘sensibility’ of the territory with the aim of concluding on well-defined zones, which may be 
qualified as most suitable. As such, phase two starts where phase one concluded (see map 5.5 
above).   
“So, phase two is the phase of selection of zones and the formation of a comprehensive 
landscaping project on the entire territory. So, it is an outline of all the wind farms around 
that are important to consider … to see where the zones that are already available on the 
neighbouring territory ... There was a zone here, and there were neighbouring territories, we 
said that it was a little close, because when you go through the territory, you will have a 
succession of zones one behind the other” (Int. Plichon, my translation).  
Thus, avoiding any so-called ‘sprawling-effect’ is a central element of this particular phase of 
the project, and it starts by summing up all nearby wind power installations (Airele 2006b). 
Therefore, nearby wind power installations are added to the concluding map of phase one, 
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which allows an overview of the parts of the territory that may eventually become wind 
power development zones.  
“As a result of the analysis under phase one, the superposition of the human, ecological and 
landscape issues have allowed the identification of the unfavourable zones as well as the 
potentially favourable zones for the implementation of wind power parks” (Airele 2006b: 15, 
my translation). 
The next step revolves around the ‘intersection point’ between the technical objectivity of 
phase one and the underlying politics. This part of the process is described by the engineer of 
Airele as:  
“Really difficult ... the first phase is very technical, we collect data, we superimpose layers, 
we get the emerging zones, etc., I mean, it is very objective, very methodological, very 
Cartesian, we move forward like that. But the second phase where we will enter the 
consultation process, it is much more delicate, it is hard to accommodate all the expectations 
and make ends meet, which is why there is a job beyond the environmental technicalities, it is 
really a job of consultations, chairing meetings, debates, etc., ... It is extremely political, that 
is for sure” (Int. Plichon, my translation).  
He mentions that a recurring problem is that when presented with the potential zones (i.e., the 
white areas without constraints), the local politicians of the CdC insist on retaining and 
proposing all of the zones to the prefect (this was, however, only to a less extent the case in 
the CdC du Pays de la Serre). This is “theoretically impossible” (Int. Plichon, my translation) 
because often the zones ‘compete’ among each other, i.e., the acceptance of one zone 
becomes a constraint on another zone. As such, the emerging zones themselves become 
constraints on other potential zones, not least because the ZDE instructions mention the need 
to avoid ‘sprawling’ effects (La Ministere de l’Ecologie et du development Durable 2006). 
As Plichon continues his description of the process, the dynamic between technique and 
politics becomes further elaborated. As he flips through the maps as they are layered, an area 
outside of the village Marle is marked in yellow, i.e., having some constraints as a potential 
wind power development zone, and then eventually turns out as white in the concluding map.  
“Here we take into account the landscape criteria and that is why it is yellow here, because 
we take into account the landscape, because otherwise it would be white. Why it evolves from 
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that map to that map, because we had a question from the mayor, who is also the chairman of 
the CdC, he asked us: there, you put the territory, which is a plateau, you put it in yellow, 
why? Because it has no other constraints than the landscape, but the landscape constraint is 
an intermediary constraint, because here we are in another type of typology of plateaus...it is 
a question of hierarchization, we relativize the zones, saying that one is much better than 
this” (Int. Plichon, my translation). 
Firstly, the favourability of the zones is relative; there will always be some zones more 
favourable than others, regardless of any so-called absolute favourability. In other words, the 
maps do not say anything about the overall favourability of the territory, simply the individual 
area’s relative favourability. Secondly, the dialogue between politicians and engineers is not 
simply a question of choosing between rival zones, but also a dialogue in which the status of 
the zones change from a zone with constraints to a zone without any constraints. Thirdly, the 
constraints are ordered hierarchically, which allows for the reordering of the categorization of 
the zone. All of this happens in dialogue between the consultants, the regional administration, 
and the local politicians:  
“Initially we had put in yellow, it was discussed in a meeting, etc. … with the DIREN and 
finally we passed it into white after these discussions… consultation. Objectively, it is 
reworked through the opinions of everyone after the meetings, but it is not fundamental, it is 
not as if we were asked to move it in white ... it was ... it was rather through a shared 
experience, sharing the territory, or the vision of the territory that one may have. So these 
maps then are inserted in there to get to the final map of synthesis. That is why it's yellow 
here and white here” (Int. Plichon, my translation).  
Among the white areas of the map, three zones are retained. The remaining part of the process 
describes these zones in depth and proposes the organization of the turbines in the zones as 
well as the upper and lower limit for installed power in each zone (Airele 2006b).  
The Final Proposal – and Democracy 
The final proposal, a 184 page document in itself, was prepared and sent to the DRIRE, who 
communicated it to the prefect as well as other involved institutions taking part in the 
decision-making process. This final proposal describes the ZDE as consisting of four sectors, 
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however, the report describing phases two and three only retains three sectors (Airele 2006b). 
Furthermore, an upper as well as a lower limit for the number of MW that could eventually be 
installed in the zones is fixed. In total, the ZDE is proposed at an upper limit of 129 MW. 
Sector One: 30 MW 
Sector Two: 33 MW 
Sector Three: 36 MW 
Sector Four: 30 MW 
The addition of the fourth sector is only explained in the last pages of the description of the 
sector, which is presented in the proposal as follows: 
“This area was not identified as one of the most favourable, from a landscape point of view, 
during the preparatory studies. Indeed, the sector embraces several high points with offers  
an interesting views on the agricultural plains around it, even the hill of Laon” (Airele 2007: 
58, my translation).  
In the closing section of the proposal, the addition of the fourth sector is stressed as something 
following after phases one to three of the preliminary analysis: 
“The CdC afterwards wished to consider the possibility of defining a sector around Montigny-
sur-Crecy and Pargny-les-Bois. This sector four is not part of the most favourable areas of 
the territory, from a landscape point of view” (Airele 2007: 65, my translation). 
This phrasing seems to draw a line between the ‘objective’ outcome of the analysis and the 
politics of the location and size/numbers of zones. Furthermore, the status of the fourth sector 
as not among the most favourable is again stressed.  
This final document frames the proposal of the ZDE around the three criteria described in the 
POPE law; namely, wind potential, grid connection, and the protection of the landscape. Also, 
a section on the activities of consultation and openness with the local population is included. 
The three main chapters of the proposal (Airele 2007; pp. 23-63) give a description of these 
criteria through which not only the added layers of constraints are made invisible, but the 
wider set of criteria deployed by Airele are not described even though they were essential to 
the work of defining the zones.  Hence, what only took up very limited room in the detailed 
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analysis of phases one to three eventually comes back at centre stage as being the primary 
framing criteria for the ZDE.  
The process of consultation is described in two pages; firstly as a process dating back to 2002, 
and secondly as including the following:
“The actions led by the Community of Communes of the Pays de la Serre are diverse and 
complementary.
 Thus, several articles are often dedicated to wind turbines in the local information 
newsletters:
- "L’émi'Serre Express" for elected representatives; 
- "Pays de la Serre Magazine" and Hors Série intended for the inhabitants. 
 Several press releases and public meetings have also been realized. The public 
meetings are organized around wind projects under development, on the territory of 
the municipalities. 
 Articles are regularly posted on the Internet. 
 The inhabitants of the area are invited to participate in free visits to the wind farm of 
Clastre, accompanied by a guide from the Tourist Office of St-Quentin (30 tours 
available)” (Airele 2007: 14, my translation). 
Thus, the consultation realized by the CdC mainly took the form of written information in 
local media. Public meetings were not organized to discuss for or against the creation of a 
ZDE on the territory, but at one occasion a specific development project, with a concrete 
developer behind it, was made the subject of a public meeting. Consultation is not discussed 
as such in the reports of Airele (2006a and 2006b), but the communication of wind power 
development on the territory is thoroughly documented in an appendix to the final proposal, 
where all articles and notices from a range of media are presented (Airele 2007).
The maps dominating the final proposal are thus illustrations of the electrical grid presented in 
relation to the proposed zones (see Map 5.5 above) as well as the wind potential in the region 
(Map 5.3 above). The final proposal is thus a return to the three criteria without making any 
mention of the detailed analysis based on adding layers of constraints.
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5.3.3FromMapstoLandscape:AVisittoAutremencourt–‘aCornerofNoInterest’
In June 2008 I visited the small village of Autremencourt, where one of the zones was to be 
situated. I met the mayor of the village, Dominique Potart, who insisted on driving me around 
to visit the area. Once in the car, he immediately tells me that he was born in the village – his 
mother did not get to the hospital in time, so this is truly his village. Our first stop is the site 
where the turbines are to be constructed. From the hill where the turbines will eventually 
stand, we can see the village of Autremencourt as well as the neighbouring village. 
Describing the location makes Potart comment on his and the neighbouring village:
“If they should have been closer to our village, I would have said no to the project… Actually, 
I do not understand that the mayor of the [neighbouring] village accepted – had I been him, I 
would have made sure that at least some of the turbines were cancelled… As it is, it will seem 
as the turbines fall down on them” (Int. Potart, my translation).   
From the site where the turbines are to be constructed, Potart points to a hill close by and tells 
me that there used to be a windmill there where locals milled their grains. So the windmill 
‘thing’ is nothing new around there, and he adds: “By the way, it shows that it is a good spot 
for mills” (Int. Potart, my translation). He also points to different areas of the landscape where 
hangars were located earlier; they were ugly and did not in any way look good on the land, 
but as such, the landscape has always been ‘embossed’.  
Some years ago, tells Potart, the government invited all the mayors of the region to a meeting; 
plans had been made for a nuclear waste deposit in the region. The planned deposit was to be 
800 meters underground. The area appointed was well suited, geologically, and it was said to 
be entirely safe. But the farmers did not agree. They were afraid that the land would become 
polluted, and that it would decrease the value of their properties. North of the village is a 
‘retired’ nuclear power plant; it simply stands there as a ‘life-threatening sarcophagus’ – no 
one knows what to do with it. At least, it is guaranteed that the wind turbines will be 
dismounted once they stop working.    
From the spot where the turbines are to be constructed, we drive off to the marshland, ‘Marais 
de la Souches’, nearly 3500 hectares and consisting of close to 1000 ponds. Potart indicates 
that the marshes have a unique fauna and flora and attract scientists from all over Europe. 
While we drive through the marshes, he repeats time and again: “It is so beautiful around 
here” (Int. Potart, my translation). 
157
Back in the village, Potart points out Autremencourt’s newly built houses. Since the wind 
power project was initially planned, Potart has informed all newcomers to the village of the 
project – but no one has changed their mind and abandoned their construction plans. And 
finally, one should not neglect the money that can be earned from hosting the turbines. Taxes 
are considerable: “If it wasn’t for the TPU46, Autremencourt could have put streetlights made 
of gold along all their dust roads” (Int. Potart, my translation).
The visit at Autremencourt was a way of leaving the technicalities of the maps and moving 
into the ‘realities’ of the landscape. Potart emphasizes how the landscape has always had an 
‘industrial’ element, and he continuously refers to hangars, windmills, nuclear power plants, 
etc., as being an integral part of the landscape. Potart seems to express an attitude towards the 
landscape that is highly personal and emotional, all the while being practical. Land serves 
other purposes than being recreational; it has historical and industrial elements too, 
something, he argues, that goes well with the construction of a wind park. He sums up by 
saying that people from outside often refer to Autremencourt as a ‘corner of no interest’, but 
he and the other villagers do not agree.
This approach to the landscape is partly explained as a ‘geographical’ factor by Lefranc, an 
engineer at DRIRE in Picardie:  
“When you are in the periurban [zone], we'll take Oise for example, you have a population 
that is francilienne, so these are people who work in the Parisian region and for them, when 
they come out [of Paris], they are very attentive to their environment, they even appropriate 
their environment, so their reaction is not the same – in terms of population. There is an 
easier rejection, an opposition to wind power, because it disrupts their environment. 
Meanwhile, in the rural areas such as in Aisne or in Somme, after all rural or less 
urbanized… the issues are different, the social perception, different populations culturally 
and socially” (Int. Lefranc, my translation). 
According to Lefranc, what the landscape represents is intimately linked to geography and/or 
population. In other words, the framing of the qualifications of the landscape are 
predominantly related to recreational dimensions in Oise and also include the land itself as a 
possible source of income in the more rural areas of Aisne and Somme.  
46 The TPU (Taxe Professionnelle Unitaire) divides the tax income between the municipalities of the CdC. 
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5.4Discussion
The emergent dynamic of the device, as described in the introduction as an effect of the two 
phases of the device fleshed out by Foucault, is one that translates the location into a variety 
of objects. To the developers, location is crucial to the economics of developing a wind park, 
and to them, location translates into both costs (grid connection, rent of land, etc.) and size of 
production (wind regime). The politicization performed by Durant makes landscape and 
national heritage the primary focus of attention, all the while distributing decision power and 
initiative to the locals. Debates in the parliament over centralization versus decentralization 
translate location into a question of grid capacity, particularly a problem in rural areas where 
the grid is prepared for moderate production input but also a question of energy system 
control. The second phase, where the device is transformed into a practice undertaken by 
engineers, is rather a process of qualification along well-defined criteria, each allowing the 
mapping of constraints. From this process emerges a representation of the territory in the form 
of a map that defines zones favourable to wind power. Here, location is translated into a 
technical object. Finally, to the mayor of Autremencourt, Mr. Potart (and probably many of 
his neighbours), the landscape is history, industry, and aesthetics all at the same time. Potart 
stresses the dynamic aspect of relating to the landscape; from windmills of the past, to future 
turbines, and the territory as a possible source of income. And these dimensions are not easily 
disentangled.
It is hardly surprising that location (and even more so landscape) may be translated into a 
variety of things, and that is recognized by the engineers as they constantly stress that 
landscape/territory is a subjective matter. But the fact that the ZDE is linked to the feed-in 
tariff as an obligatory passage point brings location, in all its shapes, to the midst of the 
marketization of wind power. With the ZDE, the different modalities of framing and 
qualifying location are connected and mediated through the practice of the engineers. These 
seem to reflect the distinction discussed in the previous chapter between value and values; the 
former being related to the transformation into a single currency, and the latter the subjective 
commitment/dedication of the locals to their environment. The politicization performed by 
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Durant seems to be built, at least partly, on the assumption that these two modalities of value 
will create controversies. However, it seems as if these different modalities co-exist 
peacefully. How this effect comes about is the subject of the next discussion, organized 
around the themes of the conflict between the framing of the device and the practice of the 
engineers – made possible through the plasticity of the device, and the tools put to use by the 
engineers – and finally a discussion of the effect on the economic agency of the developer.
5.4.1TheAbsenceofOpposition
As an attempt at constructing a NIMBY figure through the ZDE-device by the framing of the 
landscape as values rather than value, the actual unfolding of a ZDE at the territory of CdC du 
Pays de la Serre does not seem to support, or reinforce, the attempt at creating an issue of 
concern. Though opposition is not entirely absent, it only plays a very limited place in the 
accounts. The group called ‘Vent de colère’47 (Wind of fury) is mentioned a couple of times, 
but rather than being ‘born out’ of localness (as NIMBYism is generally said to be), it is 
referred to as a critique decoupled from the local context: “I think that there were ... how to 
say, arguments that were actually the same and which can be found on any territory; saying 
that finally wind power, it is useless, it's ugly” (Int. Vonfeldt, my translation).  
One reason why the ZDE, rather than politicizing the landscape, seems to have almost the 
opposite effect, I suggest, has to do with the practice emerging around the making of wind 
power development zones. The dynamic of the device, referred to in the opening of this 
chapter as unfolding around two phases, consists of a specific framing of wind power 
established through the politicization, and the (unanticipated) ways in which it unfolds, and a 
process emerging once it is put to use (Dumez and Jeunemaïtre 2010). In the case of the ZDE, 
the practice of the engineers does not ‘open up’ the landscape to make it debatable and 
controversial (not least vis-à-vis its use as wind turbine territory). The process of 
accumulating layers of concern, each layer being a single variable, to finally present the 
overall favourability of the territory in a unified map seals off rather than opens up 
controversies and possible differences in views of the landscape. The first phase of analysis is 
undertaken without any visits to the field and simply by mapping constraints from already 
47 ‘Vent de Colère’ is a national federation against industrial wind power in France. 
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available resources. These one-dimensional layers eventually translate the territory into a 
black-box because the succession of translations disappears in the final presentation of the 
zone definition. They become folded into the final presentation. The layering of constraints 
stands in stark contrast to the account of the local mayor, who presents the land as birthplace, 
living place, but also as having an industrial element, an account in which everything is 
woven into the multidimensional ‘site’ described by Nadaï; a state rather resembling the 
notion of overflows. In other words, the practice of the engineers may be an approach of 
narrowly framing the territory, but a framing that disappears when visiting those inhabiting 
the territory. 
5.4.2GoingBeyondtheDevice
The phases undertaken by the engineers of Airele are in many ways processes through which 
the territory is qualified as suitable, or even very suitable, for wind power projects. Whereas 
the regulation regarding the ZDEs underline three criteria for what constitutes a suitable 
territory for wind power projects, i.e., wind potential, grid connection, and 
landscape/monuments, the engineers rework the set of parameters that must be included: 
“So in principle, we should define the zones according to these three criteria … however we 
realize once conducting the studies, that there are many other constraints on the territorial 
level that should be taken into account to refine ... the zones which are as relevant as 
possible… such as the constraints of civil and military aviation, for example ...” (Int. Plichon, 
my translation). 
Just as illustrated through the description of the processes performed by Airele, the three 
criteria are far from categorical, in practice, for the ZDE. Rather, at least two of them are 
disqualified as important to the practical work of drawing boundaries between suitable/not 
suitable wind turbine territory, both by engineers as well as those responsible at ERDF. 
“It is true that the wind resource is perfect, there’re no worries. The instruction criteria for a 
ZDE is set very low since the wind resource must be greater than 4 meters per second at 50 
meters of height – for a wind turbine to be profitable, it must at least at 50 meters reach 5.5 
meters per second, so they set the level rather low. But also because the atlases, we base it on 
atlases, and the atlases are very, very imprecise, so there is a market and therefore the wind 
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resource, frankly, it takes away the holes and then that's all that it takes away from areas 
where they would never go. Electrical connection, in fact it is not a true test since everything 
is always feasible to view electrical connection, simply put the cost so…”  (Int. Piedvache, my 
translation). 
The criteria determining wind potential is, according to the engineer of ETD, too low to allow 
a profitable investment. According to her, the wind must be above 4 m/second at 50 metres. 
To her then, the criteria are fixed without benefiting the investment of the developer. In 
addition, the connection criterion is disqualified as being a question of costs. This is also 
raised by those responsible at ERDF. The local grid operator, answering the question whether 
the ZDE was not a way of facilitating or framing his activities of adjusting wind parks and 
local grid toward each other, states it thus: 
“Absolutely not! no! It does not facilitate mine or that of the project developer. Because 
before you could go outside the ZDE and look. Now he will be forced to look only in the 
ZDEs. Where there is supposed to be a potential grid connection. I say ‘supposed’, because 
the legislation says there have to be three criteria in the ZDE: (1) heritage protection, (2) 
wind, and (3) a possibility for grid connection which does not exceed seven years. But that is  
... never would we answer that we could not to do something in seven years. So you will 
always have a potential grid connection. In a ZDE, always! We answer, and we do the work 
towards a delivery date in seven years” (Int. Legrand, my translation). 
The criteria are met if the connection work can be performed seven years from when the PTF 
(the technical and financial proposal) is signed. But ERDF or RTE would never refuse to 
make the necessary grid work in seven years. Having disqualified two of the three criteria 
defining the ZDE, the engineers at ETD and Airele have worked out, independently, another 
set of criteria. These criteria emerge from their work with developers48, i.e., their expertise in 
the more detailed work of making wind power projects. These criteria are rather found within 
the code d’urbanisation, and the accounts from the two engineering companies illustrate a 
certain similarity on the criteria enrolled in defining the zones:
“.... radars, weather, we also take into account, as we will see, the various constraints linked 
to the infrastructure of transport of energy or roads, the distances, to finally have the zones 
48 Both companies have worked on projects with developers including the more detailed analysis required in 
impact studies, etc. – i.e., requirements for obtaining construction permits.  
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that are as realistic as possible. In fact, as soon as one has a case, as robust as possible, we 
already have the preparation for the impact study, because we do not define a zone, if we 
consider, for example, only the criteria of wind potential, grid connection and landscape. We 
would maybe define a zone that is burdened by other constraints, which then afterwards 
prevent wind power development to be carried out into projects… at the same time we must 
have some flexibility to allow for changes over time, because maybe future constraints will 
appear or the present constraints will change in the future” (Int. Plichon, my translation). 
The objective then is defining zones in the most ‘realist’ possible way, or in other words, 
framing the zones that have the best chance of becoming wind parks. These studies are 
referred to as something resembling an early impact study, a study that has generally been 
part of the developers’ job. As such, the engineers in the case studied here adopt a very 
thorough and meticulous approach, which goes well beyond the framing of the ZDE-device: 
“Here, these are the radars, the distance to habitats, the distance to gas pipelines. So in a 
ZDE we could as well have gas pipelines, power lines, all that can enter the ZDE, even 
though we will never have wind power there. We know we need certain distances, we could 
not put a wind turbine five meters from a gas pipeline. But the ZDE does not care about that. 
Therefore, we, and every other consulting firm, offer this first step to remove all technical 
constraints, because otherwise it is useless. We won’t do work to put wind turbines in valleys 
or things like that. Well, if we take the wind, the level of wind, we may remove all the valleys 
... but in the Somme, after that everything else is good ...” (Int. Piedvache, my translation).  
The practice of the engineers followed in the Picardie thus seems to be very close to the 
‘planning’ approach discussed by Nadaï: “This method … proceeds from abstraction as it 
extrudes from the territory a set of single-variable layers (e.g. natural space layer, roads 
layer etc.)” (Nadaï 2007: 2716). Nowhere in the process performed by the engineers is the site 
approached as an open and multidimensional entity or one in which overflows are invited or 
encouraged to take on life.  
5.4.3LoosingSightofSite
Potart’s description of the surroundings of Autremencourt stands in stark contrast to the 
process of the engineers. His account defies any predefined framing of the landscape such as 
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recreational, aesthetic, or ‘natural’. To Potart, the region is beautiful; this he stresses 
throughout the visit, but it is also embossed historically and industrially. His account seems to 
stress the multidimensional nature of ‘his’ site. Meanwhile, the process of adding layers of 
constraints as an emerging practice for designing ZDEs seems to be a movement away from 
the site as an open process (Nadaï 2007), allowing or even inviting overflows, as such. It is a 
process undertaken in the offices of the engineers without visits paid to the territory. Rather, it 
is the added or accumulated result that is presented in which the added layers disappear, and 
therefore each layer of constraint, as well as its premises, is black-boxed. When the final maps 
defining the zones are presented, what is visible is simply the result of adding layers, 
however, nowhere are the layers accessible.
The specific aesthetics of the territory are only made a valuable parameter insofar as they are 
inscribed in regulation as sites to be protected, such as the city of Laon situated in proximity 
to the CdC. In other words, through the practice of the engineers, aesthetics become a quality 
defined in lists of ‘protected sites’ or even ‘tourist guides’ (Int. Plichon). The attachment of 
some inhabitants to their landscape as having a distinct quality, e.g., some inhabitants of the 
CdC “felt that this particular large plateau at Marle should remain as it is – naked.  And that 
the insertion like that, of vertical elements, would disrupt the landscape and it would lose its 
quality because of it” (Int. Vonfeldt, my translation). But such attitudes are rejected with 
reference to their subjective nature: “The landscape is very subjective. Everyone has their own 
notion of his vision of the territory, of his vision of the landscape” (Int. Plichon, my 
translation), or “however, I tell you that these are arguments … one can judge that it is 
beautiful, or it's ugly. Me, I say that an agricultural silo is ugly, an agricultural hangar is 
ugly – yet they exist” (Int. Vonfeldt, my translation). The ordering of qualities as either 
objective or subjective, then, depends on a site’s inscription in a set of well-defined lists, such 
as listings of protected sites or tourist guides, and only those ordered as objective are 
translated into constraints in the practice of zone-making.  
The political element, in the sense of ‘opening up’ and making debatable (Barry 2001), in the 
siting approach as described by Nadaï, i.e., the potential co-construction of the site as an ‘in-
the-making’, is sealed off during the process undertaken by the engineers. Finalizing the 
proposal includes presenting it to the locals during meetings open to all inhabitants of the 
CdC. These presentations are performed using maps, like the ones above, and present the 
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zones suitable for wind power development as extracted from the surrounding landscape. As 
such, the democratization called for with the present device restricts itself to one question 
only: Wind power or not? Questions of how to order a potential development on the territory 
are black-boxed when presented to the local population as well as the local politicians, as only 
the engineers know the criteria actually underlying the definition of the zone. What remains 
are white zones on maps, indicating the favourability in terms of wind power development 
and the ‘multidimensional messiness’ of the site, as Potart’s description is an example of, 
seems to disappear. 
5.4.4TheMapasInscriptionandObjectivity
The map is the primary tool in the entire process of working out the wind power development 
zones, and it is central to the notion of objectivity continuously stressed by the engineers of 
Airele and the CdC. The map serves as a tool in the analysis and it provides the format for the 
collected data, and finally, it is a means of communication. The map is both an artefact and a 
fact: It is made by someone as a representation of the world, all the while enabling by 
affording us reality (Taylor and Van Every 2000). The representation constructed by the 
engineers at Airele is performed by means of a deconstruction of the territory into single-
variable layers, and it is this practice that is central to their notion of objectivity, and as such, 
the practice and objectivity is closely connected: “Unlike conduct books, maps don’t 
prescribe rules on how to see; they embody a set of practices. To read a map is to master a 
way of seeing by doing” (Daston and Galison 2008: 667). 
This objectivity of their practice of drawing the zones is constantly stressed by the engineers 
involved in the process of qualifying the territory and opposed to the politics of the local 
politicians as well as the inhabitants. The mapping of constraints starts with what is referred 
to as a ‘virgin landscape’ to allow an ‘objective’ qualification along the dimensions described 
above.
“In fact, we could say that the whole territory was white initially – or we could say favourable 
to wind power development, and then after we added… topographically "well, this is not 
good, well there anyway, this is the centre of the village, we will not construct in the middle of 
the village”… then there are listed buildings, then we have the perimeter around the hill of 
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Laon, that disappears too. Then we have a beautiful mille-feuilles, and then finally through 
deduction, the zones which remain favourable” (Int. Vonfeldt, my translation). 
The reduction of favourable zones proceeds from the ‘white’ map towards a few white zones, 
and though the process is characterized as objective, it is an objectivity that is, at some points, 
negotiable. As discussed earlier, one zone is transformed from yellow (i.e., having some 
constraints) to white (i.e., being favourable to wind power), following the inquiry of one of 
the CdC’s mayors. According to Plichon, the status of the zone is discussed with engineers at 
DRIRE and eventually qualified as favourable.
But though the engineers describe the process as Cartesian or objective, they recognize that 
the object of the study, i.e., the landscape, might as well be founded on a subjective 
attachment: 
“Yes, that is it, we propose a territorial project argued on objective criteria, although 
sometimes, in particular in relation to the landscape, it is not always objective, because the 
landscape is very subjective. Everyone has their own notion of his vision of the territory, of 
his vision of the landscape. So, we give you our vision with an external view, because we are 
external to the territory – we are not from the territory. But then, the landscape is a 
parameter which is often debated, because everyone does not have the same vision of the 
landscape, everyone does not have the same vision of wind turbines; to some it is very nice, it 
adds value to the territory, to others, it distorts the landscape, sometimes even though it is a 
very banal landscape of agricultural plateaus, there are people who are very committed to 
this type of landscape, yet there are no specific concerns, there are no particular concerns. 
These are not landscapes that are identified in atlases or which are highly touristic or other. 
But the people who live there, they are attached to their territory in a manner and to them a 
wind project distorts it, so it's really a subjective vision, the landscape” (Int. Plichon, my 
translation). 
This kind of commitment to an otherwise ‘banal’ landscape, or as expressed by the mayor of 
Autremencourt, a ‘corner without interest’, seems premised on an attachment to a landscape 
resembling the singularity described by Karpik; stressing its multidimensional, quality 
uncertain and incommensurable character (for a similar account see Espeland’s (2001) 
account of the Yavapai tribe’s relation to the territory surrounding the Orme Dam). The 
existence of the multidimensional and incommensurability of the territory is acknowledged by 
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the engineers: In their approach, there is a constant awareness of this delicate balance 
between, on the one hand, the subjective attachment of the local population to their 
environment/landscape, and on the other hand, their own process of deconstructing the 
territory, representing and mapping the landscape, and defining zones of favourability. 
5.4.5ReconfiguringtheAssemblage?
As stressed in the introduction to this chapter, location is simultaneously a central cost 
component of a wind power project, and closely associated with the most common reasoning 
for the rejection of wind park projects. The framing of the ZDE-device addresses these vital, 
but quit different, aspects of location. It is therefore not an exaggeration if it is expected that 
the ZDE affect the economic agency of the developer. Any developer, who wants to be paid 
the price settled as feed-in tariff – and it is hardly possible to imagine a developer who does 
not want that – needs to look for a location within the ZDEs49. As such, the ZDE as a device 
bears heavily on the market organization. The socio-technical market assemblage is 
influenced by the constitution of the zones as obligatory passage points to the tariff. As 
already mentioned, criteria for assessing the suitability of a site are first and foremost wind 
regime, costs of grid connection, and proximity to habitation and dwellings (Int. Lebfevre; 
Corvellec and Risberg 2007). These criteria, as well as the production capacity of the park, 
become defined through the ZDE. According to the ZDE-specialist from the local grid 
manager, fixing the limits of the ZDE is simplified by the engineering companies:  
“The upper limit [of the ZDE] is determined by the engineering company that makes the ZDE, 
which computes ... it's pretty impressive, actually… How can we do? Very well, here there are 
no constraints! Ok, we calculate, we put approximately one machine every 350 meters. Well, 
so I put one here! Another one here! And one there!! So I can put three machines, so the 
upper limit will be… since the average is two megawatts, well its three machines of two 
megawatts, so the upper limit will be six megawatts. And if the trend is machines with three 
megawatts, then the upper limit will be three machines times three megawatts. Here you go, 
nine megawatts!” (Int. Legrand and Lamarre, my translation).  
49 According to one developer, it is sometimes the developer who mobilizes and undertakes the creation of the 
ZDE (Int. Lebfevre). 
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According to Legrand, with the introduction of the ZDE, the activities of the developer 
become premised on the local politics as well as the practices of the engineers defining the 
zones favourable to wind power development, something that he thinks is carried out in a 
rather dubious manner (Int. Legrand and Lamarre). Whatever experience and skills the 
developer may have built up, they seem to have been made redundant to some extent.   
As such, framing the location of a development project is changed with the introduction of the 
ZDE-device. Whereas location may not be a good, per se, it holds certain similarities to the 
good: (Voluntary) transfer of property rights, matched by a monetary transfer and rather 
stable qualities (at least to the developer). Thus, recalling Caliskan and Callon’s statement 
regarding the passivity of things, the study here suggests a somewhat more modest separation 
between different modalities of valuation, or at least an example of their co-existence:
“… is it possible to conceive of one [market] in which goods are authorized to destroy this 
asymmetry of their own initiative and to contribute multiple suggestions of their own value or 
that of the agencies trading them? The answer is a resounding no, for it is the passivity of 
things that transforms them into goods, and that enables agencies to form expectations, make 
plans, stabilize their preferences and undertake calculations” (Caliskan and Callon 2010: 5). 
Maybe the ‘resounding no’ suggested by Caliskan and Callon could be replaced by a quiet 
and tentative yes, based on the case unfolded here. To the extent that the location becomes a 
central part of the ‘good’ of wind power, the case of CdC du Pays de la Serre suggests that 
rather different worlds co-exist. Potart illustrates how the proposal of the ‘objectively’ defined 
zones are accepted, but only as long as these can co-exist with his valuation of the landscape, 
which has stronger similarities with the singularity. He is not overtaken by the framing of the 
engineers, but accepts them: “There used to be a windmill here”, so it is well suited for the 
turbines. On the other hand, he would never have accepted the wind park had it been 
superimposed on the village (as is the case for the neighbouring village). These two 
modalities of valuing seem to peacefully co-exist without any pacification necessarily taking 
place.   
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5.5ConcludingRemarks
This study has illustrated that location is not a simple matter for wind power developers. 
Location becomes many things, depending on where, who, and how the framing and 
qualification is undertaken; it is a crucial element in the projects for wind power developers, it 
is the dwelling of locals, and it is an object of politics. The dynamic of the device, partly the 
effect of the two phases stressed by Foucault, is central to this outcome. The ZDE-device 
connects the different worlds, and as such, the initial framing of the device is not innocent; 
roles and responsibilities are distributed, e.g., the engineers do have to follow the guidelines 
of the device, local politicians are privileged in the role of initiators, and the price of wind 
power is premised on location inside a wind power development zone. These roles and 
responsibilities are delineated in the so-called first phase of the device. But the practice of 
defining the zones moves; in the case of the CdC du Pays de la Serre (as well as in two other 
cases followed), it moves well beyond the framing of the device; from the three conditions 
around which the ZDE-device is framed, i.e., wind potential, grid connection, and 
landscape/heritage, only the latter seems to be the criterion around which the zones are 
emerging. The attempt to unfold the layering of the landscape performed by the engineers, 
and its subsequent refolding in the final proposal, black-boxes the criteria invoked to 
undertake the layering. The landscape, which is often referred to as an entirely subjective 
matter, is transformed into a technical sketch made up of a considerable number of layers of 
intermediary maps of constraints. Through this process, one seems to loose sight of site, so to 
speak. This may well be referred to as an ‘objectification’ of the landscape, which seems to 
stand in contrast to the construction of NIMBYists, as described by the ‘father’ of the device, 
and as such, the second phase of the device, at least as it is performed in the case of CdC du 
Pays de la Serre, creates effects that may be seen as counterproductive to the conception of 
the device. The politicization of the landscape (in the sense of making it debatable), which led 
to the design of the ZDE, is transformed in the practice of the engineers involved in defining 
zones favourable to wind power development into something that seems closer to an 
economization of the territory (i.e., making it calculable by ordering and ranking it). As such, 
each of the two phases of the device, as defined by Foucault, are predominantly two opposed 
approaches to the territory, and consequently, two different proposals regarding the role 
location is to play to wind power development.  
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The ZDE is a central device in the market assemblage for wind power but only one element. 
The following chapter will address the links between the two devices of this study, the feed-in 
tariff and the ZDE, in order to discuss the (potentially) constitutive role they have in the larger 
market assemblage.   
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6.DISCUSSION
From the detailed analyses of two market devices, this chapter will reconnect to the broader 
marketization programme, and more specifically the notions of politicization and 
economization. However, before doing so, I will briefly redraw the skeleton of the theoretical 
argument of this dissertation by recalling the work of Polanyi, and his claim that the 
‘invention’ of the free-market springs from investments, often of a so-called political sort: 
“There was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could never have come into 
being merely by allowing things to take their course. Just as cotton-manufacturers – the 
leading free trade industry – were created by the help of protective tariffs, export bounties, 
and indirect wage subsidies, laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state” (Polanyi 1944:  
145).
One implicit aspect of this observation made by Polanyi is that there might be something to be 
gained from focusing on the making of markets; i.e., the rendering of markets that are found 
in the marketization programme. Laissez-faire is an achievement, not a starting point. 
Moreover, Polanyi stresses protective tariffs, export bounties, and wage subsidies as 
mechanisms (or devices) enabling laissez-faire. This is not meant to suggest that the French 
wind power market is bound to move towards Polanyi’s laissez-faire modality, or that the 
political market label is simply covering a phase in a market evolution scheme. Rather than 
assuming any distinct result of the introduction of the devices, inquiring into the controversies 
unfolding around them, including their politicization and economization, demonstrates a third 
aspect of Polanyi’s quote; these mechanisms or devices are neither predefined, nor as to their 
content, nor to the effects they create.   
One consequence of adopting the marketization programme, and the choice of the two devices 
as analytical entry points, is the visibility of the often-unsettled negotiations; controversies, 
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conflicts, and trials of strength, in the cases followed here, become a premise for studying 
marketization.   
In this chapter, I will take the opportunity to revisit the distinctive elements of the 
marketization programme, and more precisely, the five framings of the programme. In doing 
so, I will stress how the two devices contribute to all five framings pointed out in the 
programme; they may simply be two devices among many, but they contribute broadly to the 
construction of the market. Then I will discuss the two devices as prostheses and habilitation, 
which will then allow me to elaborate on the economization and politicization unfolding 
around the two devices.
Finally, throughout the discussion, I will draw attention to the ways in which the empirical 
specificities of the two devices are enriched through the marketization programme – and vice 
versa.
6.1From‘MarketsasPolitics’toMarketsasOutcomesofPoliticization
andEconomization
Before moving on, I will briefly readdress some of the architectural elements of this 
dissertation and stress the implications of such an emphasis in relation to the theory of 
markets as politics as presented by Fligstein. To Fligstein, seeing economic markets and 
politics as ultimately connected, and stressed under the heading of ‘markets as politics’, is not 
the exception but simply the nature of markets. According to Fligstein, this has to do with the 
formation of capitalist markets as premised on state building (as also pointed out by Polanyi 
above) and also with intra-firm and inter-firm power struggles (Fligstein 1996 and 2001). To 
him, market orders build on specific and general rules, and the underpinning idea of this 
market order is embedded in any particular society – and reflects its distinct history. As such, 
the way of organizing the wind power good in French energy markets could be analysed as an 
institutionally/historically conditioned process, stressing, for example, the role and status of 
nuclear power to the French state and the organization of its energy system, and not least the 
role of the organizations charged with the system’s maintenance. But rather than granting the 
institutional setup the explanatory power of the unfolding politics in the two cases, and 
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thereby making the political a distinct way of ordering such a thing as the energy system (and 
determining a priori what one means by political), I chose to make the devices my unit of 
analysis. This has allowed me to follow the processes, of whatever nature they may be 
granted, as they are unfolded and refolded. In other words, adopting the marketization 
programme, and its focus on the rendering of markets, has allowed me to construct a 
somewhat different account of markets for wind power and to remain open to the effects of 
the devices. 
One could argue that the issues addressed by the two devices belong to very different spheres; 
the feed-in tariff fixing the price of wind power, and the ZDE defining geographical zones in 
which wind parks should be constructed. However, qualifying one as more ‘economic’ than 
the other would be disregarding the possible effects of the devices, and rather stress 
predefined categories and assumptions of what it means to be economic. In other words, 
whereas most would easily agree that ‘pricing’-activities are at the heart of economics and 
economic markets, the analysis of landscape by engineers is something completely different. 
But the two devices bear effects on the marketization of wind power, e.g., by reconfiguring 
the market assemblage without any possible a priori differentiation between different spheres 
such as politics/economics. 
6.1.1MarketizationasaFramework
Whereas the marketization programme, and the market devices, may allow me to inquire into 
markets in the making, they also create detailed accounts that seem both incoherent and 
sometimes confusing. In other words, they have ‘forced’ me to pay attention to struggles and 
negotiations of modes of calculation, emerging engineering practices, and landscapes, just to 
mention a few aspects described in the previous chapters.
The marketization programme outlined in Chapter 2 has underpinned the study, but I have 
often restrained from referring to the programme in a literal way. However, as stressed in the 
opening of this chapter, the underlying approach of marketization is, as the conjugation of the 
word suggests, directed towards the process or activities which render something economic or 
make it into an exchangeable good. As part of this process, I argue that the two devices play 
crucial, but somewhat different roles, which I will elaborate on below. But before discussing 
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the two devices in more depth, I will briefly return to the strands of research to which the 
marketization programme speaks; first and foremost, the notion stresses the constructed 
nature of the market and thereby attempts to make up for the absence of theorizing on the 
origins of markets found in economics. Seeing markets as socio-technical assemblages and 
their obduracy as the outcome of continuous investments, and to a large extent emerging from 
the investments of economists, complements neo-classical economics. Though it is unlikely 
that many economists would believe in his/her existence, homo economicus may actually be 
constructed through the configuration of his/her network; of interest then are the ways in 
which he/she is constructed. But the marketization programme addresses yet another critique 
towards economic sociology by insisting that there is a ‘particular’ dimension to markets; 
they cannot be explained solely as socially embedded structures, which dissolve everything 
into social theory. In an attempt to drag out these particularities, we may return to the five 
framings central to the marketization programme; i.e., the framing of (1) goods, (2) agencies, 
(3) encounters, (4) price-setting, and (5) market design and maintenance, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. The two devices followed in this study together address all five framings, though 
not exhaustively. In other words, the two devices play a role in the five framings, but 
eventually these are outcomes of the larger assemblage that includes other devices, rules, 
grids, etc.
Framing goods: The efforts of settling a feed-in tariff for wind power is intimately linked to 
the qualification of the good, and the controversies unfolded during these negotiations include 
attempts at framing wind power as a renewable energy, a polluting energy (both in terms of 
CO2-emissions and qua its insertion in the landscape), fluctuating energy, and expensive 
energy, just to mention a few. These qualifications are made through associations between 
wind power and CO2-emissions, nuclear power, centrally organized energy systems, etc. As 
such, the stabilization of the good is sought after through its connection to different networks, 
rather than a set of stable and inherent qualities. Meanwhile, the introduction of wind power 
into the energy system also leads to attempts at requalifying other parts of the network; e.g., 
nuclear power may be framed as a sustainable energy, demonstrating a lower CO2-emission 
profile than many renewable energy sources. As such, the framing of wind power spills over 
and potentially contributes to the re-categorisation of nuclear power.
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Framing agency: Agency in this study is at the same time performed through the devices, as 
well as the overall effect of the entire assemblage, and as such ascribes to the irreductionist 
approach (see Asdal and Moser 2012; Law and Moser 2012). Concentrating on the feed-in 
tariff and the ZDE allows me to see some elements of agency, whereas other elements may 
remain in the dark. However, one aspect of framing agency that should be stressed is the 
implications the feed-in tariff has for the economic agency of wind power production by 
setting the boundaries for profitability and efficiency, but more importantly, it is ridding the 
assemblage of yet another kind of agency, that implied by the tendering device which the 
feed-in tariff replaced. The tendering device allowed a very distinct approach to energy 
system planning; as mentioned, the tendering scheme allowed predefined boundaries to any 
project to be established by EDF, such as location and size in terms of capacity of the park, 
and prices were based on bidding. The replacement of the tendering scheme with the feed-in 
tariff was thus a reconfiguration of the agency, which was eventually seen as crucial to the 
development of the ZDE-device, i.e., an attempt at controlling the so-called anarchistic 
development of wind parks.  
Framing encounters: With the ZDE, many dimensions of the encounter are made visible (in 
contrast to the mild critique by Caliskan and Callon (2010) towards Polanyi for repeating the 
classical doctrine of markets as the encounter between two blocs, namely, supply and 
demand): The ZDE frames the encounter between exactly these two blocs, but reconfigures 
the conditions enabling the encounter. For example, only projects within wind power 
development zones are eligible for the tariff, and as such, it re-organizes the encounter by 
introducing predefined geographical zones. Furthermore, the device is a preliminary 
organization of the encounter between turbines and grid as it delineates points of access in 
which the grid may be accessible, e.g., in terms of capacity. As such, the study of the ZDE-
device unfolded in the previous chapter begins to respond to the invitations by Caliskan and 
Callon: “In spite of the richness of existing scholarship, the various social or material 
technologies that play a part in structuring encounters still need to be recorded and studied in 
detail” (Caliskan and Callon 2010: 16). The analyses of the two devices illustrate the many 
modes of encounters and allow an appreciation of the role of the encounter to the 
economization of wind power as well as their connection to the overall assemblage. 
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Framing price-setting: One of the main controversies is directly related to the feed-in tariff 
itself, and in particular the making of the tariff at a desk rather than in the market. This 
particular mode of price-making is problematized, pointing to the device as ‘faulty’ or flawed. 
As such, the device is not simply an instrument for price generation, but also becomes the 
arena for discussions of the ‘rules of exchange’ in the emerging market for wind power as 
well as acceptable profitability levels. Though the price is eventually settled, and transactions 
may be peacefully undertaken, many of these controversies remain, as the ZDE is an example 
of whether the ZDE-device is considered an attempt to construct NIMBYism (as described by 
Durant) or ‘simply’ address an existing concern of local integration of turbines. The ZDE 
reinforces the relation between turbines and their territory; an association that may potentially 
become problematic. As such, the ZDE both problematizes and frames the encounter stressed 
in the marketization programme.  
Framing market design/maintenance: Eventually, this relationship between the two devices 
feeds into the fifth framing, market design/maintenance, which essentially is about the 
dynamics of the market assemblage (Caliskan and Callon 2010). With the study of fixing a 
feed-in tariff, or a price, for wind power, and the ways in which the valuation of the good 
leads to the proliferation of issues and controversies, as well as how ‘adoption’ of the device 
eventually leads to the design of yet another device, the ZDE may begin to illustrate some of 
the potential Callon ascribes to markets when referring to these as potentially ‘civilizing’ 
(Callon 2009). But whereas the ZDE seems designed to allow a certain local involvement to 
emerge, by bringing consultation of the local population to the forefront, it becomes as much 
(in CdC de Pays de la Serre) an engineered design for favourable wind power zones. Though 
the device seems to introduce a certain form of local democracy, quite the opposite seems to 
be the effect.  In other words, even where a version of a hybrid forum (Callon et al. 2001; 
Callon 2009) seems to be sought instated, through the ZDE’s insistence on consultation of the 
local population, neighbouring municipalities’ involvement is not bound to happen.  
Connecting the findings of the two analyses to the five framings of the marketization 
programme reflects the distributed aspect of studying marketization of economic goods, seen 
here via two devices, as argued in Chapter 3. Not only are the devices’ practices distributed 
over time and place, but their constitutive effects for the marketization of wind power are also 
distributed over the two devices – and probably many more. Whereas this distribution may 
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prove a challenge to the study of marketization, for example, where to go, who to talk to, 
which temporal traces to follow, and not least the exercise of following effects that appear to 
unravel in many different directions, they demonstrate the assembled nature of the market for 
wind power, and as such, they may be seen as a premise for studying marketization as a 
phenomenon.  
In terms of contributing to the marketization programme, this study is first and foremost an 
empirical contribution that draws together a range of subthemes within this rather broad, and 
not easily delineable, field of research; values, market devices, singularization, and 
politicization and economization are all themes unambiguously connected to marketization, 
but the study at hand is rather stressing how these processes are intertwined. Furthermore, 
choosing an object such as wind power, as well as devices targeted at reframing wind power, 
(which may be qualified as a political good or political devices (e.g., Szarka 2007a)) rather 
than any ‘conventional’ object reflects an interest in cases where market failures are 
‘corrected’ through deliberate market making. In the case followed here, the market-making 
efforts include vivid negotiations around the ‘invisible hand’ of free markets in contrast to an 
allegedly ‘visible hand’ of policymakers. This includes continuous attempts at drawing and 
redrawing the line between that which is economic and that which is political. Wishing to 
follow these negotiations, the notions of politicization and economization allow an 
appreciation of the making of the ‘political’ or ‘economical’ as they are unfolded in the 
devices. The gradual accumulation of devices may be a move towards such an end. From this 
perspective, we may see markets as assemblages that continuously grow or diminish, in order 
to address such emerging issues by constructing new devices to make issues ‘accounted for’ 
or internalize them. The two devices of this study are examples here of: The feed-in tariff as a 
response to demands for renewable energy technologies and part of a large sustainability 
discourse, and the ZDE, at least partly, a response to the effects of the feed-in tariff’s so-
called anarchistic effects.  
Stressing the ‘rendering’ of the good into something exchangeable in a market, as 
marketization does, implies constantly paying attention to these negotiations. When adopting 
the device as the entry point to the study of the marketization of wind power, the device 
becomes the arena from which to inquire into these negotiations, addressing not only the good 
it may be designed to frame, but also the larger assemblage that it is made a part of. 
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6.2DevicesBetweenProsthesesandHabilitation
The feed-in tariff and the ZDE were both, as described in the preceding chapters, results of 
rather controversial political discussions that were fiercely debated in parliament. Both 
devices were the policy outcomes of these debates, and as such, it could easily be argued that 
they are very concrete responses to political issues. However, once made part of the wind 
power market assemblage, they step into a new career; they become de facto market devices 
as they organize agency by redistributing roles and responsibilities between existing and new 
actors of the market, as well as reformulating the conditions of efficiency and profitability. 
That means that both devices being the objects of study throughout the preceding two 
chapters may be seen as born out of attempts to make a political issue, and after a range of 
negotiations between politicians and bureaucrats, they become part of a market assemblage. It 
is primarily this career of the devices, and the association between wind power as a good and 
climate change, that underlie the nomination of the label ‘political markets’ referred to in the 
opening chapter. From this point of view, the two devices may simply be seen as facilitating a 
desired development of renewable energy by compensating for failures in the existing 
electricity market. However, from the approach adopted here, the devices have agency, and 
choosing to inquire into the (re)organization of the market through the devices is founded on 
an interest in how this particular market activity is being instantiated (McFall 2009). One 
criticism of this approach could be that it effaces that which is political of the political market, 
or that it transforms political action into apolitical description (ibid.). Why I believe this not to 
be the case will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter by addressing an (implicit) 
qualification of the devices as prosthetic or habilitation, as well as the processes of 
economization and politicization unfolding in the two devices. 
6.2.1ProsthesesandHabilitation
Following the two devices of this study, the ways in which they are constantly related to the 
existing market configuration as a means of helping or repairing certain obstacles associated 
with wind power development has been predominant. Therefore, one way of talking about 
these devices, an approach that bridges more traditional economic approaches from which the 
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notion of the political market may refer as well as the approach adopted by Callon and others, 
is seeing the devices as ‘prostheses’ (Callon 2008). Inspired by the literature on ‘disability or 
handicap studies’, the following quote demonstrates how Callon may see the fertile grounds 
to be found in the handicap literature with regard to the studies of markets: 
“The forms and nature of handicaps are multiple. Some are qualified as mental and others as 
physical; some are accidental and others congenital; some are evolving and others stable. 
Agreement has gradually been reached on the idea that handicaps are not (only) linked to 
individuals themselves: they also stem from the relationship between individuals and society. 
A handicap is not located exclusively in the handicapped person, even if the two cannot be 
entirely dissociated; it is synonymous with maladjustment” (Callon 2008: 42).  
Extending these ideas to the devices developed to assist wind power in succeeding in the 
market as an economic good, I will argue that the sources of the handicap as distributed 
between the socio-technical assemblage and the good (rather than the individual) are taken 
even further in the case analysed here (and in many other markets for renewable energies): 
Wind power as a maturing technology, with emphasis on the move towards maturity, i.e., 
acknowledging its status as presently immature and thus locating the handicap in the 
technology itself. On the other hand, as also stressed elsewhere in this text, recognizing the 
failure aspect of the markets, e.g., in accounting for the pollution of fossil fuel energies, seems 
like an approach that locates the handicap in the market organization rather than the 
technology per see50. The Stern report referred to global warming as the 20th century’s biggest 
market failure, pointing to the absence of internalizing CO2-emissions in fossil fuel 
technologies.
Addressing the different strategies potentially developed to ‘repair’ the disabled, Callon 
points to two different types of policies: prosthetic and habilitation policies (Callon 2008)51.
Considering the two devices of this study, I want to argue that they may be seen as both 
50 Those critical of market organization in general, as a means for optimizing the distribution of resources, would 
then adhere to the latter attitude, namely, that the way of organizing the good appears to be the source of the 
problem – not the technology itself.   
51 Callon’s discussion of prosthetic and habilitation policies are directed at individual agency, and the emergence 
of what he calls homo economicus 2.0, an economic agent located somewhere between homo economicus and 
homo sociologicus (Callon 2008). The discussion here does not centre the individual, but rather the good; 
nonetheless, I believe that the two notions enrich the different roles the two devices may be performing.   
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prosthetic and habilitation and then briefly address the implications this has for the kind of 
politics they imply.  
Each of the two models is linked to a distinct “distribution of the sources of the handicap and 
hence the origins of the weakness it causes” (Callon 2008: 43). According to Callon, 
prosthetic policies, building on the conceptualization of the individual as the source of the 
disability, aims at equipping (repairing) the individual through attempts to restore the lacking 
competencies. Habilitation, Callon says, works in the opposite direction: Starting from the 
‘outside environment’, it shapes devices, procedures, and so on, with the objective of 
including the disabled (ibid.). Callon concedes that the models are not exclusive, and overlaps 
are bound to happen; however, what I want to stress in the following is how the devices are 
simultaneously framed as both prosthetic and habilitation policies by different spokespersons.
The feed-in tariff: Considering the feed-in tariff as a prosthetic device would imply equipping 
or ‘repairing’ the good, which is seen as ‘disabled’ or simply immature, so that it is allowed to 
survive in the market. Making a price for wind power, the prostheses attributed to wind power 
are premised on the relation between costs and price; the price paid for electricity in France 
(as for most other countries) was considered too low to allow wind power to develop, given 
the costs of the technology. Or in other words, the cost of wind power does not allow it to 
compete directly with existing technologies, which have benefitted from learning effects and 
mass production (Menanteau et al. 2003). Therefore, the survival problem was pinned down 
to be a consequence of wind power technology, and thus the prosthetic model described by 
Callon. However, the recognition that wind power is to survive in a world of failing markets, 
i.e., their inability to take into account or internalize the costs of the externalities they produce 
(e.g., the costs of CO2-emissions), is also present in the device. Adopting this perspective, the 
source of the problem is not the costs of wind power, but rather the costs of competing 
technologies not reflecting the environmental costs (ibid.). As such, the device may target 
wind power, but as a way of correcting/repairing disabilities elsewhere. Here, the device is 
seen as a response to a weakness in the outside world, i.e., external to wind power technology, 
and therefore closer to the habilitation model described by Callon. Therefore, the distribution 
of sources of the handicap targets both the technology as well as to its environment. As such, 
the device is folded around both the inefficiency of the technology as well as the failure of the 
market it must compete in, i.e., its environment. It is both prosthetic and habilitation.
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The ZDE: The ZDE may be analysed in quite the same way; on the one hand, it is argued, at 
least by some, to be a device that overcomes the obstacle of local opposition, identified as one 
of the major hindrances to the further development of wind power. As such, the ZDE may be 
seen as a prosthetic device compensating for the potential ‘pollution’ problem perceived by 
those living nearby a wind park. Here, the ‘inherent’ properties of the technology, such as 
noisy, tall-structured, and shadowy, are seen as the source of the weakness, calling for a 
device to allow for wind power’s insertion into the landscape. On the other hand, the ZDE 
allows the locals to become participants in the framing of the energy future of France, to put it 
boldly.  Enacting and empowering local communities to invite wind power projects into their 
region seems to evoke not an opposition, but rather an invitation to overcome the potential 
effect of NIMBYism. As such, the ‘disability’ is equally located in local communities 
objecting to the development of wind power on their territory.
It could thus be argued that the two devices are framed as both prosthetic and habilitation 
policies, arguing for their own existence as both a means of repairing wind power as well as 
repairing the conditions for competition between renewable energy technologies, and more 
mature energy technologies, by compensating for the externalities created by the latter 
technologies.
The devices, whether framed as prosthetic or habilitation policies, aim at equipping wind 
power in such a way that it may be able to act as a ‘comparable’ good – but they are only two 
devices among many, which are put to play in order to discipline, organize, and make wind 
power behave/be controlled in the same way as other forms of energy. Many of these may be 
seen as prosthetic in the sense that the:   
“…capacity for action (which is, as any action, distributed) imposes a very specific model in 
which the individual is autonomous to the precise extent that, in a disciplined way, she 
follows the course of action allowed by the prostheses and inscribed in them…” (Callon 2008:  
44).
Other devices aim at disciplining wind power as electrons and make them compatible with an 
energy system organized around central production units constantly made to match demand. 
On a visit at RTE’s facilities in Lille, I was shown new forecasting tools under development, 
and their potential role as facilitating the introduction of more wind power into the grid was 
stressed. New equipment or tools are constantly developed to address some aspect of inviting 
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wind power into the energy system, often by making wind power behave as any other form of 
electricity. As such, the market assemblage in which wind power is configured as an 
economic good is an assemblage constantly changing its morphology, and the 
inclusion/exclusion of devices may bring wind power closer – or further from – the framing 
as a disabled good. The two devices addressed in this study have both been stressed as crucial 
to the development of wind power in France, but they are both made part of a larger 
assemblage that combines a long and very heterogeneous range of devices, which may 
eventually create other obstacles or opportunities. For example, the introduction of the feed-in 
tariff was expected to create a radical increase in wind power development, not least because 
the feed-in tariff was ascribed success in Denmark, Germany, and Spain (Szarka 2007a and 
2007b). However, the ‘wind rush’ was not realized (Szarka 2007b; Nadaï 2007). To Szarka, 
this effect may be explained by: 
“The wider policy lesson from the French case is that it is inadvisable to focus narrowly on a 
single policy instrument – such as the feed-in tariff – since the settings, the contexts of usage 
and the relevance of mobilizing discourses are as important as the choice of instrument”
(Szarka 2007b: 331).
In the perspective adopted here, the market device, i.e., an assemblage being part of a larger 
market assemblage, for wind power implies that the agency/effects of the device may 
disappear in the politics carried by other devices in the larger assemblage.  
These devices extend the market by enlarging the associations of the network with several 
elements; firstly, the tariff is defined by the DGEMP but as the result of a working group, 
which consists of a range of actors. Secondly, the ZDE makes the engineers drawing up the 
zones as well as the CdCs important actors of the market assemblage. Furthermore, values 
associated (and negotiated) around figures of sustainability, compatibility with the remaining 
energy system, and turbines as potentially polluting get dragged into the space of calculation 
and become part of the trials of strength which combines different modalities of calculating. 
In other ways, it becomes a market space “built in a way to include goods, and the practices 
of actors that have previously been situated outside of market exchange” (Sjögren and 
Helgesson 2007: 236).
Acknowledging that the devices are simply parts of the larger market assemblage, however, 
also has implications for how we may conceptualize the idea of prosthetic and habilitation 
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policies (or devices). Insofar as we consider efficiency as an effect of the network, the 
prosthetic character of any given device is premised on the distinct configuration of the 
individual assemblage it is made a part of. In other words, a device may be prosthetic in one 
network and habilitation when associated with yet another network. From this point of view, 
mobilizing the concepts of prosthetics and habilitation as done here invites us to see the 
politics of any network, and as a consequence, the idea of the political market seems to lose 
its meaning, at least when juxtaposed with its assumed counterpart, the free market. 
I believe that this is one of the strengths of making the device an entry point to the inquiry; 
the larger arrangements that the devices are ‘added’52 to are not given simply as contexts or 
used to explain the creation of the devices; rather, they are enacted and brought into being 
(Asdal and Moser 2012), and as such they allow us to address the otherwise black-boxed 
network to which they add. Through the devices, we are prompted to follow the negotiations 
and problematizations of these black boxes, something that may be studied as processes of 
politicization and economization.  
6.3BetweenthePoliticizedPriceandtheEconomizedLocation
Choosing the perspective of the market, and thus the insistence of referring to the devices as 
market devices, obviously has the potential of creating a bias in the analysis towards certain 
effects created by the devices; namely, those related to market (re)organization. But because 
the notions of economization and politicization do not discriminate between the issues they 
act upon, profitability levels may become politicized and CO2-emissions may be economized. 
In other words, profitability is not simply an aspect of economics, it may be made debatable 
and problematized, just as much as CO2-emissions may be translated into a calculable aspect 
of wind power economics.  
In Chapter 5, I discussed the conception of the ZDE-device as an attempted politicization of 
wind power, a process in which three concerns associated with wind power were evaluated 
according to their potential public appeal as matters of concern. The conception of the ZDE 
may be seen as an enactment of the politicization in the sense that it seeks to instate:  
52 What Asdal refers to as a ’philosophy of adding’ (Asdal 2012). 
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“processes, situations or modes of actions in which the arguability of issues is emphasized 
and in which, consequently, decisions and resolutions are exposed to their political 
determination” (Muniesa and Linhardt 2011: 555).
The arena defined in the ZDE for this political determination is situated among local 
politicians and local populations. At least three moments are created in which this 
politicization is encouraged to unravel in the process defined by the ZDE: Firstly, the wind 
power development zones must be proposed by inter-communal cooperation, which 
conditions a certain agreement of a large number of neighbouring municipalities. Secondly, 
the department prefect must validate the zones. This has proven to become an obstacle in 
some departments where the prefect has been reluctant to validate wind power development 
zones in general. And thirdly, elements of dialogue or consultation with the local population 
must be undertaken and eventually demonstrated in the final proposal.  
Nonetheless, the ZDE turned out to work not quite as intended, at least by Durant, and a large 
number of wind power development zones were validated soon after the adoption of the 
device. Durant acknowledges that the ZDE did not put the breaks on wind power 
development, and that the ZDE did not reinforce, or even create, local opposition – or 
NIMBYism. One reason for this, I have argued, at least in the case of CdC du Pays de la 
Serre, has to do with the emerging practice of the engineers; a practice which might be better 
described as a process resembling an economization of the landscape; i.e. “as an aspect of 
practices, procedures and activities in which the calculability of things is put forward and in 
which, accordingly, action is subjected to optimality and hence made prone to economic 
assessment” (Muniesa and Linhardt 2011: 555). Though it would be a stretch to refer to the 
engineers as performing an ‘economic assessment’, the process bears strong resemblances to 
this type of assessment: The process of breaking down the landscape according to single-
variable layers, and measuring distances from a given spot of interest, such as the medieval 
city of Laon, to eventually add the layers of constraints, allowing the rationing of the 
landscape according to the favourability of the distinct zones. Though no economic metric is 
extracted from the practices of the engineers, the process enables an evaluation of the relative 
appropriateness of a given zone as to its favourability in terms of becoming a wind power 
development zone. Also, the practice described by Plichon, the engineer in charge of the 
process in CdC du Pays de la Serre, defines a rather specific distribution between the 
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‘objective’ delimitation of favourability, what I refer to as economization, and the politics of 
defining zones: Only when there is an excess of favourable zones are the politicians consulted 
and asked to enter into negotiations of selecting a limited number of zones. Eventually, at 
least in the case of the CdC du Pays de la Serre, the economization performed by the 
engineers seems to be stronger than the intended politicization of the device. But the case 
illustrates how two phases of the device (as stressed by Foucault) may become opposing 
forces as they act upon their object.
To Durant, choosing to adopt a feed-in tariff is ‘truly’ a political choice: “I do not think 
anyone has ever really asked the question ‘is this [wind power] good or bad’ and even today, 
I do not think this is the case” (Int. Durant, my translation). Rather, it is the exact opposite of 
an economic logical reasoning that he and Poignant are proposing:
“That is what we are trying to say here in the report [Poignant 2003], if we apply a purely 
economic logic, it encourages ... the question becomes why you encourage it [wind power]. 
We can reasonably say that the main argument is still CO², and therefore I have always found 
it surprising that no one ever started with a reflection on the economy of CO², or how many 
tons of CO² were saved by the wind turbines. From this point of view, the analysis of Serge 
Poignant, the general argument is to say: there is Denmark or Germany, where you had a 
production regime, originally, you had a regime of production chains dominated by fossil fuel 
technologies and which are highly polluting. You choose to support wind vigorously, when 
you do, it has two advantages, the first is that the production is clearly entirely replaced by a 
clean production, so there is a gain in CO² which is crisp and clear. Moreover, it is the first 
countries, chronologically, and therefore, it allowed them to build an industrial machine 
production as we see it today... those two countries are leaders today in the European 
production [of turbines]” (Int. Durant, my translation).  
Durant argues that the decision to favour the development of wind power may easily be 
economized – only it is not. Translating wind power into a question of decreasing CO2-
emissions allows an economization of the French electricity system, which demonstrates the 
uselessness of wind power (see also CRE 2001). The crux is the translation of wind power 
into a non-emitting technology rather than a renewable technology, which could address 
issues of uranium extraction and nuclear waste as part of the calculation.
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From this point, the decision of adopting the feed-in tariff is purely political in the sense that 
wind power is promoted as part of a fight against nuclear power; as stressed by Durant, wind 
power supporters are merely nuclear power opponents. As such, one could see the feed-in 
tariff as a politicization of electricity production in France; i.e., a way of making electricity 
technologies a debateable issue.
To Durant, yet another problem is the fact that any price made ‘at a desk’, such as the feed-in 
tariff, and not in the market is unlikely to reflect the costs of production, and in this case, the 
costs of wind power generation. As such, he draws a clear distinction between the ‘market 
price’ and the ‘tinkered price’ (as any price made at a desk, he says, is bound to be either too 
high or too low). This attitude illustrates the ‘moralization’, which “relies on the elevation of 
purely economic criteria such as efficiency or profit making to the status of moral value”
(Fourcade and Healy 2004: 1421). The problematization of the price is shared by CRE, but it 
takes different forms: Durant and Poignant simply deny that ‘desk-made’ prices can be made 
to reflect costs of the projects and thus generate acceptable profits for the project developers. 
The economists from CRE, on the other hand, (re)calculate and compare profitability levels to 
the proposals made by Chabot or eventually DGEMP. In other words, Durant and Poignant 
stress the idea of calculating prices as debateable (and as such, the feed-in tariff device itself), 
contrary to CRE, who stress the actual ‘number’ as faulty rather than its source. To CRE, the 
problem seems to be posed on the distinction between ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ economics; 
Chabot’s and DGEMP’s calculations belong to the latter category, and their own calculations 
belong to the former. In other words, Durant and Poignant’s refusal to calculate and the 
calculation by CRE serve the same purpose; namely, to problematize the feed-in tariff. To 
CRE, the calculated demonstration that the tariff leads to profitability levels way above 
average is not a proposal to simply lower the tariff; rather, it is used to suggest the dismissal 
of the feed-in tariff and make all wind power development projects be the result of EDF 
initiated tendering processes.
The device as prosthetic, and thus the implication that the source of the handicap is located in 
the technology rather than the failure of markets, allows the politicization of wind power vis-
à-vis its role in the French energy system: Does wind power lead to a decrease in CO2-
emissions? Is it ‘cleaner’ than nuclear power? Or does it in fact increase CO2-emissions from 
the French energy system? The feed-in tariff, and thus the making of a price for wind power is 
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made the arena in which these issues are opened and problematized, and they are intimately 
linked with the idea of the device being a prosthesis: Why support an inefficient technology if 
it has no positive effects? In other words, it is the need of prostheses that is made part of the 
disqualification of the technology.
Eventually, a price is fixed. But the making of the price is black-boxed to some extent, though 
admittedly the different valuations discussed in Chapter 4 were all considered in the price-
making. And this seems to reinforce its status as a ‘political’ number rather than an 
‘economic’ number. Making the calculation invisible leaves questions of what has been taken 
into account unanswered.
This brings me closer to the counterintuitive conclusion that the feed-in tariff, and the 
negotiations around it, is closer to politicization, and the practice of the ZDE to 
economization. Dissolving the distinction between politics and economics as two distinct 
spheres, and rather stressing the importance of economization and politicization, allows us to 
see these devices in a new light; fixing a price as a process of valuation gives rise to a range 
of often-conflicting values that need to be negotiated. On the other hand, though starting as a 
device for politicization, the ZDE, at least as it is practised in the CdC de Pays de la Serre, 
seems closer to the idea of economization, a process of closing down and making everything 
measurable – even the landscape. 
As processes, economization and politicization are constantly ongoing, sometimes 
intermingled, and at other times very pure. This discussion also demonstrates that the two 
concepts are difficult to handle because the objects they address, i.e., the objects that they 
make arguable or make apt for rationing, constantly shift. The politicization of wind power 
may be positioned on its association to CO2-emissions as calculable benefits (or lack thereof), 
its role in the electricity system, its effects on the landscape, or its association to the prosthetic 
device, i.e., the feed-in tariff. Politicization may thus be unfastening distinct elements of the 
particular network and be making it debateable; sometimes by calculating the association 
between wind power and parts of the network – at other times refusing the calculability of the 
same aspect.  
The political market in light of the above discussion emerges as a more complex assemblage 
in which the ‘political’ becomes an effect of constant ongoing efforts of framing elements of 
wind power development, e.g., the location of the installations, and at other times wind power 
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per se, or eventually pointing to the flaws of the context into which it is introduced. 
Accordingly, qualifications of the devices as either prostheses or habilitation points to the 
distinct configuration of the socio-technical assemblages and processes of economization and 
politicization.   
Seen from the perspective of politicization and economization, the political market may 
simply be seen as a market in which attempts at politicizing the good has stabilized to a 
degree that some aspects of the ordering of market exchange must be dealt with, or has 
become premised on politics in some way. And these may, in turn, become translated into 
specific devices added to the assemblage.   
6.4UnstableAssemblages–TellingStories
Whereas there might seem to be a certain stabilization of the devices’ association to politics in 
some way, the studies of the two devices constantly remind us of the unstable character of 
their network. One way of discussing this stability is through the notion of weak or strong 
convergence in a network (Callon 1991). A convergent network is one in which activities, 
despite the heterogeneity of its putative actors, fit together, and where actors may “mobilise 
the skills within that network without having to get involved in costly adaptation, translation 
and decoding” (Callon 1991: 148). But such strongly convergent networks, Callon stresses, 
are only likely to come about after large investments over long periods of time (ibid.). As this 
study has shown, the assemblage of a market for wind power is rather one in which a 
proposed translation is met by counter translations, and the introduction of one device leads to 
the making of yet another device. In this way, actor identities and roles are questioned, and 
the mobilisation of other parts of the network may be difficult to sustain. Such a weakly 
convergent network is a description not unlike the market assemblage for wind power, and 
more specifically, the two devices studied here. As also discussed in the methodological 
reflexions (Chapter 3), an account of such a network should strive towards ‘telling the story’ 
rather than risk simplifying (and possibly quantifying) and thus betraying the state of the 
network. Stressing valuation as involving five different, and to some degree conflicting, 
figures of value, as well as the opposing modalities for calculating fairness and efficiency, 
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demonstrates the empirical variation in valuation approaches and practices. The result is thus 
a description of controversies, attempts at reconfiguration, or detailed descriptions of 
engineering practices; activities which are all difficult – if not impossible – to summarize and 
simplify in a once and for all manner.  
However, this is not meant to suggest that the market devices and the wind power market 
assemblage will remain weakly convergent networks; as Callon indirectly suggests, and what 
also seems to be implied by Polanyi’s comment on the notion of laissez-faire outlined in the 
opening of this chapter, continuous investments over time may bring the assemblage closer to 
convergence, e.g., the variation in valuation practices may be reduced to a single criterion that 
is well accepted by (all) actors in the network. In that case, the studies presented in this 
dissertation would rather serve as an illustration of the work and controversies, which may 
eventually lead to the achievement of a convergent network. Such a convergence is a 
possibility but far from an inescapable future.  
In many ways, the (weak) convergence of the market assemblage for wind power may be 
related to matters of concern. As demonstrated, the valuation of wind power evolve in close 
relation to concerns (such as global warming), and new concerns emerge (e.g., concern for the 
pollution of the landscape). Furthermore, the ZDE is framed as a response to concerns, and it 
provides a space in which these may be raised. This leads me to one final question, namely, 
whether the case studied here bears any resemblance to the ‘civilizing’ market described by 
Callon; i.e., a market which is at the heart of producing and resolving matters of concern, as 
well as a market which combines devices that used to be attributed either to the economy or to 
‘expression and political action’ (Callon 2009). For such a ‘civilizing’ market to exist, and for 
issues to be raised and eventually ‘be taken into account’, strong convergence, I argue, is 
unlikely to be the state of the network. It implies openness towards new actors as well as 
towards the translation of issues into, for example, new criteria for valuation. Central to the 
civilizing process is the emergence of ‘hybrid forums’ (Callon et al. 2001) or concerned 
groups (Callon 2009) participating or contributing, either through problematizations of 
existing markets or their suggestions for designs of emerging markets, which appear to 
expand the boundaries of groups involved in making market designs and their maintenance.   
In many ways, as demonstrated throughout this study, the making of a market for wind power 
does exactly that. Nonetheless, I am hesitant to describe the market for wind power as a 
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civilizing market; not as a description of the distinct market studied here, but also because of 
what the term seems to imply.  
The normative dimension the depiction appears to suggest, and its implication as a new 
category of markets, seems to fall into a somewhat similar trap of reproducing the critique, 
raised by Callon himself, of the new economic sociology; namely, to expand sociological 
explanations to all kinds of orderings, including those of the market (and thus embedding 
economics in sociology). In other words, it seems to propose that marketization has the 
potential to be a possible solution to a range of matters of concern, such as climate change, 
which extends the ordering of exchange of distinct goods53. However, the adoption of the 
marketization programme prompts us to inquire into these matters of concern, which emerge 
in relation to the markets we study, and the politicizations and economizations through which 
delineations between spheres and their responsibilities are drawn. Making these processes a 
characteristic of an emerging kind of market is maybe as much an effect of our methods and 
materials, as argued in Chapter 3, as a new reality. As the discussion by Polanyi in the 
opening of this chapter reminds us, the free market in which cotton manufacturers engaged in 
exchanges found its origin in protective tariffs and wage subsidies (devices not so unlike the 
devices of this thesis) and could possibly have generated concerns of their own.
Finally, and this has to do with my reluctance to use the term ‘civilizing’ in relation to the 
specific case studied here. The study of the feed-in tariff suggests that one significant concern 
emerging from the valuation is related to the perceived ‘merits’ of economic markets from a 
neo-classical perspective; namely, deregulated markets as providers of optimal resource 
allocation – and not least that the optimum is distorted by the introduction of prosthetic 
devices such as the feed-in tariff. Seen from a constructivist perspective, it is hardly a 
civilizing quality of a market that this abstract figure of the free market still roams around, no 
matter who its protagonists are, neither when put forward by economists, nor by concerned 
agents outside of economics. Instead, I would stick to the description of the market for wind 
power as a negotiated, and thus, at a minimum, a quasi-political market. 
53 Though I believe that Callon’s civilized market is something rather different from what Keynes meant to 
propose when he commented that economists are the “trustees, not of civilization, but of the possibility of 
civilization” (from Fourcade and Healy 2007: 14.3), it still seems to privilege the economist and his practice. 
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7.CONCLUSION
Let us now briefly return to the place we started; Herning in the mid 1970’s. Many of the 
discussions over the preceding pages have demonstrated some of the work that goes into the 
marketization of wind power. Though the experiments of Christian Riisager demonstrated that 
electricity produced from a turbine could be injected into the grid simply by using an existing 
outlet in Riisager’s home, these efforts did not construct an economic good. To him, the 
turbine and the grid were within reach, and it was out of curiosity that he wanted to test their 
compatibility. Though Riisager’s experiment demonstrated the potential peaceful coexistence 
of grid and wind turbine, this ‘marriage’ has remained controversial. And the marketization of 
wind power, following albeit indirectly and discontinuously from this experiment, has been a 
fragile and contingent achievement ever since and has also spanned a range of concerns, as 
the studies here demonstrate.    
The two studies presented here illustrate how both ‘valuation’ and ‘location’ were 
problematized and eventually framed through the two devices analysed. The approach 
adopted has allowed me to follow the marketization of wind power through these two devices 
deemed both crucial to the further development of wind power (i.e., the proliferation of the 
wind power good), and simultaneously the ‘correction’, or disciplining, of the good (i.e., 
attempts at making up for some of the perceived side-effects of wind power development). In 
other words, wind power is deemed a ‘good’ to the collective (because of its positive 
association with global warming as a CO2-emission reducing technology), but none the less a 
disabled energy in terms of being an economic good.     
The study of the feed-in tariff, as a frame for setting a price for wind power, demonstrated 
controversies relating to the qualities of wind power as well as its associations with different 
networks; according to some valuation accounts, wind power is a CO2-reducing technology, 
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and at other times the reverse, i.e., a CO2-increasing technology. Not surprisingly, these 
different qualifications affect the value attached to wind power. However, the qualifications 
which are central to the valuation of wind power are not limited to wind power as energy or 
the turbines as technology, but they also address the device that frames the valuation; the 
feed-in tariff is framed as both market-like, and market-distorting, and as such, the object of 
valuation shifts between the energy, its position in the network, and the device.
Also, the study demonstrated the constant folding and unfolding of both value and values, 
together with notions of efficiency and fairness. Moreover, a range of different figures of 
value appear and reappear throughout the five different valuation proposals: Value as being 
CO2 reductions, value as being renewability, value as being on the forefront (in developing 
wind power), value as being nothing but supply/demand, and finally the value of landscape. 
Each of the five valuations followed suggest specific assemblages of value (folded around 
these figures) and use them to suggest calculated prices – or simply deny the possibility of 
such calculations. For example, calculations are rejected in one valuation because unfairness 
is associated with the device, not the price per se. Finally, and maybe most importantly, it is 
when stressing the value of CO2 reductions that the requalification of nuclear power as 
‘sustainable’ is made possible. The shift of category, from renewability (a category from 
which nuclear power is disqualified) to sustainability (a category in which nuclear power may 
or may not qualify), frames the calculative space in which nuclear power and wind power 
may become compared along their CO2-emissions profiles – and leave out questions of 
nuclear waste and security issues. Eventually, it is the association with climate change that 
allows the devaluation of wind power.   
The price, which is eventually defined, remains a rather controversial number, both in terms 
of fairness and efficiency, as well as to its effects. One such effect is said to be the risk of 
polluting the landscape, a concern that is being associated with the establishment of the tariff. 
This concern is translated into the second device, the ZDE. Though born as an attempt to 
politicize wind power, i.e., making the location of turbines an issue in the hands of local 
populations and local politicians, the case of CdC du Pays de la Serre demonstrates quite 
different effects. The engineers’ meticulous practice of breaking down the landscape 
according to single-dimension layers is presented as an entirely objective process; the contrast 
of the politics and the ‘social relating’ to the landscape of the local population. The 
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engineered process entails expanding the list of criteria from which to frame and qualify the 
landscape, all of which are eventually black-boxed and presented as an objective definition of 
favourable zones.
The study also illustrates how location remains a variety of other things besides well-defined 
zones of relative favourability; for example, landscape, heritage, and dwelling place. As 
demonstrated by the mayor of Autremencourt, Dominique Potart, the territory is beyond being 
well framed, but rather co-exists with the zoning process undertaken by the engineers. This 
coexistence, I argue, could be described along the lines of singularization and singularity; the 
former pointing to the process of establishing the characteristics (of the good), and the latter 
stressing its uniqueness as multidimensional, incommensurable, and uncertain as to its 
quality. A similar contrast is found in the valuation accounts. For example, the association 
between wind power and climate change allows, in some of the valuations, for the 
establishment of wind power as a singularity, because the extent (and ways) to which it 
contributes to climate change remains relatively undetermined (it is multidimensional, 
incommensurable, and uncertain as to its quality). At the same time, wind power is subjected 
to a singularization in which it is made comparable to nuclear power (as well as other 
energies) qua CO2 calculations.  
Both devices are central to the marketization of wind power; the feed-in tariff not only defines 
the price but also guarantees that the energy produced is bought, creates expectations as to 
technological learning curves through the declining tariffs, and explicitly addresses what are 
considered acceptable profitability levels. The ZDE is crucial to the marketization of wind 
power for at least two reasons; firstly, it is an obligatory passage point to the tariffs, and 
secondly, it defines possible locations for wind parks, which is a central element of any wind 
power project.
Meanwhile, the two devices may be studied as market devices, but they are also at the heart of 
the negotiations and controversies unfolding around the creation of markets for wind power. 
As prosthetic devices, they become the crutches that allow wind power (market) to survive, 
and as habilitation, they become a means of addressing the politics of the networks into which 
they are introduced. Taking this insight as a stepping-stone for a discussion of politicization 
and economization, and as a means of demonstrating how the boundaries between politics and 
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economics are defined and redefined, the two devices are as prostheses, at least partly situated 
within the realm of politics. This is what underlies the notion of the political market. But 
inquiring into these two devices demonstrates how the notions of politicization and 
economization may be used to describe the ongoing controversies. Sometimes they are 
mutually constitutive; economizations of CO2-emissions or profitability levels may be used to 
politicize the existence of the feed-in tariff. At the core of these processes is the emphasis on 
network associations such as wind power associated with nuclear power, or wind power 
associated with fossil fuel generated power.  
Eventually, what seems to remain is a feed-in tariff that continues to be controversial; not 
only did some valuation proposals attempt to disqualify the potential for CO2 reductions in 
relation to the French electricity system through an economization of emission profiles of 
wind power and nuclear power, something which suggests the feed-in tariff is not only a 
politically driven choice, but also a ‘bad’ one. On the other hand, the ZDE-device, born out of 
a deliberate attempt to politicize wind power, appoints ‘spaces’ for concerned groups (or 
rather opponents) to be heard. As the father of the device concluded, the ZDE did not work 
out quite as intended. Based on the case study of the CdC du Pays de la Serre, it is illustrated 
how the meticulous practice of the engineers, something I describe as an economization of the 
landscape, black boxes that which went into its fabric and simply remains an (objective) 
delineation between favourable and less favourable zones for wind power development.    
As a result, in the case studied here, deconstructing and organizing landscapes in order to 
draw zones for wind power development behind the desks of engineers is far less 
controversial than the making of prices behind the desks of government officials.  
7.1Contributions
The contributions made by the present study are first and foremost empirical elaborations of 
the marketization programme in general and the role of market devices more specifically; on 
the one hand making the devices the analytical entry points to the study of markets, and on the 
other hand, their effects on the larger market assemblage. The two analyses respond to 
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Caliskan and Callon’s (2010) invitation for contributions to the issues of price-setting and 
framing of encounters, and with the feed-in tariff and the ZDE, the two empirical analyses 
provide examples of the distinct ways in which prices may be defined and how encounters are 
framed as processes of connecting developer, grid, landscape, wind, and inhabitants, amongst 
others.
Furthermore, the study contributes to the emerging field of valuation studies. Making the 
feed-in tariff an entry point to such a study allows insights to be produced on the 
qualifications and associations required to set a price; but instead of discarding the tariff as 
political, because it is performed at the desks of bureaucrats rather than by the market, it 
demonstrates the diversity of values emerging from the process of setting a price, and not 
least how the making of the price is entangled with notions of fairness, efficiency, and 
profitability levels. And eventually, how the disqualifications target the device rather than the 
price per se. 
Finally, what I believe to be the most important contribution is to establish an agenda for 
furthering studies of markets for ‘goods’, which are argued to require the mobilization or 
construction of prosthetic devices. As demonstrated, these prosthetic devices may eventually 
become targets for the disqualification of the good (e.g., the device is unfair, rather than the 
price). However, when the devices are seen as habilitations, they allow for a recognition of 
the politics of the socio-technical assemblage they are added to. In other words, assemblages 
such as the grid are by no means ‘value-neutral’ but are organized around specific modalities 
for production, which eventually may be made part of disqualifications of wind power. 
We need to inquire into these markets (e.g., markets for renewable energy, carbon markets, 
markets for sustainable goods, etc.), which are, on the one hand, set in motion to ‘save’ us 
from the putative dysfunctions of mass production and consumption – and the so-called 
failures of its organization – and on the other hand, the ongoing disqualifications of these 
(political) markets because of the alleged pollution of the economy they are said to cause. 
Instead, we should see these controversies as the effect of not (yet) stabilized demarcations 
between questions qualified as political and questions qualified as economic, i.e., questions 
that are expected to be solved in one, rather than the other ‘sphere’.
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RÉSUMÉ
This project studies the making of a market for wind power in France. Markets for wind 
power, as well as markets for other renewable energies, are often referred to as ‘political 
markets: On the one hand, wind power has the potential to reduce CO2-emissions and thus 
stall the effects of electricity generation on climate change; and on the other hand, as an 
economic good, wind power is said to suffer from ‘disabilities’, such as high costs, fluctuating 
and unpredictable generation, etc. Therefore, because of its performance as a good, it is 
argued that the survival of wind power in the market is premised on different instruments, 
some of which I will refer to as ‘prosthetic devices’. This thesis inquires into two such 
prosthetic devices: The feed-in tariff and the wind power development zones (ZDE) as they 
are negotiated and practiced in France, and the ways in which they affect the making of 
markets for wind power. In this thesis, it is argued that while the two devices frame the price 
of wind power and the location of turbines, they also affect and address questions of costs, 
profitability, and efficiency; and as such, they may be investigated as market devices.   
Theoretically, this dissertation mobilizes the marketization programme, which, as the 
conjugation of the word suggests, implies stressing the rendering of markets; i.e., markets as 
outcomes of negotiations and the alignment of interests and concerns. Being a constructivist 
approach, the marketization programme conceptualizes markets as socio-technical 
assemblages, stressing the heterogeneous and distributed character of their constituent 
elements. Furthermore, the marketization programme allows for the questioning of the 
deadlocked delineation between politics and economics, a delineation that appears to underlie 
the idea of the political market. With the notions of politicization and economization, the 
fundamental delineation between the spheres of politics and economics may be challenged. 
By investigating the ways in which an issue is opened up and made debateable, and 
eventually becomes an object for political decision-making (i.e., a politicization), or how its 
measurability and calculability is stressed, and it is made into an object for economic 
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assessment (i.e., economization), the naturalized distinction between politics and the market 
disappears.
Based on fieldwork in France, the core of this thesis is made up of two analyses; firstly, the 
definition of a feed-in tariff is empirically followed as a process of valuation in which value is 
seen as the outcome of irregular and costly activities, rather than as the identification of the 
inherent property of any object. To study how value, here in the form of a price, comes about 
in the case of wind power, five different empirical traces are followed with each one 
presenting a distinct approach to valuation. These valuation proposals involve qualifying and 
disqualifying wind power, e.g., from CO2-reducing to CO2-emitting, and they span a range of 
controversies. In particular, the study suggests that the valuations may be associated with five 
emerging figures of value – categories against which to undertake the valuation. The study 
demonstrates how these values are folded – or unfolded – with notions of efficiency, fairness, 
and profitability levels; for example, several valuations disqualify the device rather than the 
price itself.   
The second analysis addresses the ZDE-device. With this device, the location of any wind 
power project is bound to be located within predefined zones if they are to be paid the price 
defined in the feed-in tariff. In other words, the ZDE is made an obligatory passage to the 
feed-in tariff.  The analysis follows the device along two phases; namely, its conception and 
its emerging practice in a specific case, the CdC du Pays de la Serre. The first phase is 
discussed as a politicization of wind power, a distinct framing of location in which the 
possibility for local opposition is enforced. The practice of the device as it unfolds in CdC du 
Pays de la Serre, on the other hand, is better described as an economization of the landscape, a 
process of translating the territory into single-layer variables. In their final presentation, these 
layers are accumulated and black-boxed, and the criteria for their construction disappear.  
Based on the studies of the two market devices, this dissertation addresses their roles as either 
prostheses or habilitation. The mobilisation of these concepts allows a discussion not only of 
the politics of the devices, but also a discussion of the politics of the networks to which the 
devices are added. When seen as prosthetic, the devices become explicit framings in which 
the source of ‘disability’ is located in wind power technology itself, whereas the notion of 
habilitation draws attention to ‘disabilities’ located in the network, or the connexion between 
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the network and the technology, e.g., the grid, the distinct framings of the market constituents, 
or even notions such as sustainability. In other words, it allows for an appreciation of the 
distinct politics of the existing system. 
In the market assemblage for wind power studied here, the status of the devices as either 
prosthetic or habilitation seem to coexist; this may be explained by the constantly ongoing 
processes of politicization and economization. These processes seem to be continuous and 
overlapping attempts at either making the introduction of wind power a (bad) political  
choice, or premised on failures of the existing system. The economizations and politicizations 
target different points in the network. The economization of CO2-emissions, i.e., calculating 
and associating the emissions and their sources, may be used to frame the decision of 
subsidizing wind power as a political decision, rather than a decision related to the failure of 
existing markets for energy. As such, these processes are difficult to follow, something that is 
partly affected by the state of the network; the market assemblage for wind power is not a 
convergent and uncontroversial arrangement.   
Eventually, the study demonstrates how making a price is – and remains – politicized, 
whereas the making of geographical zones becomes an economization of the landscape 
through its practice, despite its origin as a device for politicization. It remains far more 
controversial to make prices behind desks than to deconstruct and redefine the landscape 
behind desks.
This dissertation contributes to the marketization programme as a detailed empirical study of 
two market devices as framings of valuation and location. Furthermore, the study of the 
controversial and irregular activities of making a price – and a price that may be disqualified 
through the device rather than the price itself – contributes by empirically underscoring the 
importance of valuation studies. Also, using the notions of politicization and economization 
with regard to the empirical material, as illustrated in the ongoing attempts of (dis)qualifying 
the market assemblage for wind power, the study suggests a new approach to a phenomenon 
such as the ‘political market’. It reorients attention towards an underlying struggle for 
determining where to draw the demarcation between economics and politics. As such, this 
thesis stresses the importance of studying these so-called political markets; markets that are, 
on the one hand, argued to be a partial solution to issues such as climate change and on the 
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other hand constantly negotiated because of the ‘pollution’ that the prosthetic devices are 
argued to infer on markets.  
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DANSKRESUMÉ(RÉSUMÉINDANISH)
Denne afhandling undersøger konstruktionen af et vindkraftmarked i Frankrig. 
Vindkraftmarkeder, såvel som andre markeder for vedvarende energi, benævnes ofte 
’politiske markeder’. Den benævnelse fremhæver på den ene side vindkraftens potentiale til at 
reducere CO2-udledninger, og derved mindske elproduktionens effekt på den globale 
opvarmning. På den anden side argumenteres det, at vindkraft som ’økonomisk gode’ ikke er 
konkurrencedygtig på grund af høje omkostninger, samt svingende og uforudsigelig 
produktion. Disse ’svagheder’ fører til en antagelse om, at vindkraftens overlevelse på 
markedet er betinget af en række ’policy-instrumenter’, som i afhandlingen betegnes 
’prosthetic devices’. I afhandlingen ses nærmere på to af disse prosthetic devices: ’Feed-in 
tariffen’ og ’Zoner for vindkraftudvikling’, som de er blevet forhandlet og praktiseret i 
Frankrig – og ikke mindst måderne hvorpå disse påvirker markedsdannelsen for vindkraft. I 
afhandlingen argumenteres der for, at altimens de to devices sætter rammerne for prisen på 
vindkraft, samt placeringen af møllerne, så påvirker og adresserer de samtidig spørgsmål 
vedrørende omkostninger, rentabilitet og efficiens. Derfor kan de undersøges som ’market
devices’. 
Afhandlingens teoretiske grundlag er det såkaldte marketization-program, der indebærer et 
særligt fokus på selve processen bag markedsdannelsen. Med dette menes, at markedet kan 
ses som et resultat af forhandlinger samt tilpasninger af forskellige interesser. I marketization-
programmets konstruktivistiske tilgang konceptualiseres markedet som et socio-teknisk 
arrangement, der fremhæver markeder som konstituerede gennem heterogene og distribuerede 
elementer, såsom mennesker, værktøjer, devices etc. Endvidere giver marketization-
programmet anledning til at åbne den fastlåste grænse mellem politik og økonomi: En 
afgrænsning som forekommer at ligge til grund for selve ideen om det ’politiske marked’. 
Ved at inddrage begreberne politisering og økonomisering gøres det muligt at udfordre denne 
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grænse mellem det politiske og det økonomiske, det vil sige som to væsensforskellige sfærer. 
På den baggrund undersøges måderne hvorpå et issue åbnes op og gøres debaterbart, og 
dermed i sidste ende bliver gjort til objekt for en politisk beslutningsproces (dvs. en 
politisering), eller hvorledes dets målbarhed og beregnelighed fremhæves, og det dermed 
gøres til objekt for en økonomisk vurdering (dvs. en økonomisering). Med denne tilgang 
udviskes det ’naturlige’ skel mellem det ’politiske’, på den ene side, og markedet som del af 
den økonomiske sfære, på den anden side. 
Empirisk er afhandlingen baseret på feltarbejde foretaget i Frankrig. Det empiriske materiale 
udfoldes over to analyser: Første analyse følger fastsættelsen af feed-in tariffen, som en 
proces hvorigennem værdi og pris opfattes som resultatet af en værdifastsættelsesproces 
(valuation), der indebærer kvalificeringer af vindkraft, fra hhv. CO2-reducerende til CO2-
forurenende. I analysen følges fem forskellige forslag til værdifastsættelsen på vindkraft, som 
hver især repræsenterer en særskilt strategi herfor. I analysen isoleres fem specifikke ’værdi-
figurer’ som centrale kategorier i de enkelte værdifastsættelsesforslag og studiet 
demonstrerer, hvorledes disse værdier ’foldes’ - eller ’udfoldes’ - med begreber som 
effektivitet, retfærdighed og rentabilitet, der eksempelvis muliggør en diskvalificering af feed-
in tariffen som device, frem for prisen selv.  
Afhandlingens anden analyse undersøger dannelsen af vindkraftzoner. Med dette device bliver 
placeringen af vindmølleprojekter bundet til predefinerede zoner, såfremt projektet skal kunne 
modtage betaling i form af feed-in tariffen. Med andre ord er vindkraftzonerne blevet 
obligatory passage points til feed-in tariffen. Analysen følger dette device som konstitueret 
gennem to faser, nemlig dens ’undfangelse’ samt dens praksis. Den første fase diskuteres som 
en politisering af vindkraft, hvor møllernes placering i landskabet problematiseres, og der 
skabes rum og mulighed for lokal modstand mod vindkraftprojekter. Den anden fase, dvs. den 
praksis de involverede ingeniører udvikler for dannelsen af vindkraftzoner, undersøges 
gennem et casestudie af CdC du Pays de la Serre. Denne fase beskrives som en 
økonomisering af landskabet, det vil sige en proces hvori det geografiske område 
dekonstrueres ved hjælp af en række kriterier. I den endelige præsentation af vindkraftzonerne 
er disse lag akkumuleret og black-boxed og tilbage står zoner, der er vurderet særligt 
favorable for vindkraftudvikling, men hvor kriterierne bag processen ikke længere er synlige. 
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På baggrund af analyserne af de to devices, adresserer afhandlingen dernæst deres roller som 
enten ’proteser’ eller ’habilitering’. Anvendelsen af disse begreber muliggør en diskussion, 
ikke blot af den politik der udfoldes i de to devices, men også af den politik, der er indlejret i 
de netværk som de knyttes til. Set som proteser bliver de to devices eksplicitte framings, hvor 
kilden til ’svaghederne’ er placeret i selve vindkraftteknologien. Begrebet habilitering 
henleder derimod opmærksomheden på ’svagheder’ i netværket, som for eksempel elnettet. 
Med andre ord giver marketization perspektivet mulighed for et indblik i det eksisterende 
systems politik.  
I nærværende studie af det franske vindkraftmarked, synes de to devices status (som enten 
protese eller habilitering) at sameksistere. Dette kan delvist forklares ved de konstant 
igangværende politiserings- og økonomiseringsprocesser: Processerne synes at være 
kontinuerlige og overlappende forsøg på enten at gøre introduktionen af vindkraft til et 
(dårligt) politisk valg, eller være begrundet i fejl i det eksisterende system. Dertil rettes 
økonomiseringerne og politiseringerne mod forskellige punkter i netværket. Økonomiseringen 
af CO2-udledninger, dvs. kalkuler af, samt associationer mellem, CO2-udledningen og dens 
kilder, anvendes til at frame beslutningen om at subsidiere vindkraft som en politisk 
beslutning, frem for en beslutning relateret til svagheder i de eksisterende energimarkeder. 
Således bliver processerne vanskelige at følge, hvilket delvist er en effekt af netværkets 
tilstand, og særligt at det studerede markedsarrangement for vindkraft ikke er et stabilt og 
konvergent arrangement.  
Endeligt demonstrerer afhandlingen, at prisskabelsen er og forbliver politiseret, hvorimod 
skabelsen af geografiske zoner gennem praksis, og på trods af vindkraftzonernes oprindelse 
som en politisering, snarere tager karakter af en økonomisering af landskabet. Med andre ord 
forbliver det langt mere kontroversielt at gøre prisfastsættelse til et skrivebordsarbejde, end at 
dekonstruere og redefinere landskabet bag et skrivebord.
Afhandlingen bidrager til marketization-programmet gennem de detaljerede empiriske studier 
af de to market devices, som framer såvel værdifastsættelse som lokalitet. Studiet af 
prisfastsættelsens forhandlinger og kontroverser, og ikke mindst hvorledes feed-in tariffen 
som device gøres til objekt for diskvalifikationerne, snarere end af prisen selv, bidrager til at 
understrege vigtigheden af valuation studies. Ved at udfolde begreberne politisering og 
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økonomisering på et empirisk materiale, som forsøg på at (dis)kvalificere vindkraftmarkedet, 
bidrager afhandlingen til at udpege en ny indgangsvinkel til fænomenet det ’politiske 
marked’, idet den sætter fokus på den underliggende kamp for at definere grænsen mellem det 
økonomiske og det politiske. Dermed understreger afhandlingen også vigtigheden af at 
studere disse såkaldte politiske markeder; det vil sige, markeder der på den ene side 
fremhæves som en delvis løsning på udfordringer såsom klimaændringer, og på den anden 
side konstant er til forhandling på grund af den ’forurening’ de såkaldte prosthetic devices 
siges at påføre markedet. 
203
8.REFERENCES
Abolafia, Mitchel (1996): “Making Markets: Opportunism and Restraint on Wall Street”,
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Ackerman, Frank and Lisa Heinzerling (2004): “Priceless – On Knowing the Price of 
Everything and the Value of Nothing”, London: The New Press. 
ADEME (2007): “L’éolien: un atout pour les territoires – Synthèse du 5e colloque national 
éolien”, Valbonne: ADEME.
Akrich, Madeleine (1992): “The De-Scription of Technical Objects”, in Bijker, Wiebe E. and 
John Law (eds.): “Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change”,
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Andersen, Ib, Finn Borum, Peer H. Kristensen and Peter Karnøe (1995): “On the Art of Doing 
Field Studies”, Copenhagen: Handelshøjskolens Forlag. 
Araujo, Luis (2007): “Markets, Market-making and Marketing”, in Marketing Theory vol. 7 
(3): 211-227. 
Asdal, Kristin (2012): “Contexts in Action – And the Future of the Past in STS”, in Science,
Technology & Human Values, vol. 37 (4): 379-403. 
Asdal, Kristin and Ingunn Moser (2012): “Experiments in Context and Contexting”, in 
Science, Technology & Human Values, vol. 37 (4): 291-306. 
Barry, Andrew (2001): “Political Machines – Governing a Technological Society”, London: 
The Athlone Press. 
204
Barry, Andrew (2002): “The Anti-political Economy”, in Economy and Society, vol. 31 (2): 
268-284.
Baumol, William J. and Wallace E. Oates (1971): “The Use of Standards and Prices for 
Protection of the Environment”, in The Swedish Journal of Economics, vol. 73 (1): 42-54.
Becker, Howard S. (1998): “Tricks of the trade – how to think about your research while 
you’re doing it”, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Beckert, Jens and Patrik Aspers (eds.) (2011): “The Worth of Goods – Valuation & Pricing in 
the Economy”, New York: Oxford University Press.
Bennet, Jane (2005): “The Agency of Assemblages and the North American Blackout”, in 
Public Culture, vol. 17 (3): 445-465. 
Beunza, Daniel and David Stark (2004): “Tools of the Trade: The socio-technology of 
arbitrage in a Wall Street trading room”, Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 13 (2): 369-
401.
Beunza, Daniel and Raghu Garud (2007): “Calculators, lemmings, or frame-makers? The 
intermediary role of security analysts”, in Callon, Michel, Fabian Muniesa and Yuval Milo 
(eds.): “Market Devices”, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Beuscart, Jean Samuel and Ashveen Peerbaye (2006): “Histoires de dispositifs”, in Terrains
and Travaux, vol. 2 (11):3-15. 
Block, Fred (2001): “Introduction”, in Karl Polanyi: “The Great Transformation – The 
Political and Economic Origins of our time”, Boston: Beacon Press. 
Blok, Anders (2011): “Clash of the eco-sciences: carbon marketization, environmental NGOs 
and performativity as politics”, in Economy and Society, vol. 40 (3): 451-476. 
Boltanski, Luc and Laurent Thévenot (2006): “On Justification – Economies of Worth”,
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 
Bouneau, Christophe, Michel Derdevet and Jacques Percebois (2007): ”Les réseaux 
électriques – au cæur de la civilisation industrielle”, Boulogne : Timée Editions.  
205
Bryman, Alan (2004): “Social Research Methods” (2nd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Butler, Judith (2010): “Performative Agency”, in Journal of Cultural Economy, vol. 3 (2): 
147-161.
Caliskan, Koray (2007): “Price as a market device: cotton trading in Izmir Mercantile 
Exchange”, in Callon, Michel, Fabian Muniesa and Yuval Millo (eds.) (2007): “Market 
Devices“, Oxford: Blackwell.  
Caliskan, Koray and Michel Callon (2009): “Economization, part 1: shifting attention from 
the economy towards processes of economization”, in Economy and Society, vol. 38 (3): 369-
398.
Caliskan, Koray and Michel Callon (2010): “Economization, part 2: a research programme for 
the study of markets”, in Economy and Society, vol. 39(1): 1-32. 
Callon, Michel (1986): “Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the 
scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay”, in Law, John: “Power, action and belief: a new 
sociology of knowledge?”, London: Routledge.
Callon, Michel (1991): “Techno-economic networks and irreversibility”, in Law, John. (ed.): 
“A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination”, London: 
Routledge.
Callon, Michel (1998a): “Introduction: The embeddedness of economic markets in 
economics”, in Michel Callon (ed.): “The Laws of the Markets”, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers.
Callon, Michel (1998b): “An essay on framing and overflowing: economic externalities 
revisited by sociology”, in Michel Callon (ed.): “The Laws of the Markets”, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
Callon, Michel (2007a): “An Essay on the Growing Contribution of Economic Markets to the 
Proliferation of the Social”, in Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 24 (7-8): 139-163. 
206
Callon, Michel (2007b): “What Does it Mean to Say That Economics is Performative?”, in 
MacKenzie, Donald, Fabian Muniesa and Lucia Siu (eds.): “Do Economists Make Markets – 
On the Performativity of Economics”, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Callon, Michel (2008): “Economic Markets and the Rise of Interactive Agencements: From 
Prosthetic Agencies to Habilitated Agencies”, in Pinch, Trevor and Richard Swedberg (eds.) 
“Living in a Material World: Economic Sociology meets Science and Technology Studies”, 
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.  
Callon, Michel (2009): “Civilizing Markets: Carbon trading between in vitro and in vivo 
experiments”, in Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 34 (3-4). 
Callon, Michel (2010): “Performativity, Misfires and Politics”, in Journal of Cultural 
Economy, vol. 3 (2): 163-169.
Callon, Michel, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe (2001): “Agir dans un monde incertain 
– essai sur la démocratie technique“, Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 
Callon, Michel, Cécile Méadel and Vololona Rabeharisoa (2002): “The economy of 
qualities”, in Economy and Society, Vol. 31 (2): 194-217. 
Callon, Michel and John Law (2005): “On qualculation, agency and otherness”, in 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 23 (5): 717-733. 
Callon, Michel and Fabian Muniesa (2005): “Economic Markets as Calculative Collective 
Devices”, in Organization Studies, vol. 26 (8): 1229-1250. 
Callon, Michel, Fabian Muniesa and Yuval Milo (2007): “Market Devices”, Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Chabot, Bernard (2001a): “Fair and Efficient Tariffs for Wind Energy: Principles, Method, 
Proposal, Data and Potential Consequences in France”, presented at the 2001 European Wind 
Energy Conference – Wind Energy for the New Millenium, Copenhagen, July 2-6. 
Chabot, Bernard (2001b): “La nouvelle tarification de l’énergie éolienne : genèse, description 
et première analyse”, Revue de l’Énergie, nr. 528, juillet-août. 
207
Chabot, Bernard and Bernard Saulnier (2001): “Fair and efficient rates for large scale 
development of wind power: the new French solution”, CanWEA 2001 Seminar and 
Conference, Ottawa, October 29-31.
Chabot, Bernard, Paul Kellet and Bernard Saulnier  (2002): ”Defining advanced wind energy 
tariffs systems to specific locations and applications: lessons from the French tariff system 
and examples”, presented at the 2002 Global Wind Power Conference, Paris, April 2-5. 
Chabot, Bernard (2004): ”A Simple and Reliable Tool to Optimize Sustainable Energy 
Programmes : the Profitability Index Method”; [http://www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws
/France/ChabotonWind-Works/ChabotPIMethod.pdf] 
Chabot, Bernard and L. Buquet (2006): “Le développement de l’énergie éolienne en France 
en 2005”, DEWI Magazin, nr. 29, August 2006. 
Chamberlin, Edward H. (1962): “The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Reorientation of 
the Theory of Value” (8th edition), Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Coase, Ronald H. (1988): “The Firm, the Market and the Law”, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Cochet, Yves (2000): “Stratégies et moyens de développement de l’efficacité énergétique et 
des sources d’énergie renouvelables”, Paris: Documentation française. 
Cochoy, Franck (2007): “A sociology of market-things: on tending the garden of choices in 
mass retailing”, in The Sociological Review, vol. 55:109-129.
Cochoy, Franck (2008): “Calculation, qualculation, calqulation: shopping cart arithmetic, 
equipped cognition and the clustered consumer”, in Marketing Theory vol. 8 (1): 5-44.
Corvellec, Hervé and  Annette Risberg (2007): “Sensegiving as mise-en-sens – The case of 
wind power development”, in Scandinavian Journal of Management, vol. 23: 306-326. 
Couture, Toby D., Karlynn Cory, Claire Kreychik and Emily Williams (2010): “The Policy 
Maker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design”, Golden: National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory.
208
CRE (Commission de régulation de l’énergie) (2001a): ”Avis de la Commission de régulation 
de l’électricité en date du 5 juin 2001 sur l’arrêté fixant les conditions d’achat de l’électricité 
produite par les installations utilisant l’énergie mécanique du vent”; 
http://www.industrie.gouv.fr/energie/renou/f1e_ren.htm [23 May 2006]. 
CRE (2001b): “La CRE a émis un avis négatif sur le tarif de reprise de l’électricité d’origine 
éolienne”, Communique de presse, 22 June 2001: http://www.cre.fr/documents/presse/ 
communiques-de-presse/la-cre-a-emis-un-avis-negatif-sur-le-tarif-de-reprise-de-l-electricite-
d-origine-eolienne
CRE (2006): “Avis sur le projet d’arrêté fixant les conditions d’achat de l’électricité produite 
par les installations utilisant l’énergie du vent”, Journal Officiel (27 juillet); 
http://www.cre.fr/imgAdmin/1154108653140.pdf [20 October 2006]. 
Czarniawska, Barbara (1998): “A narrative approach to organization studies”, Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Daston, Lorraine and Peter Galison (2008): “Objectivity and Its Critics”, in Victorian Studies,
vol. 50 (4): 666-677.
Dewey, John (1916): “Democracy and Education – An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Education”, New York: The Free Press. 
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell (1983): “The Iron Cage revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”, in American Sociological 
Review, vol. 48 (2):147-160. 
Doganova, Liliana (2012): “Necessarily Untrue: on the use of the discounted cash flow 
formula in the valuation of exploratory projects”, paper presented at ‘7th Critical Management 
Studies Conference”, Naples, Italy.  
DRIRE (2008): “Etat d’avancement des Zones de Développement Eolien en Picardie” (April 
2008): http://www.picardie.drire.gouv.fr/energie/eolien/index.html. 
209
du Gay, Paul, Yuval Millo and Penelope Tuck (2012): “Making government liquid: shifts in 
governance using financialisation as a political device”, Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy, vol. 30: 1083-1099.
Dumez, Hervé and Alain Jeunemaître (2010): “Michel Callon, Michel Foucault and the 
‘dispositif’”, in Le Libellio a’AEGIS, vol. 6 (4):27-37. 
Edenhofer, Ottmar, Ramón Pichs Madruga and Youba Sokona (eds.) (2012): “Renewable
Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation – Special Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Espeland, Wendy (2001): “Bureaucrats and Indians in Contemporary Colonial Encounter”, in 
Law and Social Inquiry, vol. 26 (2): 403-433. 
Espeland, Wendy N. and Mitchell L. Stevens (1998): “Commensuration as a Social Process”, 
in Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 24:313-343. 
Espeland, Wendy N. and Mitchell L. Stevens (2008): “A Sociology of Quantification”, in 
European Journal of Sociology, vol. 49 (3):401-436. 
Finon, Dominique and Philippe Menanteau (2003): “The static and dynamic efficiency of 
instruments of promotion of renewables’, Energy Studies Review, 12(1): 53–83. 
Finon, Dominique and Philippe Menanteau (2004): “La promotion des énergies renouvelables 
dans les nouveaux marchés électriques concurrentiels", Working Paper Cired 2004-6, 
Published in the Annales des Mines-Réalités Industrielles, August 2004. 
Finon, Dominique (2006): “The social efficiency of instruments for the promotion of 
renewable energies in the liberalised power industry”, in Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics, vol. 77 (3): 309-343.
Fligstein, Neil (1996): “Markets as Politics: a Political-Cultural Approach to Market 
Institutions”, American Sociological Review, vol. 61 (4):656-673. 
Fligstein, Neil (2001): “The Architecture of Markets – An Economic Sociology of Twenty-
First-Century Capitalist Societies”, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
210
Fligstein, Neil and Iona Mara-Drita (1996): “How to Make a Market: Reflections on the 
Attempt to Create a Single Market in the European Union”, in American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 102 (1):1-33.
Fligstein, Neil and Luke Dauter (2007): “The Sociology of Markets”, in Annual Review of 
Sociology, vol. 33: 105-128. 
Flyvbjerg, Bent (2004): “Five misunderstandings about case-study research”, Sosiologisk 
Tidsskrift, vol. 2: 117-143. 
Fourcade, Marion (2007): “Theories of Markets and Theories of Society”, in American
Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 50; 8 (1015-1034).
Fourcade, Marion (2011): “Price and Prejudice: On Economics, and the Enchantment/ 
Disenchantment of Nature”, in Beckert, Jens and Patrik Aspers (eds.) “The Worth of Goods”, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fourcade, Marion and Kieran Healy (2007): “Moral Views of Market Society”, in Annual
Review of Sociology, vol. 33: 14.1-14.27.
Garud, Ragu, Joel Gehman and Peter Karnøe (2010): “Categorization by association: nuclear 
power and emission free electricity”, in Research in the Sociology of Work, vol. 21: 51-93. 
Gipe, Paul (2006): “Renewable Energy Policy Mechanisms”. Retrieved from 
http://www.windworks.org/FeedLaws/RenewableEnergyPolicyMechanismsbyPaulGipe.pdf 
Gipe, Paul and Bernard Chabot (2006): “North America’s First Electricity Feed Law: 
Standard Offer Contracts in Onatario, Canada”, DEWI Magazin, nr. 29, August 2006. 
Gosset, Jerôme and Thierry Ranchin (2006): “Bilan et prospective de la filière éolienne 
francaise”, Armines/Ademe: http://www.scep.ensmp.fr/~tr/Pdf/Rapport_Final.pdf 
Granovetter, Mark (1985): “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness”, in American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510. 
211
Granovetter, Mark (1990): “The old and the new economic sociology: A history and an 
agenda”, in Friedland, Roger and A. F. Robertson (eds.): “Beyond the marketplace – 
rethinking economy and society”, New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Guyer, Jane I. (2009): “Composites, fictions and risk: Towards an ethnography of price”, in 
Hann, Chris and Keith Hart: “Market and Society: The Great Transformation today”, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hardie, Iain and Donald MacKenzie (2007): “Assembling an economic actor: the agencement 
of a Hedge Fund”, in The Sociological Review vol. 55 (1): 57-80. 
Hardin, Garrett (1968): “The Tragedy of the Commons – The population problem has no 
technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality”, in Science, vol. 162 
(1243-1248).
Heller, Michael A. and Rebecca S. Eisenberg (1998): “Can patents deter innovation? The 
anticommons in biomedical research”, in Science, vol. 280 (5364): 698-701. 
Hecht, Gabrielle (2009): “The Radiance of France – Nuclear Power and National Identity 
after World War II”, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press.  
Holm, Petter (2007): “Which Way is Up on Callon”, in MacKenzie, Donald, Fabian Muniesa 
and Lucia Siu (eds.): “Do Economists Make Markets – On the Performativity of Economics”,
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hughes, Thomas P. (1983): “Networks of Power – Electrification in Western Society, 1880-
1930”, Baltimore/London: The John Hopkins University Press. 
Hvelplund Frede (2001a): “Political Prices or Political quantities? A Comparison of 
Renewable Energy Support Systems”, in New Energy vol. 5: 18-23. 
Hvelplund, Frede (2001b): “Renewable Energy Governance Systems - A comparison of the 
“political price-/amount market” model with the “political quota-/certificate price market" 
system (The German and Danish cases)”, Ålborg: Ålborg Universitet. 
Hvelplund, Frede (2006): “Renewable energy and the need for local energy markets”, in 
Energy vol. 31: 2293-2302. 
212
Jersild, Hanne (2000): “Møllebyggeren fra Skærbæk”, in Vindformation nr. 22 (December), 
Copenhagen: Vindmølleindustrien.  
Jensen, Ib Konrad (2003): ”Mænd i modvind”, Copenhagen: Børsens Forlag. 
Jobert, Arthur, Pia Laborgne and Solveig Mimler (2007): “Local acceptance of wind energy: 
Factors of success identified in French and German case studies”, in Energy Policy vol. 35: 
2751-2760.
Karnøe, Peter (2010): “Material disruptions in electricity systems: can wind power fit in the 
existing electricity system?”, in Akrich, Madeleine, Yannick Barthe, Fabian Muniesa and 
Philippe Mustar (eds.): “Débordements. Mélanges offerts à Michel Callon”, Paris: Presse des 
Mines. 
Karnøe, Peter (2012): “How disruptive is wind power? A lesson from Denmark”, in Debating
Innovation vol. 2 (3): 72-77. 
Karpik, Lucien (2011): “What is the Price of a Scientific Paper”, in Beckert, Jens and Patrik 
Aspers (eds.): “The Worth of Goods – Valuation & Pricing in the Economy”, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Karpik, Lucien (2010): “Valuing the Unique: The Economics of Singularities”, Princeton, N. 
J.: Princeton University Press. 
Kjellberg, Hans and Claes-Fredrik Helgesson (2006): “Multiple versions of markets: 
Multiplicity and performativity in market practice”, in Industrial Marketing Management,
vol. 35 (7): 839-855. 
Kvale, Steinar (1997): ”Interview – En introduktion til det kvalitative forskningsinterview”, 
København, Hans Reitzels Forlag. 
Laali, A. R. and M. Benard (1999): “French wind power generation programme Eole 2005: 
results of the first call for tenders”, in Energy Policy, 30 (10):839-848. 
Latour, Bruno and Peter Weibel (eds.) (2005): “Making Things Public – Atmospheres of 
Democracy”, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press. 
213
Latour, Bruno (1996): “Aramis – or the love of technology”, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Latour, Bruno (2004): “How to talk about the body? The normative dimension of science 
studies”, in Body and Society, vol. 10 (2/3): 205-229.
Latour, Bruno (2005): “The Politics of Nature – How to Bring The Sciences into Democracy”, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.  
Law, John (2004): “After method – mess in social science research”, London: Routledge. 
Law, John and Ingunn Moser (2012): “Contexts and Culling”, in Science, Technology and 
Human Values, vol. 37 (4): 332-354. 
Machado, Nuno Miguel Cardoso (2011): “Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology: 
Notes on the Concept of (Dis)embeddedness”, in RCCS Annual Review, October, 3.
MacKenzie, Donald (2006): “An engine, not a camera: how financial models shape markets”,
Cambridge MA: MIT Press.  
MacKenzie, Donald (2009a): “Making things the same: Gases, emission rights and the 
politics of carbon markets”, in Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34 (3-4), 440-455. 
MacKenzie, Donald (2009b): “Material markets – How Economic Agents are Constructed”, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
MacKenzie, Donald, Fabian Muniesa and Lucy Siu (eds.): “Do Economists Make Markets – 
On the Performativity of Economics”, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.  
MacKenzie, Donald and Yuval Millo (2003): “Constructing a market, performing theory: the 
historical sociology of a financial derivatives exchange”, in American Journal of Sociology,
vol. 109: 107-145.
Marcus, George E. (1995): “Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-
Sited Ethnography”, in Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 24: 95-117.
McFall, Liz (2009): “Devices and Desires: How Useful is the ‘new’ new economic sociology 
for understanding market attachment”, Sociology Compass, vol. 3 (2): 267-282.
214
Menanteau, Philippe, Dominique Finon and Marie-Laure Lamy (2003): “Prices versus 
quantities: choosing policies for promoting the development of renewable energy”, in Energy
Policy vol. 31: 799-812. 
Mendonça, Miguel (2007): “Feed-in Tariffs: Accelerating the Deployment of Renewable 
Energy”, London: EarthScan. 
Meyer, John W. and Brian Rowan (1977): “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure 
as Myth and Ceremony”, in American Journal of Sociology, vol. 83 (2):340-363. 
Miller, Daniel (2002): “Turning Callon the right way up”, in Economy and Society, vol. 31 
(2): 218-233. 
Miller, Peter (1997): “The multiplying machine”, in Accounting, Organizations and Society,
vol. 22 (3/4): 355-364. 
Miller, Peter and Ted O’Leary (2007): “Mediating instruments and the making of markets: 
Capital budgeting, science and the economy”, in Accounting, Organizations and Society vol. 
32: 701-734. 
Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie (2006): ”Instructions detaillees 
relatives aux zones de developpement de l’eolien terrestre”, Paris.  
Mol, Annemarie (2002): “The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice”, London: Duke
University Press.  
Muniesa, Fabian (2007): “Market technologies and the pragmatics of prices”, in Economy and 
Society, vol. 36 (3): 377-395. 
Muniesa, Fabian (2010): “Cooling Down and Heating Up: A Stress Test on Politics and 
Economics”, in Akrich, Madeleine, Yannick Barthe, Fabian Muniesa and Philippe Mustar 
(eds.): “Débordements. Mélanges offerts à Michel Callon”, Paris: Presse des Mines.   
Muniesa, Fabian (2012): “A Flank Movement in the Understanding of Valuation”, in The
Sociological Review, vol. 59: 24-38. 
215
Muniesa, Fabian, Yuval Millo and Michel Callon (2007): “An Introduction to Market 
Devices”, in Callon, Michel, Yuval Millo and Fabian Muniesa (eds.): “Market Devices”, 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Muniesa, Fabian and Dominique Linhardt (2011): “Trials of explicitness in the 
implementation of public management reform”, in Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 
22: 550-566. 
Musselin, Christine and Catherine Paradeise (eds.) (2005): “Quality: a debate”, in Sociologie
du travail vol.47: 89-123.
Nadaï, Alain (2007): “Planning, Siting and the Local Acceptance of Wind Power: Some 
Lessons from the French Case”, Energy Policy 35:2715-2726.
Nadaï, Alain and Olivier Labussière (2009): “Wind power planning in France (Aveyron), 
from state regulation to local planning”, in Land Use Policy, vol. 26 (3): 744-754. 
Nadaï, Alain and Olivier Labussière (2010): “Birds, Wind and the Making of Wind Power 
Landscapes in Aude, Southern France”, in Landscape Research, vol. 35 (2): 209-233.
North, Douglass C. (1977): “Markets and Other Allocation Systems in History: The 
Challenge of Karl Polanyi”, in Journal of European Economic History 6: 703-716. 
Noy, Chaim (2008): “Sampling knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in 
Qualitative Research”, in International Journal of Social Research Methodology, vol. 11 (4): 
327-344.
OECD (2010): “Energy Policies of IEA Countries – France 2009 Review”, Paris: OECD/IEA. 
Poignant, Serge (2003): “Rapport 2160 pour la commission des affaires économiques, de 
l’environnement et du territoire sur le projet de loi modifié par le sénat” (1669): Assemblée 
Nationale, 22 Mars 2005. 
Polanyi, Karl (2001): “The Great Transformation – The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time”, Boston: Beacon Press.
216
Porter, Theodor (1995): “Trust in Numbers – The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public 
Life”, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Power, Michael (2004): “Counting, Control and Calculation: Reflections on Measuring and 
Management”, in Human Relations, vol. 57(6): 765-783. 
Preda, Alex (2006): “Socio-technical agency in financial markets: the case of the stock 
ticker”, in Social Studies of Science, vol. 36: 753-782. 
Raffnsøe, Sverre and Marius  Gudmand-Høyer (2005): “Dispositivanalyse”, in Esmark, 
Anders, Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen (eds.): “Poststrukturalistiske 
Analysestrategier”, Frederiskberg: Roskilde Universitetsforlag. 
RTE (2011): “The French Electricity Report 2010”, downloadable from: http://www.rte-
france.com/uploads/media/pdf_zip/publications-annuelles/rte-be10-fr-02.pdf
Taylor, James R. and van Every, Elizabeth J. (2000): “The Emergent Organization: 
Communication as Its Site and Surface” Mahwah, NJ.: Erlbaum.
Thomas, Nicholas (1991): “Entangled objects: exchange, material culture, and colonialism in 
the Pacific”, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Schewe, Phillip F. (2007): “The Grid – a journey through the heart of our electrified world”,
Washington DC: Joseph Henry Press. 
Silverman, David (2005): “Doing Qualitative Research”, (2nd ed.), London: Sage 
Publications.
Sjögren, Ebba and Claes-Fredrik Helgesson (2007): “The Q(u)ALYfying hand: health 
economics and medicine in the shaping of Swedish markets for subsidized pharmaceuticals”, 
in Callon, Michel, Fabian Muniesa and Yuval Milo (eds.): “Market Devices”, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Stark, David (2009): “The Sense of Dissonance – Accounts of Worth in Economic Life”, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
217
Stern, Nicholas (2006): “The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review”, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Swedberg, Richard (1994): “Markets as Social Structures”, in Smelser, Neil J.  and Richard 
Swedberg (eds.): “The Handbook of Economic Sociology”, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
Swedberg, Richard (1997): “New Economic Sociology: What Has Been Accomplished, What 
Is Ahead?”, in Acta Sociologica vil. 40: 161-82. 
Swedberg, Richard and Mark Granovetter (eds.) (1992): “The Sociology of Economic Life”,
Boulder: Westview Press. 
Syndicat des Energies Renouvelable (2012): “L’énergie éolienne en France: chiffres clés”. 
Downloadable from: http://www.enr.fr/ docs/2010122633_02FEEChiffresclesFrance.pdf
Szarka, Joseph (2007a): “Wind Power in Europe – Politics, Business and Society”, Palgrave 
Macmillian, New York. 
Szarka, Joseph (2007b): “Why is There No Wind Rush in France?”, European Environment
17, 321-333. 
van der Horst, Dan (2007): “NIMBY or Not? Exploring the relevance of location and the 
politics of voiced opinions in renewable energy siting controversies”, in Energy Policy, vol. 
35 (5): 2705-2714. 
Weber, Max (1978) [1922]: “Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology”
(vol. 1), Berkeley: University of California Press.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975): “Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications”, New York: Free Press. 
Wolsink, Maarten (1994): “Entanglement of Interests and Motives: Assumptions behind the 
NIMBY-theory on Facility Siting”, in Urban Studies, vol. 31 (6): 851-866.
Wolsink, Maarten (1996): “Dutch wind power policy – Stagnating implementation of 
renewables”, in Energy Policy, vol. 24 (12): 1079-1088. 
218
Wolsink, Maarten (2000): “Wind power and the NIMBY-myth: institutional capacity and the 
limited significance of public support”, in Renewable Energy vol. 21: 49-64. 
Zelizer, Viviana A. (1994): “The Social Meaning of Money”, New York: Basic Books. 
Zelizer, Viviana A. (2007): “Pasts and Futures of Economic Sociology”, in American
Behavioral Scientist, vol. 50 (8): 1056-1069. 
News Journals: 
Journal de l’environnement (15/05/2012): “Le tariff d’achat éolien est-il une aide d’Etat?”: 
Downloadable from: http://www.journaldelenvironnement.net/article/le-tarif-d-achat-eolien-
est-il-une-aide-d-etat,29049.
Le Figaro Magazine (11/02/2008): “Èoliennes – Miracle or Arnaque?”: Downloadable from: 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/lefigaromagazine/2008/02/08/01006-20080208ARTWWW00644-
eoliennes-miracle-ou-arnaque-.php 
Le Figaro (16/03/2012): “Nucléaire: Francois Hollande entretient le flou”. Downloadable 
from:http://elections.lefigaro.fr/presidentielle-012/2012/03/16/0103920120316ARTFIG00613
-nucleaire-francois-hollande-entretient-le-flou.php
Le Monde (24/03/2005): “L’énergie éolienne est vivement contestée par des associations 
locales”. Downloadable from: http://www.radicalparty.org/fr/content/l%C3%A9nergie-%
C3%A9olienne-est-vivement-contest%C3%A9e-par-des-associations-locales 
Le Point (09/08/2007): “Eoliennes – Comment vendre du vent à prix d’or”: Downloadable 
from http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-societe/2007-08-09/comment-vendre-du-vent-a-prix-d-
or/920/0/195728
Spiegel (08/02/2013): “A Mere Breeze: Era of Fast Growth Ends for wWind Energy in 
Europe”. Downloadable from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/era-of-fast-
growth-ends-for-wind-energy-in-europe-a-882357.html   
219
Internal documents: 
Airele (2006a): “Communauté de Communes de Pays de la Serre – Schema territorial éolien 
– Phase 1”, Airele, Roost-Warendin.  
Airele (2006b): “Communauté de Communes de Pays de la Serre – Schema territorial éolien 
– Phase 2 et 3”, Airele, Roost-Warendin. 
Airele (2007): “Dossier de proposition d’une ZDE intercommunale - “Communauté de 
Communes de Pays de la Serre”, Airele, Roost-Warendin. 
TITLER I PH.D.SERIEN:
2004
1. Martin Grieger
 Internet-based Electronic Marketplaces
 and Supply Chain Management
2. Thomas Basbøll
 LIKENESS
 A Philosophical Investigation
3. Morten Knudsen
 Beslutningens vaklen
 En systemteoretisk analyse of mo-
derniseringen af et amtskommunalt 
sundhedsvæsen 1980-2000
4. Lars Bo Jeppesen
 Organizing Consumer Innovation
 A product development strategy that 
is based on online communities and 
allows some ﬁrms to beneﬁt from a 
distributed process of innovation by 
consumers
5. Barbara Dragsted
 SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION 
AND TRANSLATION MEMORY 
 SYSTEMS
 An empirical investigation of cognitive
 segmentation and effects of integra-
ting a TM system into the translation 
process
6. Jeanet Hardis
 Sociale partnerskaber
 Et socialkonstruktivistisk casestudie 
 af partnerskabsaktørers virkeligheds-
opfattelse mellem identitet og 
 legitimitet
7. Henriette Hallberg Thygesen
 System Dynamics in Action
8. Carsten Mejer Plath
 Strategisk Økonomistyring
9. Annemette Kjærgaard
 Knowledge Management as Internal 
 Corporate Venturing
 – a Field Study of the Rise and Fall of a
  Bottom-Up Process
10. Knut Arne Hovdal
 De profesjonelle i endring
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
11. Søren Jeppesen
 Environmental Practices and Greening 
 Strategies in Small Manufacturing 
 Enterprises in South Africa
 – A Critical Realist Approach
12. Lars Frode Frederiksen
 Industriel forskningsledelse
 – på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde 
i danske forskningsintensive virksom-
heder
13. Martin Jes Iversen
 The Governance of GN Great Nordic
 – in an age of strategic and structural
  transitions 1939-1988
14. Lars Pynt Andersen
 The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV 
 Advertising 
 A study of the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years with 
 special emphasis on genre and irony
15. Jakob Rasmussen
 Business Perspectives on E-learning
16. Sof Thrane
 The Social and Economic Dynamics 
 of Networks 
 – a Weberian Analysis of Three 
 Formalised Horizontal Networks
17. Lene Nielsen
 Engaging Personas and Narrative 
 Scenarios – a study on how a user-
 centered approach inﬂuenced the 
 perception of the design process in 
the e-business group at AstraZeneca
18. S.J Valstad
 Organisationsidentitet
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
19. Thomas Lyse Hansen
 Six Essays on Pricing and Weather risk 
in Energy Markets
20.  Sabine Madsen
 Emerging Methods – An Interpretive
  Study of ISD Methods in Practice
21. Evis Sinani
 The Impact of Foreign Direct Inve-
stment on Efﬁciency, Productivity 
Growth and Trade: An Empirical Inve-
stigation
22. Bent Meier Sørensen
 Making Events Work Or, 
 How to Multiply Your Crisis
23. Pernille Schnoor
 Brand Ethos
 Om troværdige brand- og 
 virksomhedsidentiteter i et retorisk og 
diskursteoretisk perspektiv 
24. Sidsel Fabech
 Von welchem Österreich ist hier die 
Rede?
 Diskursive forhandlinger og magt-
kampe mellem rivaliserende nationale 
identitetskonstruktioner i østrigske 
pressediskurser 
25. Klavs Odgaard Christensen
 Sprogpolitik og identitetsdannelse i
  ﬂersprogede forbundsstater
 Et komparativt studie af Schweiz og 
 Canada
26. Dana B. Minbaeva
 Human Resource Practices and 
 Knowledge Transfer in Multinational 
 Corporations
27. Holger Højlund
 Markedets politiske fornuft
 Et studie af velfærdens organisering i 
 perioden 1990-2003
28. Christine Mølgaard Frandsen
 A.s erfaring
 Om mellemværendets praktik i en 
transformation af mennesket og 
 subjektiviteten
29. Sine Nørholm Just
 The Constitution of Meaning
 – A Meaningful Constitution? 
 Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion 
in the debate on the future of Europe
2005
1. Claus J. Varnes
 Managing product innovation through 
 rules – The role of formal and structu-
red methods in product development
2. Helle Hedegaard Hein
 Mellem konﬂikt og konsensus
 – Dialogudvikling på hospitalsklinikker
3. Axel Rosenø
 Customer Value Driven Product Inno-
vation – A Study of Market Learning in 
New Product Development
4. Søren Buhl Pedersen
 Making space
 An outline of place branding
5. Camilla Funck Ellehave
 Differences that Matter
 An analysis of practices of gender and 
 organizing in contemporary work-
places
6. Rigmor Madeleine Lond
 Styring af kommunale forvaltninger
7. Mette Aagaard Andreassen
 Supply Chain versus Supply Chain
 Benchmarking as a Means to 
 Managing Supply Chains
8. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan
 From an idea to a standard
 The UN and the global governance of 
 accountants’ competence
9. Norsk ph.d. 
10. Vivienne Heng Ker-ni
 An Experimental Field Study on the 
 Effectiveness of Grocer Media 
 Advertising 
 Measuring Ad Recall and Recognition, 
 Purchase Intentions and Short-Term 
Sales
11. Allan Mortensen
 Essays on the Pricing of Corporate 
Bonds and Credit Derivatives
12. Remo Stefano Chiari
 Figure che fanno conoscere
 Itinerario sull’idea del valore cognitivo 
e espressivo della metafora e di altri 
tropi da Aristotele e da Vico ﬁno al 
cognitivismo contemporaneo
13. Anders McIlquham-Schmidt
 Strategic Planning and Corporate 
 Performance
 An integrative research review and a 
 meta-analysis of the strategic planning 
 and corporate performance literature 
 from 1956 to 2003
14. Jens Geersbro
 The TDF – PMI Case
 Making Sense of the Dynamics of 
 Business Relationships and Networks
15 Mette Andersen
 Corporate Social Responsibility in 
 Global Supply Chains
 Understanding the uniqueness of ﬁrm 
 behaviour
16.  Eva Boxenbaum
 Institutional Genesis: Micro – Dynamic
 Foundations of Institutional Change
17. Peter Lund-Thomsen
 Capacity Development, Environmental 
 Justice NGOs, and Governance: The 
Case of South Africa
18. Signe Jarlov
 Konstruktioner af offentlig ledelse
19. Lars Stæhr Jensen
 Vocabulary Knowledge and Listening 
 Comprehension in English as a Foreign 
 Language
 An empirical study employing data 
 elicited from Danish EFL learners
20. Christian Nielsen
 Essays on Business Reporting
 Production and consumption of  
strategic information in the market for 
information
21. Marianne Thejls Fischer
 Egos and Ethics of Management 
 Consultants
22. Annie Bekke Kjær
 Performance management i Proces-
 innovation 
 – belyst i et social-konstruktivistisk
 perspektiv
23. Suzanne Dee Pedersen
 GENTAGELSENS METAMORFOSE
 Om organisering af den kreative gøren 
i den kunstneriske arbejdspraksis
24. Benedikte Dorte Rosenbrink
 Revenue Management
 Økonomiske, konkurrencemæssige & 
 organisatoriske konsekvenser
25. Thomas Riise Johansen
 Written Accounts and Verbal Accounts
 The Danish Case of Accounting and 
 Accountability to Employees
26. Ann Fogelgren-Pedersen
 The Mobile Internet: Pioneering Users’ 
 Adoption Decisions
27. Birgitte Rasmussen
 Ledelse i fællesskab – de tillidsvalgtes 
 fornyende rolle
28. Gitte Thit Nielsen
 Remerger
 – skabende ledelseskræfter i fusion og 
 opkøb
29. Carmine Gioia
 A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF 
 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
30. Ole Hinz
 Den effektive forandringsleder: pilot, 
 pædagog eller politiker?
 Et studie i arbejdslederes meningstil-
skrivninger i forbindelse med vellykket 
gennemførelse af ledelsesinitierede 
forandringsprojekter
31. Kjell-Åge Gotvassli
 Et praksisbasert perspektiv på dynami-
ske 
 læringsnettverk i toppidretten
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
32. Henriette Langstrup Nielsen
 Linking Healthcare
 An inquiry into the changing perfor-
 mances of web-based technology for 
 asthma monitoring
33. Karin Tweddell Levinsen
 Virtuel Uddannelsespraksis
 Master i IKT og Læring – et casestudie 
i hvordan proaktiv proceshåndtering 
kan forbedre praksis i virtuelle lærings-
miljøer
34. Anika Liversage
 Finding a Path
 Labour Market Life Stories of 
 Immigrant Professionals
35. Kasper Elmquist Jørgensen
 Studier i samspillet mellem stat og   
 erhvervsliv i Danmark under 
 1. verdenskrig
36. Finn Janning
 A DIFFERENT STORY
 Seduction, Conquest and Discovery
37. Patricia Ann Plackett
 Strategic Management of the Radical 
 Innovation Process
 Leveraging Social Capital for Market 
 Uncertainty Management
2006
1. Christian Vintergaard
 Early Phases of Corporate Venturing
2. Niels Rom-Poulsen
 Essays in Computational Finance
3. Tina Brandt Husman
 Organisational Capabilities, 
 Competitive Advantage & Project-
Based Organisations
 The Case of Advertising and Creative 
 Good Production
4. Mette Rosenkrands Johansen
 Practice at the top
 – how top managers mobilise and use
 non-ﬁnancial performance measures
5. Eva Parum
 Corporate governance som strategisk
 kommunikations- og ledelsesværktøj
6. Susan Aagaard Petersen
 Culture’s Inﬂuence on Performance 
 Management: The Case of a Danish 
 Company in China
7. Thomas Nicolai Pedersen
 The Discursive Constitution of Organi-
zational Governance – Between unity 
and differentiation
 The Case of the governance of 
 environmental risks by World Bank 
environmental staff
8. Cynthia Selin
 Volatile Visions: Transactons in 
 Anticipatory Knowledge
9. Jesper Banghøj
 Financial Accounting Information and  
 Compensation in Danish Companies
10. Mikkel Lucas Overby
 Strategic Alliances in Emerging High-
Tech Markets: What’s the Difference 
and does it Matter?
11. Tine Aage
 External Information Acquisition of 
 Industrial Districts and the Impact of 
 Different Knowledge Creation Dimen-
sions
 
 A case study of the Fashion and  
Design Branch of the Industrial District 
of Montebelluna, NE Italy
12. Mikkel Flyverbom
 Making the Global Information Society 
 Governable
 On the Governmentality of Multi- 
Stakeholder Networks
13. Anette Grønning
 Personen bag
 Tilstedevær i e-mail som inter-
aktionsform mellem kunde og med-
arbejder i dansk forsikringskontekst
14. Jørn Helder
 One Company – One Language?
 The NN-case
15. Lars Bjerregaard Mikkelsen
 Differing perceptions of customer 
value
 Development and application of a tool 
for mapping perceptions of customer 
value at both ends of customer-suppli-
er dyads in industrial markets
16. Lise Granerud
 Exploring Learning
 Technological learning within small 
 manufacturers in South Africa
17. Esben Rahbek Pedersen
 Between Hopes and Realities: 
 Reﬂections on the Promises and 
 Practices of Corporate Social 
 Responsibility (CSR)
18. Ramona Samson
 The Cultural Integration Model and 
 European Transformation.
 The Case of Romania
2007
1. Jakob Vestergaard
 Discipline in The Global Economy
 Panopticism and the Post-Washington 
 Consensus
2. Heidi Lund Hansen
 Spaces for learning and working
 A qualitative study of change of work, 
 management, vehicles of power and 
 social practices in open ofﬁces
3. Sudhanshu Rai
 Exploring the internal dynamics of 
software development teams during 
user analysis
 A tension enabled Institutionalization 
 Model; ”Where process becomes the 
 objective”
4. Norsk ph.d. 
 Ej til salg gennem Samfundslitteratur
5. Serden Ozcan
 EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN 
 ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIONS AND 
 OUTCOMES
 A Behavioural Perspective
6. Kim Sundtoft Hald
 Inter-organizational Performance 
 Measurement and Management in 
Action
 – An Ethnography on the Construction 
of Management, Identity and 
 Relationships
7. Tobias Lindeberg
 Evaluative Technologies
 Quality and the Multiplicity of 
 Performance
8. Merete Wedell-Wedellsborg
 Den globale soldat
 Identitetsdannelse og identitetsledelse 
i multinationale militære organisatio-
ner
9. Lars Frederiksen
 Open Innovation Business Models
 Innovation in ﬁrm-hosted online user 
 communities and inter-ﬁrm project 
 ventures in the music industry 
 – A collection of essays
10. Jonas Gabrielsen
 Retorisk toposlære – fra statisk ’sted’ 
til persuasiv aktivitet
11. Christian Moldt-Jørgensen
 Fra meningsløs til meningsfuld  
evaluering.
 Anvendelsen af studentertilfredsheds-
 målinger på de korte og mellemlange  
 videregående uddannelser set fra et 
 psykodynamisk systemperspektiv
12. Ping Gao
 Extending the application of 
 actor-network theory
 Cases of innovation in the tele-
 communications industry
13. Peter Mejlby
 Frihed og fængsel, en del af den 
samme drøm? 
 Et phronetisk baseret casestudie af 
 frigørelsens og kontrollens sam-
eksistens i værdibaseret ledelse! 
 
14. Kristina Birch
 Statistical Modelling in Marketing
15. Signe Poulsen
 Sense and sensibility: 
 The language of emotional appeals in 
insurance marketing
16. Anders Bjerre Trolle
 Essays on derivatives pricing and dyna-
mic asset allocation
17. Peter Feldhütter
 Empirical Studies of Bond and Credit 
Markets
18. Jens Henrik Eggert Christensen
 Default and Recovery Risk Modeling 
and Estimation
19. Maria Theresa Larsen
 Academic Enterprise: A New Mission 
for Universities or a Contradiction in 
Terms?
 Four papers on the long-term impli-
cations of increasing industry involve-
ment and commercialization in acade-
mia
20.  Morten Wellendorf
 Postimplementering af teknologi i den  
 offentlige forvaltning
 Analyser af en organisations konti-
nuerlige arbejde med informations-
teknologi
21.  Ekaterina Mhaanna
 Concept Relations for Terminological 
Process Analysis
22.  Stefan Ring Thorbjørnsen
 Forsvaret i forandring
 Et studie i ofﬁcerers kapabiliteter un-
der påvirkning af omverdenens foran-
dringspres mod øget styring og læring
23.  Christa Breum Amhøj
 Det selvskabte medlemskab om ma-
nagementstaten, dens styringstekno-
logier og indbyggere
24.  Karoline Bromose
 Between Technological Turbulence and 
Operational Stability
 – An empirical case study of corporate 
venturing in TDC
25.  Susanne Justesen
 Navigating the Paradoxes of Diversity 
in Innovation Practice
 – A Longitudinal study of six very 
 different innovation processes – in 
practice
26.  Luise Noring Henler
 Conceptualising successful supply 
chain partnerships
 – Viewing supply chain partnerships 
from an organisational culture per-
spective
27.  Mark Mau
 Kampen om telefonen
 Det danske telefonvæsen under den 
tyske besættelse 1940-45
28.  Jakob Halskov
 The semiautomatic expansion of 
existing terminological ontologies 
using knowledge patterns discovered 
on the WWW – an implementation 
and evaluation
29.  Gergana Koleva
 European Policy Instruments Beyond 
Networks and Structure: The Innova-
tive Medicines Initiative
30.  Christian Geisler Asmussen
 Global Strategy and International 
 Diversity: A Double-Edged Sword?
31.  Christina Holm-Petersen
 Stolthed og fordom
 Kultur- og identitetsarbejde ved ska-
belsen af en ny sengeafdeling gennem 
fusion
32.  Hans Peter Olsen
 Hybrid Governance of Standardized 
States
 Causes and Contours of the Global 
Regulation of Government Auditing
33.  Lars Bøge Sørensen
 Risk Management in the Supply Chain
34.  Peter Aagaard
 Det unikkes dynamikker
 De institutionelle mulighedsbetingel-
ser bag den individuelle udforskning i 
professionelt og frivilligt arbejde
35.  Yun Mi Antorini
 Brand Community Innovation
 An Intrinsic Case Study of the Adult 
Fans of LEGO Community
36.  Joachim Lynggaard Boll
 Labor Related Corporate Social Perfor-
mance in Denmark
 Organizational and Institutional Per-
spectives
2008
1. Frederik Christian Vinten
 Essays on Private Equity
2.  Jesper Clement
 Visual Inﬂuence of Packaging Design 
on In-Store Buying Decisions
3.  Marius Brostrøm Kousgaard
 Tid til kvalitetsmåling?
 – Studier af indrulleringsprocesser i 
forbindelse med introduktionen af 
kliniske kvalitetsdatabaser i speciallæ-
gepraksissektoren
4. Irene Skovgaard Smith
 Management Consulting in Action
 Value creation and ambiguity in 
 client-consultant relations
5.  Anders Rom
 Management accounting and inte-
grated information systems
 How to exploit the potential for ma-
nagement accounting of information 
technology
6.  Marina Candi
 Aesthetic Design as an Element of 
 Service Innovation in New Technology-
based Firms
7.  Morten Schnack
 Teknologi og tværfaglighed
 – en analyse af diskussionen omkring 
 indførelse af EPJ på en hospitalsafde-
ling
8. Helene Balslev Clausen
 Juntos pero no revueltos – un estudio 
sobre emigrantes norteamericanos en 
un pueblo mexicano
9. Lise Justesen
 Kunsten at skrive revisionsrapporter.
 En beretning om forvaltningsrevisio-
nens beretninger
10. Michael E. Hansen
 The politics of corporate responsibility:
 CSR and the governance of child labor 
and core labor rights in the 1990s
11. Anne Roepstorff
 Holdning for handling – en etnologisk 
undersøgelse af Virksomheders Sociale 
Ansvar/CSR
12. Claus Bajlum
 Essays on Credit Risk and 
 Credit Derivatives
13. Anders Bojesen
 The Performative Power of Competen-
ce  – an Inquiry into Subjectivity and 
Social Technologies at Work
14. Satu Reijonen
 Green and Fragile
 A Study on Markets and the Natural  
Environment
15. Ilduara Busta
 Corporate Governance in Banking
 A European Study
16. Kristian Anders Hvass
 A Boolean Analysis Predicting Industry 
Change: Innovation, Imitation & Busi-
ness Models
 The Winning Hybrid: A case study of 
isomorphism in the airline industry
17. Trine Paludan
 De uvidende og de udviklingsparate
 Identitet som mulighed og restriktion 
blandt fabriksarbejdere på det aftaylo-
riserede fabriksgulv
18. Kristian Jakobsen
 Foreign market entry in transition eco-
nomies: Entry timing and mode choice
19. Jakob Elming
 Syntactic reordering in statistical ma-
chine translation
20. Lars Brømsøe Termansen
 Regional Computable General Equili-
brium Models for Denmark
 Three papers laying the foundation for 
regional CGE models with agglomera-
tion characteristics
 
21. Mia Reinholt
 The Motivational Foundations of 
Knowledge Sharing
22.  Frederikke Krogh-Meibom
 The Co-Evolution of Institutions and 
Technology
 – A Neo-Institutional Understanding of 
Change Processes within the Business 
Press – the Case Study of Financial 
Times
23. Peter D. Ørberg Jensen
 OFFSHORING OF ADVANCED AND 
HIGH-VALUE TECHNICAL SERVICES: 
ANTECEDENTS, PROCESS DYNAMICS 
AND FIRMLEVEL IMPACTS
24. Pham Thi Song Hanh
 Functional Upgrading, Relational 
 Capability and Export Performance of 
Vietnamese Wood Furniture Producers
25. Mads Vangkilde
 Why wait?
 An Exploration of ﬁrst-mover advanta-
ges among Danish e-grocers through a 
resource perspective
26.  Hubert Buch-Hansen
 Rethinking the History of European 
Level Merger Control
 A Critical Political Economy Perspective
2009
1. Vivian Lindhardsen
 From Independent Ratings to Commu-
nal Ratings: A Study of CWA Raters’ 
Decision-Making Behaviours
2. Guðrið Weihe
 Public-Private Partnerships: Meaning 
and Practice
3. Chris Nøkkentved
 Enabling Supply Networks with Colla-
borative Information Infrastructures
 An Empirical Investigation of Business 
Model Innovation in Supplier Relation-
ship Management
4.  Sara Louise Muhr
 Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulner-
ability of Diversity Management
5. Christine Sestoft
 Forbrugeradfærd i et Stats- og Livs-
formsteoretisk perspektiv
6. Michael Pedersen
 Tune in, Breakdown, and Reboot: On 
the production of the stress-ﬁt self-
managing employee
7.  Salla Lutz
 Position and Reposition in Networks 
 – Exempliﬁed by the Transformation of 
the Danish Pine Furniture Manu-
 facturers
8. Jens Forssbæck
 Essays on market discipline in 
 commercial and central banking
9. Tine Murphy
 Sense from Silence – A Basis for Orga-
nised Action 
 How do Sensemaking Processes with 
Minimal Sharing Relate to the Repro-
duction of Organised Action?
10. Sara Malou Strandvad
 Inspirations for a new sociology of art: 
A sociomaterial study of development 
processes in the Danish ﬁlm industry
11. Nicolaas Mouton
 On the evolution of social scientiﬁc 
metaphors: 
 A cognitive-historical enquiry into the 
divergent trajectories of the idea that 
collective entities – states and societies, 
cities and corporations – are biological 
organisms.
12. Lars Andreas Knutsen
 Mobile Data Services:
 Shaping of user engagements
13. Nikolaos Theodoros Korﬁatis
 Information Exchange and Behavior
 A Multi-method Inquiry on Online 
Communities
14.  Jens Albæk
 Forestillinger om kvalitet og tværfaglig-
hed på sygehuse
 – skabelse af forestillinger i læge- og 
plejegrupperne angående relevans af 
nye idéer om kvalitetsudvikling gen-
nem tolkningsprocesser
15.  Maja Lotz
 The Business of Co-Creation – and the 
Co-Creation of Business
16. Gitte P. Jakobsen
 Narrative Construction of Leader Iden-
tity in a Leader Development Program 
Context
17. Dorte Hermansen
 ”Living the brand” som en brandorien-
teret dialogisk praxis:
 Om udvikling af medarbejdernes 
brandorienterede dømmekraft
18. Aseem Kinra
 Supply Chain (logistics) Environmental 
Complexity
19. Michael Nørager
 How to manage SMEs through the 
transformation from non innovative to 
innovative? 
20.  Kristin Wallevik
 Corporate Governance in Family Firms
 The Norwegian Maritime Sector
21. Bo Hansen Hansen
 Beyond the Process
 Enriching Software Process Improve-
ment with Knowledge Management
22. Annemette Skot-Hansen
 Franske adjektivisk aﬂedte adverbier, 
der tager præpositionssyntagmer ind-
ledt med præpositionen à som argu-
menter
 En valensgrammatisk undersøgelse
23. Line Gry Knudsen
 Collaborative R&D Capabilities
 In Search of Micro-Foundations
24. Christian Scheuer
 Employers meet employees
 Essays on sorting and globalization
25. Rasmus Johnsen
 The Great Health of Melancholy
 A Study of the Pathologies of Perfor-
mativity
26. Ha Thi Van Pham
 Internationalization, Competitiveness 
Enhancement and Export Performance 
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 Evidence from Vietnam
27. Henriette Balieu
 Kontrolbegrebets betydning for kausa-
tivalternationen i spansk
 En kognitiv-typologisk analyse
2010
1.  Yen Tran
 Organizing Innovationin Turbulent 
Fashion Market
 Four papers on how fashion ﬁrms crea-
te and appropriate innovation value
2. Anders Raastrup Kristensen
 Metaphysical Labour
 Flexibility, Performance and Commit-
ment in Work-Life Management
3. Margrét Sigrún Sigurdardottir
 Dependently independent
 Co-existence of institutional logics in 
the recorded music industry
4.  Ásta Dis Óladóttir
 Internationalization from a small do-
mestic base:
 An empirical analysis of Economics and 
Management
5.  Christine Secher
 E-deltagelse i praksis – politikernes og 
forvaltningens medkonstruktion og 
konsekvenserne heraf
6. Marianne Stang Våland
 What we talk about when we talk 
about space:
 
 End User Participation between Proces-
ses of Organizational and Architectural 
Design
7.  Rex Degnegaard
 Strategic Change Management
 Change Management Challenges in 
the Danish Police Reform
8. Ulrik Schultz Brix
 Værdi i rekruttering – den sikre beslut-
ning
 En pragmatisk analyse af perception 
og synliggørelse af værdi i rekrutte-
rings- og udvælgelsesarbejdet
9. Jan Ole Similä
 Kontraktsledelse
 Relasjonen mellom virksomhetsledelse 
og kontraktshåndtering, belyst via ﬁre 
norske virksomheter
10. Susanne Boch Waldorff
 Emerging Organizations: In between 
local translation, institutional logics 
and discourse
11. Brian Kane
 Performance Talk
 Next Generation Management of  
Organizational Performance
12. Lars Ohnemus
 Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and 
Shareholder Value
 An Empirical Reconciliation of two 
Critical Concepts
13.  Jesper Schlamovitz
 Håndtering af usikkerhed i ﬁlm- og 
byggeprojekter
14.  Tommy Moesby-Jensen
 Det faktiske livs forbindtlighed
 Førsokratisk informeret, ny-aristotelisk 
τηθος-tænkning hos Martin Heidegger
15. Christian Fich
 Two Nations Divided by Common 
 Values
 French National Habitus and the 
 Rejection of American Power
16. Peter Beyer
 Processer, sammenhængskraft  
og ﬂeksibilitet
 Et empirisk casestudie af omstillings-
forløb i ﬁre virksomheder
17. Adam Buchhorn
 Markets of Good Intentions
 Constructing and Organizing 
 Biogas Markets Amid Fragility  
and Controversy
18. Cecilie K. Moesby-Jensen
 Social læring og fælles praksis
 Et mixed method studie, der belyser 
læringskonsekvenser af et lederkursus 
for et praksisfællesskab af offentlige 
mellemledere
19. Heidi Boye
 Fødevarer og sundhed i sen- 
modernismen
 – En indsigt i hyggefænomenet og  
de relaterede fødevarepraksisser
20. Kristine Munkgård Pedersen
 Flygtige forbindelser og midlertidige 
mobiliseringer
 Om kulturel produktion på Roskilde 
Festival
21. Oliver Jacob Weber
 Causes of Intercompany Harmony in 
Business Markets – An Empirical Inve-
stigation from a Dyad Perspective
22. Susanne Ekman
 Authority and Autonomy
 Paradoxes of Modern Knowledge 
Work
23. Anette Frey Larsen
 Kvalitetsledelse på danske hospitaler
 – Ledelsernes indﬂydelse på introduk-
tion og vedligeholdelse af kvalitetsstra-
tegier i det danske sundhedsvæsen
24.  Toyoko Sato
 Performativity and Discourse: Japanese 
Advertisements on the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Desire
25. Kenneth Brinch Jensen
 Identifying the Last Planner System 
 Lean management in the construction 
industry
26.  Javier Busquets
 Orchestrating Network Behavior  
for Innovation
27. Luke Patey
 The Power of Resistance: India’s Na-
tional Oil Company and International 
Activism in Sudan
28. Mette Vedel
 Value Creation in Triadic Business Rela-
tionships. Interaction, Interconnection 
and Position
29.  Kristian Tørning
 Knowledge Management Systems in 
Practice – A Work Place Study
30. Qingxin Shi
 An Empirical Study of Thinking Aloud 
Usability Testing from a Cultural 
Perspective
31.  Tanja Juul Christiansen
 Corporate blogging: Medarbejderes 
kommunikative handlekraft
32.  Malgorzata Ciesielska
 Hybrid Organisations.
 A study of the Open Source – business 
setting
33. Jens Dick-Nielsen
 Three Essays on Corporate Bond  
Market Liquidity
34. Sabrina Speiermann
 Modstandens Politik
 Kampagnestyring i Velfærdsstaten. 
 En diskussion af traﬁkkampagners sty-
ringspotentiale
35. Julie Uldam
 Fickle Commitment. Fostering political 
engagement in 'the ﬂighty world of 
online activism’
36. Annegrete Juul Nielsen
 Traveling technologies and 
transformations in health care
37. Athur Mühlen-Schulte
 Organising Development
 Power and Organisational Reform in 
the United Nations Development 
 Programme
38. Louise Rygaard Jonas
 Branding på butiksgulvet
 Et case-studie af kultur- og identitets-
arbejdet i Kvickly
2011
1. Stefan Fraenkel
 Key Success Factors for Sales Force 
Readiness during New Product Launch
 A Study of Product Launches in the 
Swedish Pharmaceutical Industry
2. Christian Plesner Rossing
 International Transfer Pricing in Theory 
and Practice
3.  Tobias Dam Hede
 Samtalekunst og ledelsesdisciplin
 – en analyse af coachingsdiskursens 
genealogi og governmentality
4. Kim Pettersson
 Essays on Audit Quality, Auditor Choi-
ce, and Equity Valuation
5. Henrik Merkelsen
 The expert-lay controversy in risk 
research and management. Effects of 
institutional distances. Studies of risk 
deﬁnitions, perceptions, management 
and communication
6. Simon S. Torp
 Employee Stock Ownership: 
 Effect on Strategic Management and 
Performance
7. Mie Harder
 Internal Antecedents of Management 
Innovation
8. Ole Helby Petersen
 Public-Private Partnerships: Policy and 
Regulation – With Comparative and 
Multi-level Case Studies from Denmark 
and Ireland
9. Morten Krogh Petersen
 ’Good’ Outcomes. Handling Multipli-
city in Government Communication
10. Kristian Tangsgaard Hvelplund
 Allocation of cognitive resources in 
translation - an eye-tracking and key-
logging study
11. Moshe Yonatany
 The Internationalization Process of 
Digital Service Providers
12. Anne Vestergaard
 Distance and Suffering
 Humanitarian Discourse in the age of 
Mediatization
13. Thorsten Mikkelsen
 Personligsheds indﬂydelse på forret-
ningsrelationer
14. Jane Thostrup Jagd
 Hvorfor fortsætter fusionsbølgen ud-
over ”the tipping point”?
 – en empirisk analyse af information 
og kognitioner om fusioner
15. Gregory Gimpel
 Value-driven Adoption and Consump-
tion of Technology: Understanding 
Technology Decision Making
16. Thomas Stengade Sønderskov
 Den nye mulighed
 Social innovation i en forretningsmæs-
sig kontekst
17.  Jeppe Christoffersen
 Donor supported strategic alliances in 
developing countries
18. Vibeke Vad Baunsgaard
 Dominant Ideological Modes of  
Rationality: Cross functional 
 integration in the process of product
 innovation
19.  Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson
 Governance Failure and Icelands’s
 Financial Collapse
20.  Allan Sall Tang Andersen
 Essays on the modeling of risks in
 interest-rate and inflation markets
21.  Heidi Tscherning
 Mobile Devices in Social Contexts
22.  Birgitte Gorm Hansen
 Adapting in the Knowledge Economy
  Lateral Strategies for Scientists and 
Those Who Study Them
23.  Kristina Vaarst Andersen
 Optimal Levels of Embeddedness
  The Contingent Value of Networked 
Collaboration
24.  Justine Grønbæk Pors
 Noisy Management
  A History of Danish School Governing 
from 1970-2010
25.  Stefan Linder
  Micro-foundations of Strategic  
Entrepreneurship
  Essays on Autonomous Strategic Action
26.  Xin Li
  Toward an Integrative Framework of 
National Competitiveness
 An application to China
27.  Rune Thorbjørn Clausen
 Værdifuld arkitektur 
  Et eksplorativt studie af bygningers 
rolle i virksomheders værdiskabelse
28.  Monica Viken
  Markedsundersøkelser som bevis i 
varemerke- og markedsføringsrett
29.  Christian Wymann
  Tattooing 
  The Economic and Artistic Constitution 
of a Social Phenomenon
30.  Sanne Frandsen
 Productive Incoherence 
  A Case Study of Branding and  
Identity Struggles in a Low-Prestige 
Organization
31.  Mads Stenbo Nielsen
 Essays on Correlation Modelling
32.  Ivan Häuser
 Følelse og sprog
  Etablering af en ekspressiv kategori, 
eksemplificeret på russisk
33.  Sebastian Schwenen
 Security of Supply in Electricity Markets
2012
1.  Peter Holm Andreasen
  The Dynamics of Procurement  
Management
 - A Complexity Approach
2.  Martin Haulrich
  Data-Driven Bitext Dependency 
 Parsing and Alignment
3.  Line Kirkegaard
  Konsulenten i den anden nat 
  En undersøgelse af det intense  
arbejdsliv
4.  Tonny Stenheim
  Decision usefulness of goodwill  
under IFRS
5.  Morten Lind Larsen
  Produktivitet, vækst og velfærd
  Industrirådet og efterkrigstidens  
Danmark 1945 - 1958
6.  Petter Berg
  Cartel Damages and Cost Asymmetries 
7.  Lynn Kahle
 Experiential Discourse in Marketing 
  A methodical inquiry into practice  
and theory
8.  Anne Roelsgaard Obling
  Management of Emotions  
in Accelerated Medical Relationships
9.  Thomas Frandsen
  Managing Modularity of  
Service Processes Architecture
10.  Carina Christine Skovmøller
  CSR som noget særligt
  Et casestudie om styring og menings-
skabelse i relation til CSR ud fra en 
intern optik
11.  Michael Tell
  Fradragsbeskæring af selskabers  
finansieringsudgifter
  En skatteretlig analyse af SEL §§ 11, 
11B og 11C
12.  Morten Holm
  Customer Profitability Measurement 
Models
  Their Merits and Sophistication  
across Contexts
13.  Katja Joo Dyppel
  Beskatning af derivater 
 En analyse af dansk skatteret
14.  Esben Anton Schultz
  Essays in Labor Economics 
 Evidence from Danish Micro Data
15.  Carina Risvig Hansen
  ”Contracts not covered, or not fully 
covered, by the Public Sector Directive”
16.  Anja Svejgaard Pors
 Iværksættelse af kommunikation
  - patientfigurer i hospitalets strategiske 
kommunikation
17.  Frans Bévort
  Making sense of management with 
logics
  An ethnographic study of accountants 
who become managers
18.  René Kallestrup
  The Dynamics of Bank and Sovereign 
Credit Risk
19.  Brett Crawford
  Revisiting the Phenomenon of Interests 
in Organizational Institutionalism
  The Case of U.S. Chambers of  
Commerce
20.  Mario Daniele Amore
  Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance
21.  Arne Stjernholm Madsen
  The evolution of innovation strategy 
  Studied in the context of medical 
device activities at the pharmaceutical 
company Novo Nordisk A/S in the 
period 1980-2008
22.  Jacob Holm Hansen
  Is Social Integration Necessary for  
Corporate Branding?
  A study of corporate branding  
strategies at Novo Nordisk
23.  Stuart Webber
  Corporate Profit Shifting and the  
Multinational Enterprise
24.  Helene Ratner
  Promises of Reflexivity
  Managing and Researching  
Inclusive Schools
25.  Therese Strand
  The Owners and the Power: Insights 
from Annual General Meetings
26.  Robert Gavin Strand
  In Praise of Corporate Social  
Responsibility Bureaucracy
27.  Nina Sormunen
 Auditor’s going-concern reporting
  Reporting decision and content of the 
report
28.  John Bang Mathiasen
  Learning within a product development 
working practice:
  - an understanding anchored  
in pragmatism
29.  Philip Holst Riis
  Understanding Role-Oriented Enterprise 
Systems: From Vendors to Customers
30.  Marie Lisa Dacanay
 Social Enterprises and the Poor 
  Enhancing Social Entrepreneurship and 
Stakeholder Theory
31.  Fumiko Kano Glückstad
  Bridging Remote Cultures: Cross-lingual 
concept mapping based on the  
information receiver’s prior-knowledge
32.  Henrik Barslund Fosse
  Empirical Essays in International Trade
33.  Peter Alexander Albrecht
  Foundational hybridity and its  
reproduction 
 Security sector reform in Sierra Leone
34.  Maja Rosenstock
 CSR  - hvor svært kan det være? 
  Kulturanalytisk casestudie om  
udfordringer og dilemmaer med at 
forankre Coops CSR-strategi
35.  Jeanette Rasmussen
 Tweens, medier og forbrug
  Et studie af 10-12 årige danske børns 
brug af internettet, opfattelse og for-
ståelse af markedsføring og forbrug
36.  Ib Tunby Gulbrandsen
  ‘This page is not intended for a  
US Audience’
  A five-act spectacle on online  
communication, collaboration  
& organization.
37.  Kasper Aalling Teilmann
  Interactive Approaches to  
Rural Development
38.  Mette Mogensen
  The Organization(s) of Well-being  
and Productivity
  (Re)assembling work in the Danish Post
39.  Søren Friis Møller
  From Disinterestedness to Engagement 
  Towards Relational Leadership In the 
Cultural Sector
40.  Nico Peter Berhausen
  Management Control, Innovation and 
Strategic Objectives – Interactions and 
Convergence in Product Development 
Networks
41.  Balder Onarheim
 Creativity under Constraints
  Creativity as Balancing  
‘Constrainedness’
42.  Haoyong Zhou
 Essays on Family Firms
43.  Elisabeth Naima Mikkelsen
 Making sense of organisational conflict
  An empirical study of enacted sense-
making in everyday conflict at work
2013
1.  Jacob Lyngsie
  Entrepreneurship in an Organizational 
Context
2.  Signe Groth-Brodersen
 Fra ledelse til selvet
  En socialpsykologisk analyse af  
forholdet imellem selvledelse, ledelse 
og stress i det moderne arbejdsliv
3.  Nis Høyrup Christensen
  Shaping Markets: A Neoinstitutional 
Analysis of the Emerging  
Organizational Field of Renewable 
Energy in China
4.  Christian Edelvold Berg
 As a matter of size 
  THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL  
MASS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SCARCITY FOR TELEVISION MARKETS 
5.  Christine D. Isakson
  Coworker Influence and Labor Mobility  
Essays on Turnover, Entrepreneurship 
and Location Choice in the Danish 
Maritime Industry
6.  Niels Joseph Jerne Lennon
  Accounting Qualities in Practice  
Rhizomatic stories of representational 
faithfulness, decision making and  
control
7.  Shannon O’Donnell
 Making Ensemble Possible
  How special groups organize for  
collaborative creativity in conditions  
of spatial variability and distance
8.  Robert W. D. Veitch
  Access Decisions in a  
Partly-Digital World 
Comparing Digital Piracy and Legal 
Modes for Film and Music
9.  Marie Mathiesen
 Making Strategy Work 
 An Organizational Ethnography
10.  Arisa Shollo
 The role of business intelligence in   
 organizational decision-making 
11.  Mia Kaspersen
  The construction of social and  
environmental reporting
12. Marcus Møller Larsen
 The organizational design of offshoring
13. Mette Ohm Rørdam
 EU Law on Food Naming
 The prohibition against misleading   
 names in an internal market context
14. Hans Peter Rasmussen 
 GIV EN GED!
 Kan giver-idealtyper forklare støtte 
 til velgørenhed og understøtte 
 relationsopbygning?
15. Ruben Schachtenhaufen 
 Fonetisk reduktion i dansk
16. Peter Koerver Schmidt
 Dansk CFC-beskatning
  I et internationalt og komparativt  
perspektiv
17. Morten Froholdt
 Strategi i den offentlige sektor 
 En kortlægning af styringsmæssig   
 kontekst, strategisk tilgang, samt 
 anvendte redskaber og teknologier for  
 udvalgte danske statslige styrelser
18. Annette Camilla Sjørup
 Cognitive effort in metaphor translation
 An eye-tracking and key-logging study
19. Tamara Stucchi
  The Internationalization  
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 A Context-Specific Study
20. Thomas Lopdrup-Hjorth
 “Let’s Go Outside”:
 The Value of Co-Creation
21. Ana Alačovska
 Genre and Autonomy in Cultural 
 Production
 The case of travel guidebook 
 production
22. Marius Gudmand-Høyer
  Stemningssindssygdommenes historie  
i det 19. århundrede
  Omtydningen af melankolien og 
manien som bipolære stemningslidelser 
i dansk sammenhæng under hensyn til 
dannelsen af det moderne følelseslivs 
relative autonomi. 
  En problematiserings- og erfarings-
analytisk undersøgelse
23. Lichen Alex Yu
 Fabricating an S&OP Process
  Circulating References and Matters  
of Concern
24. Esben Alfort
 The Expression of a Need
 Understanding search
25. Trine Pallesen
 Assembling Markets for Wind Power  
 An Inquiry into the Making of 
 Market Devices
TITLER I ATV PH.D.-SERIEN
1992
1.  Niels Kornum
  Servicesamkørsel – organisation, øko-
nomi og planlægningsmetode
1995
2.  Verner Worm
 Nordiske virksomheder i Kina
 Kulturspecifikke interaktionsrelationer
 ved nordiske virksomhedsetableringer i
 Kina
1999
3.  Mogens Bjerre
 Key Account Management of Complex
 Strategic Relationships
 An Empirical Study of the Fast Moving
 Consumer Goods Industry
2000
4.  Lotte Darsø
 Innovation in the Making
  Interaction Research with heteroge-
neous Groups of Knowledge Workers
 creating new Knowledge and new
 Leads
2001
5.  Peter Hobolt Jensen
 Managing Strategic Design Identities
  The case of the Lego Developer Net-
work
2002
6.  Peter Lohmann
 The Deleuzian Other of Organizational
 Change – Moving Perspectives of the
 Human
7.  Anne Marie Jess Hansen
 To lead from a distance: The dynamic
  interplay between strategy and strate-
gizing – A case study of the strategic
 management process
2003
8.  Lotte Henriksen
 Videndeling
  – om organisatoriske og ledelsesmæs-
sige udfordringer ved videndeling i
 praksis
9.  Niels Christian Nickelsen
  Arrangements of Knowing: Coordi-
nating Procedures Tools and Bodies in
 Industrial Production – a case study of
 the collective making of new products
2005
10.  Carsten Ørts Hansen
  Konstruktion af ledelsesteknologier og
 effektivitet
TITLER I DBA PH.D.-SERIEN
2007
1.  Peter Kastrup-Misir
 Endeavoring to Understand Market
 Orientation – and the concomitant
 co-mutation of the researched, the
 re searcher, the research itself and the
 truth
2009
1.  Torkild Leo Thellefsen
  Fundamental Signs and Significance 
effects
 A Semeiotic outline of Fundamental
 Signs, Significance-effects, Knowledge
 Profiling and their use in Knowledge
 Organization and Branding
2.  Daniel Ronzani
 When Bits Learn to Walk Don’t Make
 Them Trip. Technological Innovation
 and the Role of Regulation by Law
 in Information Systems Research: the
 Case of Radio Frequency Identification
 (RFID)
2010
1.  Alexander Carnera
 Magten over livet og livet som magt
 Studier i den biopolitiske ambivalens
